Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Environmental Law
Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA
Several oil refineries with average daily crude oil throughput below 75,000 barrels in 2024 applied to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2025 for exemptions from their obligations under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program for the 2024 compliance year. The RFS program, established under the Clean Air Act, requires refineries to blend renewable fuels into transportation fuels. The Act provides for a “small refinery” exemption for facilities that do not exceed the 75,000-barrel threshold in a calendar year. The petitioning refineries did not seek exemptions for 2023 and based their applications solely on their 2024 throughput.After the refineries submitted their applications, the EPA informed them that, under its 2014 regulation, eligibility required a refinery to meet the “small refinery” definition both for "the most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension" and for "the year or years for which an exemption is sought." The EPA interpreted this to mean petitioners needed to satisfy the throughput limit in both 2023 and 2024. Since the refineries exceeded the threshold in 2023, the EPA denied the exemption requests. The refineries then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The D.C. Circuit held that the EPA’s interpretation of its 2014 regulation was contrary to the regulation’s plain text. The court found that, because the applications were filed in 2025 for the 2024 compliance year, both the “most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension” and “the year for which an exemption is sought” referred to 2024. Since the petitioners met the threshold in 2024, they were eligible under the regulation. The court vacated the EPA’s denial orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law
Center for Biological Diversity v. Zeldin
Florida sought approval from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to assume authority for issuing permits under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, which would allow parties to discharge pollutants into state waters. To streamline the process for permit applicants and reduce the burden of complying with the Endangered Species Act (ESA), Florida proposed a permitting program in which the state would monitor and protect ESA-listed species primarily through a “technical assistance process,” with only advisory input from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). The EPA and FWS approved Florida’s proposal after the FWS issued a programmatic Biological Opinion (BiOp) and Incidental Take Statement (ITS) that found no jeopardy to protected species and exempted permittees from further ESA liability, relying heavily on Florida’s assurances rather than detailed, up-front analysis.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the actions of the EPA and FWS after environmental groups challenged Florida’s permitting program, asserting violations of the ESA and Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court found that the FWS’s BiOp and ITS were unlawful because they failed to conduct the required analyses and deferred essential protections to a less rigorous state-run process. The court also determined the EPA’s reliance on these documents was impermissible and that the EPA had wrongly failed to consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). As a remedy, the district court vacated the EPA’s approval of Florida’s permitting program along with the BiOp and ITS.On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the environmental groups had standing and their claims were ripe. It concluded that the FWS’s BiOp and ITS did not comply with the ESA, that the EPA’s reliance on those documents was unlawful, and that the EPA erred by not consulting with the NMFS. The court required vacatur of the EPA’s approval of Florida’s permitting program and the associated ESA documents. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Zeldin" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
Clean Fuels Alliance America v. EPA
The case concerns a challenge brought by two renewable fuel industry groups to a 2020 rule issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program. The challenged rule established the percentage of renewable fuel that refiners and importers must include in their annual fuel output. The groups objected to EPA’s refusal to adjust the 2020 standard to account for renewable fuel shortfalls resulting from past retroactive small refinery exemptions. While the case was pending, EPA issued a new rule in 2022 that recalculated the 2020 standards and reaffirmed its approach of not making up for past exemptions. In addition, Congress altered the statutory framework, granting EPA broader discretion in setting future renewable fuel volumes.Following the issuance of the 2022 rule, most petitioners dismissed their challenges, and the two remaining groups shifted their focus, no longer seeking to set aside the 2020 rule but instead seeking a ruling that would require EPA to change its policy in future rulemakings. They did not challenge the 2022 rule, nor did they request its invalidation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the case was moot. The court reasoned that the 2022 rule superseded the 2020 rule, eliminating any live controversy over that agency action. The court further explained that the legal landscape had changed due to statutory amendments, so the original dispute no longer presented the same question. Because petitioners were not seeking to overturn any concrete, current agency action, their challenge amounted to a request for an impermissible advisory opinion. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions as moot. View "Clean Fuels Alliance America v. EPA" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
Friends of Animals v. United States Bureau of Land Management
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued four ten-year plans authorizing the gathering and removal of wild horses from public lands in specific areas to achieve and maintain population levels within approved management ranges. Friends of Animals challenged these plans, arguing that they allowed indefinite removals without specific findings of overpopulation, failed to rely on current information, and did not include proper consultation, contrary to requirements under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act. The BLM responded that the Act permitted multiple removal operations over a period of years within a single plan.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case. The court held that the ten-year plans were unlawful to the extent they permitted additional gathers after achieving the approved management levels, and vacated those portions of the plans. The court also held that future removal operations must be based on current information and proper consultation, and must be conducted promptly, as required by the Act. The court remanded the matter to BLM to revise the plans and clarify which future gathers would require further process before proceeding. Notably, the court did not resolve the parties’ principal disputes, leaving them to be addressed on remand.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the appeal brought by Friends of Animals. The appellate court determined that the District Court’s remand order was not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it left the core dispute unresolved for further proceedings. As a result, the appellate court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the case and dismissed the appeal. The disposition was a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Friends of Animals v. United States Bureau of Land Management" on Justia Law
Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
The case concerns the approval of a 32-mile natural gas pipeline intended to supply fuel to a new natural-gas turbine that will replace one of two coal-fired units at the Cumberland Fossil Plant in Tennessee. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federal agency, decided to retire the coal units and replace one with a gas turbine, which is expected to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved the pipeline after preparing a detailed environmental impact statement. The Sierra Club and Appalachian Voices challenged this approval, arguing that FERC’s decision violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act.Previously, FERC issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the pipeline, finding that market need was established by TVA’s long-term agreement to purchase all pipeline capacity and that the project’s benefits outweighed its harms. FERC also credited the pipeline with enabling a net reduction in emissions due to the coal-to-gas transition. After the Sierra Club requested rehearing, FERC clarified that only one coal unit would be replaced but maintained its approval. The Sierra Club then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the petitions. The court held that FERC’s approval complied with NEPA and the Natural Gas Act. It found that FERC reasonably analyzed downstream emissions, properly considered the no-action alternative, and was not required to analyze the pipeline and power plant as connected actions because FERC lacked regulatory authority over power generation. The court also held that FERC’s reliance on TVA’s precedent agreement established market need and that FERC’s public interest balancing was reasonable. The court emphasized that, following recent Supreme Court precedent, judicial review of NEPA compliance is highly deferential. View "Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law
SSM Litigation Group v. EPA
A coalition of trade associations, whose members operate stationary sources of air pollution and hold Title V permits under the Clean Air Act, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 2023 rescission of a longstanding affirmative defense. This defense had protected permit holders from liability for exceeding emission limits during emergency events, provided certain conditions were met. The EPA rescinded the defense, arguing it was unlawful because it encroached on the judiciary’s authority to impose civil penalties and rendered emission standards non-continuous, allegedly violating the Clean Air Act.The SSM Litigation Group petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The EPA and environmental intervenors contested the group’s standing, but the court found that SSM had associational standing, as its members were directly regulated and injured by the rescission. SSM’s standing was supported by the administrative record and further confirmed by declarations submitted in its reply brief, which the court accepted.On the merits, the D.C. Circuit reviewed EPA’s action under the Clean Air Act’s standard, which mirrors the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious review. The court held that EPA’s rescission was based entirely on erroneous legal grounds. First, the court found that the affirmative defense was a complete defense to liability, not a limitation on judicial remedies, and thus did not encroach on the judiciary’s authority. Second, the court determined that the defense did not render emission limitations non-continuous, as it did not suspend the underlying standards. The court concluded that EPA’s rescission was not reasonably explained and not in accordance with law, granted the petition, and reversed the rescission. View "SSM Litigation Group v. EPA" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Environmental Law
Healthy Gulf v. Department of the Interior
The case concerns a challenge to the United States Department of the Interior’s approval of the 2024–2029 National Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program, which authorizes up to three lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico region. Environmental organizations argued that the Department failed to adequately assess the risks to vulnerable coastal communities, did not properly consider the endangered Rice’s whale in its environmental sensitivity analysis, overlooked potential conflicts with other ocean uses, and did not sufficiently balance the program’s projected benefits against its environmental costs. The Department, in coordination with the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, had developed the program through a multi-year process involving public comment and environmental review.After the Department finalized the program, the environmental groups and the American Petroleum Institute (API) each petitioned for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. API later withdrew its petition but remained as an intervenor. The environmental petitioners sought to have the program remanded for further consideration, arguing violations of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). The Department and API contested the petitioners’ standing and the merits of their claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the environmental petitioners had associational standing to pursue their claims. On the merits, the court found that the Department of the Interior had satisfied OCSLA’s requirements by reasonably evaluating environmental justice concerns, the selection of representative species for environmental sensitivity analysis, and potential conflicts with other uses of the Gulf. The court concluded that the Department’s decision-making process was reasoned and not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review, leaving the 2024–2029 leasing program in effect. View "Healthy Gulf v. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law
New Mexico Cattle Growers’ Association v. FWS
The case centers on the southwestern willow flycatcher, a bird listed as an endangered subspecies by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service since 1995. The New Mexico Cattle Growers’ Association petitioned the Service to remove the bird from the endangered species list, arguing that it is not a valid subspecies and thus does not qualify for protection under the Endangered Species Act. Their petition relied heavily on a 2015 scientific article by Robert Zink, which critiqued previous studies supporting the subspecies classification. The Service conducted a thorough review, including public comment and expert consultation, and ultimately reaffirmed the subspecies designation, finding that the best available scientific evidence supported its continued listing.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the Service’s decision after the Cattle Growers filed suit, claiming the agency’s determination was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Service and its intervenors, the Center for Biological Diversity and the Maricopa Audubon Society, finding that the Service had reasonably explained its reliance on scientific studies and its application of the non-clinal geographic variation standard to determine subspecies validity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the Service’s decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious, as it was based on a reasonable and well-explained evaluation of scientific evidence. The court rejected the Cattle Growers’ arguments regarding the indeterminacy of the non-clinal geographic variation standard and found no merit in claims of constitutional or procedural deficiencies. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "New Mexico Cattle Growers' Association v. FWS" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law
Sierra Club v. FERC
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved a 1,000-foot natural-gas pipeline crossing the U.S.-Mexico border. The Sierra Club and Public Citizen challenged this approval, arguing that FERC should have exercised jurisdiction over a longer 157-mile pipeline extending into Texas, considered the environmental impact of the entire pipeline, and evaluated alternatives to the border-crossing segment. They also claimed that FERC's approval of the border-crossing pipeline was arbitrary and capricious.The lower court, FERC, concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the 157-mile Connector Pipeline because it did not cross state lines or carry interstate gas upon entering service. FERC conducted an Environmental Assessment for the 1,000-foot Border Facility, found minimal environmental impact, and deemed it in the public interest. After FERC reaffirmed its conclusions on rehearing, the petitioners sought judicial review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC reasonably declined to exercise jurisdiction over the Connector Pipeline under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, respecting state regulatory authority. The court also found substantial evidence supporting FERC's conclusion that the Connector Pipeline would not transport interstate gas initially, thus not subjecting it to Section 7 jurisdiction. The court rejected the petitioners' claims that FERC's approval of the Border Facility was arbitrary and capricious, noting the presumption favoring authorization under the Natural Gas Act.Regarding the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the court found that FERC reasonably defined the project's purpose and need, appropriately limited its environmental review to the Border Facility, and did not need to consider the upstream Connector Pipeline's impacts. The court denied the petition, affirming FERC's decisions. View "Sierra Club v. FERC" on Justia Law
Center for Biological Diversity v. FWS
The American Burying Beetle, the largest carrion beetle in North America, was listed as an endangered species by the Fish and Wildlife Service in 1989. In 2015, the Service began reevaluating the Beetle's status, prompted by a petition from private entities. The Service's Species Status Assessment Report revealed that the Beetle's current range is larger than initially thought, with several large, resilient populations across the United States. The Service concluded that the Beetle faces a relatively low near-term risk of extinction but is likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future due to future land-use changes and climate change. Consequently, in 2020, the Service downlisted the Beetle from "endangered" to "threatened" and established a Section 4(d) Rule for its conservation.The Center for Biological Diversity challenged the downlisting and the sufficiency of the protections for the Beetle as a threatened species. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for the Service, concluding that the Downlisting Rule did not violate the Endangered Species Act, was supported by the administrative record, and was reasonably explained. The court also found that the Center failed to establish standing for its challenges to the Section 4(d) Rule.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the Service's conclusion that the Beetle was not endangered at the time of the decision in 2020 was reasonable and consistent with the record evidence. The court also found that the Center lacked standing to challenge the Section 4(d) Rule on appeal. The Service's decision to downlist the Beetle to threatened status was based on the best available scientific and commercial data, and the Service's predictions about the Beetle's future viability were adequately explained and supported by the record. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. FWS" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law