Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Corps issued Mingo Logan a permit to excavate the tops of several West Virginia mountains, then the EPA withdrew approval from two of the disposal sites, and Mingo Logan challenged the EPA's statutory authority to withdraw the two sites from the Corps permit after it had been issued but the court determined that the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C 1251, authorized the EPA to do so. The court remanded for the district court to consider Mingo Logan's remaining challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706. This appeal concerns the district court's resolution of the APA claims. The court concluded that the EPA did not violate the APA in withdrawing specification of certain disposal areas from the permit; rather, it considered the relevant factors and adequately explained its decision. The EPA’s ex post withdrawal is a product of its broad veto authority under the CWA, not a procedural defect. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mingo Logan Coal v. EPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the government violated various federal statutes by allowing Cape Wind's offshore energy project to move through the regulatory approval process. The Bureau allegedly violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), the Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1337(p), the National Historic Preservation Act, 54 U.S.C. 306108, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. 703(a). The Bureau and the United States Coast Guard allegedly violated the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-241, 414, 120, Stat. 516, 540 (2006). The Fish and Wildlife Service allegedly violated the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1538. The district court rejected most of plaintiffs' claims and granted partial summary judgment to the government agencies. The district court then rejected plaintiffs’ remaining claims, granted summary judgment, and dismissed the case. The court reversed the district court’s judgment that the Bureau’s environmental impact statement complied with NEPA and that the Service’s incidental take statement complied with the Endangered Species Act, and the court vacated both statements. The court affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing plaintiffs' remaining claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Public Employees v. Hopper" on Justia Law

The Associations filed suit under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., challenging the Commission’s decision authorizing Freeport to redesign its liquefied natural gas terminal in Texas to support export operations. The court held that the Associations have standing to press their challenges to the Commission’s orders and that their case is not moot. However, the court denied the petition on the merits. The court concluded that, to the extent the Associations complain about the environmental consequences of exporting natural gas from Freeport’s terminal, those objections should be raised in the pending challenge to the Department of Energy’s order authorizing Freeport to export natural gas. The court found no error in the Commissions analysis of the non-export-related environmental consequences of Freeport's proposal that would rise to the level of arbitrary and capricious decision-making. Accordingly, the court rejected the Associations' challenges. View "Sierra Club, et al v. FERC" on Justia Law

Sierra Club filed suit under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., seeking review of the Commission's authorization of an increase in production capacity at a liquefied natural gas terminal in Louisiana. The court concluded that Sierra Club has standing but that its challenges to the Commission’s orders fail on the merits, largely for the reasons stated in the companion case, Sierra Club v. FERC (Freeport), No. 14-1275 (D.C. Cir June 28, 2016). The court also concluded that the court otherwise lacks jurisdiction over challenges to the Commission’s cumulative impacts analysis because Sierra Club failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court dismiss the petition in part and denied the petition in part. View "Sierra Club v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Service listed three antelope species – the scimitar-horned oryx, addax, and dama gazelle – as endangered. On the same day that the Service designated the antelope species as endangered, it issued a blanket exemption for qualifying domestic entities and individuals that breed the antelope species in captivity. The district court determined that the Captive-Bred Exemption violated Section 10(c) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq. President Obama then signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. G, tit. I, 127, 128 Stat. 5, 315-16 (Section 127), which reinstated the Captive-Bred Exemption. Friends of Animals filed suit alleging that the Reinstatement Rule violates the Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706, and that Section 127 violates the United States Constitution. The district court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment and denied Friends of Animals' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that, under FEC v. Akins, Friends of Animals has informational standing to pursue its claims, so there is no jurisdictional impediment to this lawsuit. The court rejected Friends of Animals' claims on the merits, concluding that Congress acted within its constitutional bounds when it passed Section 127. Therefore, the court concluded that there can be no doubt that the Service was fully authorized to reinstate the Captive-Bred Exemption. View "Friends of Animals v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenge the NRC's rule and generic environmental impact statement (GEIS) concerning the continued, and possibly indefinite, storage of spent fuel from nuclear power plants in the United States. Petitioners contend that the NRC failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court concluded that the NRC appropriately characterized its rule and considered alternatives and mitigation measures; the GEIS sufficiently analyzes the impacts of continued storage of spent nuclear fuel where the GEIS considered essentially common risks to reactor sites and the NRC evaluated the probability of failure to site a repository, the GEIS assessed the cumulative impacts of the continued storage of spent nuclear fuel, the NRC did not ignore short-term high-volume leaks, and the NRC's waiver process ensures consideration of site-specific impacts; and the NRC's assumptions are not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "State of New York v. NRC" on Justia Law

NRDC challenged the NRC's denial of NRDC’s request for a hearing and subsequent application for a waiver, asserting this process was inconsistent with the procedural rigor mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The denial thwarted NRDC’s attempt to intervene in the license renewal proceeding for Exelon’s Limerick nuclear power station where NRDC sought to present “new and significant” information regarding severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMAs) relevant to Limerick. The court found that the Commission reasonably concluded that NRDC's request to intervene was a challenge to a general rule - 10 C.F.R. 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(L) (Rule (L)) - improperly raised in an individual adjudication. The court further stated that, contrary to NRDC’s view, while NEPA requires agencies to take a hard look before approving a major federal action, it does not mandate adoption of a particular process for doing so. Because NRDC failed to show its contentions were unique to Limerick, NRDC also was not entitled to a waiver. Therefore, the Commission’s actions were not arbitrary and capricious, and the court denied the petition. View "NRDC v. NRC" on Justia Law

The Association has successfully applied to the District’s Historic Preservation Review Board to have the former Spingarn Senior High School designated a historic landmark. Next to Spingarn is Langston Terrace, a 13-acre public housing complex built in the 1930s as segregated housing for African Americans. The Association now challenges the District's development of a streetcar program and Car Barn that would be centered in this neighborhood. The district court rejected the Association's claims in dismissals for failure to state a claim and summary judgment. The City Council passed the “Wire Acts” to allow the construction of aerial wires to supply streetcars with power: Transportation Infrastructure Emergency Amendment Act of 2010, D.C. Act 18-486; Transportation Infrastructure Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2010, D.C. Act 18-583; Transportation Infrastructure Amendment Act of 2010, D.C. Act 18-684 (codified at D.C. Code 9-1171(a)). Determining that the Association has standing, the court concluded that taking into account the Home Rule Act's, District. D.C. Code 1-201.02(a), 1-206.02(a), stated purpose, the Wire Acts do not violate an 1888 statute barring the District from authorizing telegraph, telephone, electric lighting or other wires, D.C. Code 34-1901.01. The court upheld that district court's dismissal of the Association's environmental impact statement (EIS) claim. The court rejected the Association's Equal Protection claim, concluding that the project and the associated site selection appear to have been facially neutral and to serve legitimate government purposes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. Bowser" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the Service's application of the 2012 Colorado Rule to allow development of a proposed egress ski trail on once-roadless land within the Special Use Permit boundary for the Snowmass Ski Resort in Aspen. The court agreed with the district court that the Service offered ample reasons for its decision to exclude existing designated ski areas from the Colorado roadless inventory, and that the Service’s six-year public rulemaking process satisfied all applicable notice requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment because the Service adequately explained the limited ski-area exclusion and did not violate any applicable notice requirements. View "Ark Initiative v. Tidwell" on Justia Law

Energy Answers seeks to build a waste incinerator in Arecibo, Puerto Rico. Sierra Club seeks to vacate a 1980 rule promulgated by EPA that implements the Clean Air Act's (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7470 et seq., and 7501 et seq., permitting scheme as it relates here to the regulation of the waste incinerator’s lead emissions. The court concluded that, because Sierra Club does not bring its petition within 60 days of any after-arising grounds, its petition is time-barred under 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition. View "Sierra Club de Puerto Rico v. EPA" on Justia Law