Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the EPA promulgated a final rule adopting a new, one-hour primary national ambient air quality standard (NAAQS) for nitrogen dioxide (NO2). The American Petroleum Institute, the Utility Air Regulatory Group, and the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (collectively the API) petitioned for review of that rule, claiming the EPA, in adopting the NAAQS, was arbitrary and capricious and violated the Clean Air Act. The API also challenged a statement in the preamble to the final rule regarding the EPA's intended implementation of the NAAQS. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals (1) denied the petitions insofar as they challenged the EPA's adoption of the NAAQS, holding that the EPA's adoption of the NAAQS for NO2 was neither arbitrary or capricious nor in violation of the Clean Air Act; and (2) dismissed the portions of the petitions challenging the EPA's non-final statement regarding permitting in the preamble to the Final Rule, holding that it did not have jurisdiction to consider those portions of the petitions. View "Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Vermont Department of Public Service and the New England Coalition petitioned for review of a decision of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issuing to Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. a renewed license to operate the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. Petitioners contended the license renewal was unlawful because Entergy failed to furnish a state water quality certification, which they asserted was required under the Clean Water Act. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petitions for review, concluding that Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before the NRC and thereby waived the right to raise their water quality certification objection on judicial review. View "Vt. Dep't of Pub. Servs. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n" on Justia Law

RSM Production Corporation brought a complaint against a law firm and two of its partners ("Freshfields"), alleging that Freshfields, through its representation of the nation of Grenada in international arbitration, conspired to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in an effort to prevent RSM from obtaining an exclusive license for offshore oil and gas exploration and development in Grenada. The district court ruled that RSM's lawsuit was barred under the doctrine of res judicata because of its prior lawsuit in the Southern District of New York regarding the same licensing effort. On appeal, RSM contended that Freshfields was not in privity with the New York defendants and that RSM was not required to add Freshfields as a party to that litigation on pain of res judicata. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the alternative ground that RSM's complaint failed to state a claim of RICO conspiracy against Freshfields. View "RSM Prod. Corp. v. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer U.S. LLP" on Justia Law

Petitioners petitioned the court for review of the Commission's rulemaking regarding temporary storage of permanent disposal of nuclear waste. The court held that the rulemaking issue constituted a major federal action necessitating either an environmental impact statement or a finding of no significant environmental impact. The court further held that the Commission's evaluation of the risks of spent nuclear fuel was deficient in two specified ways. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review, vacated the Commission's orders, and remanded for further proceedings. View "State of New York v. NRC" on Justia Law

API petitioned for review of a 2008 EPA regulation deregulating many "hazardous secondary materials" under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901-6992k. After the parties completed briefing, the EPA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that, if made final, would significantly amend the EPA's 2008 decision. As a result, the court deemed this controversy unripe as a prudential matter and ordered the case held in abeyance, subject to regular reports on the status of the proposed rulemaking. View "American Petroleum Institute v. EPA" on Justia Law

Petitioners, nuclear power plant owners and operators, sought review of a November 2010 determination by the Secretary of Energy finding that there was no basis for suspending, or otherwise adjusting, annual fees collected from them totaling some $750 million a year. The court concluded that the Secretary had failed to perform a valid evaluation, as he was obliged to do under the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq., but the court did not think it appropriate to order the suspension of the fee at this time. Instead, the court remanded to the Secretary with directions to comply with the statute within six months. View "Nat'l Assoc. of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. Dept. of Energy" on Justia Law

Mobil petitioned for review of the Commission's denial of Mobil's application for permission to charge market-based rates on Pegasus, in light of the competitiveness of the Western Canadian crude oil market and Pegasus's minor role in it. The court concluded that the Commission's decision was unreasonable in light of the record evidence where the record showed that producers and shippers of Western Canadian crude oil have numerous competitive alternatives to Pegasus for transporting and selling their crude oil; Pegasus did not possess market power; and therefore, the court granted Mobil's petition for review, vacated FERC's order, and remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. View "Mobil Pipe Line Co. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Occidental and a number of its subsidiaries petitioned for review of final orders of the FERC granting negotiated rate authority to Tres Amigas, a proposed energy transmission project. Occidental argued that Tres Amigas did not satisfy the criteria the FERC had set out as preconditions for such authority. Because the court concluded that Occidental lacked standing to challenge these orders, the court did not reach this question and instead dismissed the petition. View "Occidental Permian Ltd. v. FERC" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over operation of an Exxon gas station located next to the Watergate in Washington, D.C. Metroil sued Exxon and Anacostia, claiming three violations of federal and D.C. law relating to the sale of the station by Exxon to Anacostia. The court concluded that the Retail Service Station Amendment Act of 2009, D.C. Code 36-304.12(a), did not take effect until after Exxon's sale to Anacostia and the law therefore did not give Metroil a right of first refusal in this case. Because it was undisputed that Metroil still operates the gas station, buys and sells Exxon fuel, and uses the Exxon trademark, the franchise relationship has continued. Therefore, Metroil's Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 2802, claim was properly dismissed. All of the burdens and risks alleged by Metroil were permitted by the original contract and were not attributable to the assignment. Therefore, the court rejected Metroil's claims that Exxon violated the D.C. Code's prohibition against contract assignments that materially increased the burden or risk on the non-assigning party. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Metroil, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp., et al." on Justia Law

Noble Energy and other lessees sued in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging that application of the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1451-1464, suspension requests constituted a material breach of their lease agreements to drill for, develop, and produce oil and natural gas on submerged lands off the coast of California. The Court of Federal Claims agreed; on appeal the Federal Circuit affirmed. One year after the Federal Circuit's decision in the breach-of-contract litigation, the Minerals Management Service (MMS), sent a letter to Noble ordering it to plug and abandon Well 320-2 permanently. The district court ruled that the common law doctrine of discharge did not relieve Noble of the regulatory obligation to plug its well permanently, an obligation that the lease did not itself create. Resolution of the dispute depended on what the plugging regulations meant. The court held that it was up to MMS's successor to interpret its regulation in the first instance and to determine whether they apply in situations like Noble's. If they do, the agency must explain why. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and sent the case back to the district court with instructions to vacate Interior's order and to remand to the Secretary for further proceedings. View "Noble Energy, Inc. v. Salazar, et al." on Justia Law