Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, nuclear power plant owners and operators, sought review of a November 2010 determination by the Secretary of Energy finding that there was no basis for suspending, or otherwise adjusting, annual fees collected from them totaling some $750 million a year. The court concluded that the Secretary had failed to perform a valid evaluation, as he was obliged to do under the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., but the court did not think it appropriate to order the suspension of the fee at this time. Instead, the court remanded to the Secretary with directions to comply with the statute within six months. View "Nat'l Assoc. of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. Dept. of Energy" on Justia Law

Mobil petitioned for review of the Commission's denial of Mobil's application for permission to charge market-based rates on Pegasus, in light of the competitiveness of the Western Canadian crude oil market and Pegasus's minor role in it. The court concluded that the Commission's decision was unreasonable in light of the record evidence where the record showed that producers and shippers of Western Canadian crude oil have numerous competitive alternatives to Pegasus for transporting and selling their crude oil; Pegasus did not possess market power; and therefore, the court granted Mobil's petition for review, vacated FERC's order, and remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. View "Mobil Pipe Line Co. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Occidental and a number of its subsidiaries petitioned for review of final orders of the FERC granting negotiated rate authority to Tres Amigas, a proposed energy transmission project. Occidental argued that Tres Amigas did not satisfy the criteria the FERC had set out as preconditions for such authority. Because the court concluded that Occidental lacked standing to challenge these orders, the court did not reach this question and instead dismissed the petition. View "Occidental Permian Ltd. v. FERC" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over operation of an Exxon gas station located next to the Watergate in Washington, D.C. Metroil sued Exxon and Anacostia, claiming three violations of federal and D.C. law relating to the sale of the station by Exxon to Anacostia. The court concluded that the Retail Service Station Amendment Act of 2009, D.C. Code 36-304.12(a), did not take effect until after Exxon's sale to Anacostia and the law therefore did not give Metroil a right of first refusal in this case. Because it was undisputed that Metroil still operates the gas station, buys and sells Exxon fuel, and uses the Exxon trademark, the franchise relationship has continued. Therefore, Metroil's Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 2802, claim was properly dismissed. All of the burdens and risks alleged by Metroil were permitted by the original contract and were not attributable to the assignment. Therefore, the court rejected Metroil's claims that Exxon violated the D.C. Code's prohibition against contract assignments that materially increased the burden or risk on the non-assigning party. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Metroil, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Noble Energy and other lessees sued in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging that application of the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1451-1464, suspension requests constituted a material breach of their lease agreements to drill for, develop, and produce oil and natural gas on submerged lands off the coast of California. The Court of Federal Claims agreed; on appeal the Federal Circuit affirmed. One year after the Federal Circuit's decision in the breach-of-contract litigation, the Minerals Management Service (MMS), sent a letter to Noble ordering it to plug and abandon Well 320-2 permanently. The district court ruled that the common law doctrine of discharge did not relieve Noble of the regulatory obligation to plug its well permanently, an obligation that the lease did not itself create. Resolution of the dispute depended on what the plugging regulations meant. The court held that it was up to MMS's successor to interpret its regulation in the first instance and to determine whether they apply in situations like Noble's. If they do, the agency must explain why. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and sent the case back to the district court with instructions to vacate Interior's order and to remand to the Secretary for further proceedings. View "Noble Energy, Inc. v. Salazar, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition with the court, purporting to challenge the NRC's decision to reinstate the Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) construction permits for the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant. Petitioner stated that it was not challenging the NRC order, but rather, petitioner asserted that its petitions for review challenged only a compilation of "Response Sheets" filed by individual Commissioners in December 2008 and January 2009. Petitioner contended that this compilation of Commissioners' views resulted in a final order on January 27, 2009. Under the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. 2342(4), the court had jurisdiction to review only "final orders" of the NRC. The court held that the petitions at issue did not seek review of final NRC orders and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed. View "Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League v. NRC, et al." on Justia Law

El Paso operated an interstate pipeline that transported natural gas to California and other western states, and Freeport shipped gas on El Paso's pipeline to power its various mining, smelting, and refining facilities. El Paso and Freeport separately challenged several orders of the Commission issued in connection with El Paso's 2005 rate filing and subsequent settlement. The court denied the petition for review and held that the Commission's reasoning was sound when it found that the CAP Orders had neither changed the bargain underlying the 1996 Settlement nor abrogated Article 11.2 of the Settlement. The court also held that the Commission reasonably determined the converted FR contracts were "amended" within the meaning of that term in Article 11.2; Article 11.2 applied to turnback capacity; the applicable rate cap for turnback capacity was determined by the shipper's delivery point; Article 11.2 did not apply to capacity created by the Line 2000 project; and where the Commission adopted the presumption that the capacity of El Paso's system on December 31, 1995 was 4000 MMcf/d. The court further found that the Commission's approval of the Settlement appropriate under the so-called Trailblazer Pipeline Co. approach. Accordingly, the Commission's orders were not arbitrary or capricious and the petitions for review were denied. View "Freeport-McMoran Corp. v. FERC" on Justia Law

The petition for review before the court arose from a dispute between the IURC and PJM, which, subject to the Commission's oversight, operated the market for wholesale electricity in the District of Columbia and all or parts of 13 states, including Indiana. The IURC petitioned for review of an order of the Commission approving the tariff of PJM. The court dismissed the petition insofar as it challenged the order on grounds that the IURC did not raise with sufficient specificity in its request for rehearing by the Commission pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 825l(b). In all other respects, the court denied the petition because the IURC had not shown the Commission acted unreasonably. View "Indiana Utility Regulatory Comm. v. FERC" on Justia Law

This case arose when Southern Power terminated its service agreement with Georgia Power, represented by Local 84, and Alabama Power, represented by Local 801-1, taking over four electricity generating plants' operations. Local 84 and Local 801-1 requested recognition, contending that Southern Power qualified as a successor employer to Georgia Power and Alabama Power. After a hearing, an ALJ found that Southern Power violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., ordering it to recognize and bargain with the unions. The ALJ also found that the three-plant bargaining unit represented by Local 84 was inappropriate. On March 20, 2009, the Board, acting with only two sitting members, issued an order affirming the ALJ's findings but found, however, that the Georgia Power three-plant bargaining unit was proper given the unit's bargaining history. Southern Power petitioned for review and the court remanded in light of New Process Steel, which required at least three members to exercise the Board's authority. On November 30, 2010, a three-member panel of the Board affirmed the ALJ's decision and adopted the recommended Order. Southern Power subsequently petitioned for review of the Board's November 30 Order. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider two of Southern Power's arguments, another was time-barred, and two others failed on the merits. Accordingly, the court denied the petition and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Southern Power Co. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

PSEG challenged orders of the FERC accepting the results of an auction for electric generation capacity conducted by ISO New England. In those orders, FERC approved ISO New England's determination that PSEG's resources in Connecticut could not reduce their capacity supply obligation because doing so would endanger the system's reliability. FERC also held that ISO New England could reduce the per unit price paid to PSEG for that capacity. The court held that because the latter holding was based on tariff provisions that the FERC thought were clear but now conceded were ambiguous, and because in the course of construing those provisions it failed to respond to PSEG's facially legitimate objections, the petition was granted and the orders were remanded for further consideration. View "PSEG Energy Resources & Trade, et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law