Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellants filed suit challenging the Service's withdrawal of its 2010 proposal to list the dunes sagebrush lizard, whose habitat is in New Mexico and Texas, as endangered. Between the time the Service proposed listing the lizard and the time it decided to withdraw that proposal, the Service received updated information about the conservation efforts in the two States and by the Bureau of Land Management in New Mexico. Based on this information, the Service concluded that “current and future threats are not of sufficient imminence, intensity, or magnitude to indicate that the . . . lizard is in danger of extinction (endangered), or likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future (threatened), throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” The court concluded that appellants failed to show the Service did not rationally apply its policy in evaluating the Texas plan inasmuch as the Service’s factual conclusions are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Mach Mining petitioned for review of the Commission's final order concluding that two of Mach's regulatory violations under the Mine Safety and Health Act (MSHA), 30 U.S.C. 801, were the result of “high negligence” and one violation was also “significant and substantial.” Mach operates a longwall coal mine that releases more than 1 million cubic feet of methane daily. An inspector issued a citation to Mach based on coal that had accumulated around two conveyor belts and the inspector concluded that the accumulations violation was the result of high negligence and was "significant and substantial." Mach also received a violation for locating battery charging stations in primary escapeways. The inspector investigating the charging station concluded that the violation was a result of Mach's high negligence. The court rejected Mach's arguments based on mitigating circumstances and denied the petition for review, concluding that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings for the "high negligence" and the "significant and substantial" determinations. View "Mach Mining, LLC v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two membership organizations, filed suit alleging that federal agencies unlawfully neglected to manage stocks of river herring and shad in the Atlantic Ocean from New York to North Carolina. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was no basis for judicial review of the Fishery Council’s decision. The court affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs' claims are not subject to judicial review under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 U.S.C. 1801(b)(3), and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Anglers Conservation Network v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Friends petitioned the Service to list certain species of sturgeon as endangered or threatened. The Service went more than 12 months without making any determinations – initial or final – on Friends’ petition. The district court held that Friends did not give the Service adequate notice before suing and dismissed the complaint. Because Friends did not wait until after the issuance of the positive initial determinations to provide 60 days’ notice of the allegedly overdue final determinations, its suit seeking to compel the final determinations is barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Friends of Animals v. Ashe" on Justia Law

Dalton Trucking and ARTBA challenged the EPA's final decision authorizing California regulations intended to reduce emissions of particulate matter and oxides of nitrogen from in-use nonroad diesel engines. Dalton Truck sought review of the same EPA decision at the same time in the Ninth Circuit, where ARTBA intervened in Dalton Trucking's behalf. Before this court, Dalton Trucking and ARTBA argue that the Ninth Circuit is the proper venue for their challenges and seek dismissal or transfer of their petitions for review. The court agreed that, pursuant to section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1), venue is not proper in this court because EPA’s decision does not satisfy either of the statutory avenues for filing in the D.C. Circuit. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions for review. View "Dalton Trucking, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

EPA exercised its authority under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q, to issue a Final Rule designating 29 areas as not meeting its new sulfur dioxide standards. Treasure State Resource Industry Association challenged the one designation for part of Yellowstone County, Montana, and U.S. Steel challenged the one for part of Wayne County, Michigan. The court upheld the Final Rule's designation of part of Yellowstone County as nonattainment and rejected the Association's argument that the data on which EPA relied were so unreliable that its reliance was arbitrary and capricious, and the Association's argument that EPA's application of the Act was retroactive within the meaning of Landgraf v. U.S.I. Film Products. The court rejected the Association's remaining claims. The court concluded that U.S. Steel meets the requirements of standing by demonstrating a rederessable injury in fact, and rejected EPA's argument that its Final Rule is not final. On the merits, the court upheld EPA's designation of part of Wayne County as nonattainment because the court found neither a violation of the Act nor any arbitrariness in EPA's action. The court denied the petitions for review of the Final Rule and EPA's denial of petitions for reconsideration. View "Treasure State Resource v. EPA" on Justia Law

Sierra Club filed suit against the government seeking to set aside several federal agencies' regulatory approvals relating to the Flanagan South pipeline and to enjoin the pipeline's construction and operation in reliance on any such approvals. The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief and entered summary judgment in favor of the agencies and Enbridge. The court held that the federal government was not required to conduct National Environment Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321-4370h, analysis of the entirety of the Flanagan South pipeline, including portions not subject to federal control or permitting; the court rejected Sierra Club’s Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251-1387, challenge to the Corps’s verifications of Flanagan South’s water crossings under Nationwide Permit 12 because the Corps was authorized to conduct its review on a regional rather than nationwide basis, and the Corps’s District Managers adequately supported their verification decisions; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sierra Club’s motion to supplement and amend its complaint, because the proposed new allegations would not have affected the dispositive legal analysis. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the Commission's issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Columbia Gas conditionally authorizing the company to extend a natural gas pipeline in Maryland. The court concluded that petitioners satisfied the requirements of Article III standing; the court has jurisdiction over the present controversy and the case is not moot; but petitioners' interest in protecting its members property from eminent domain in the face of alleged non-compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), and Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1), does not fall within the zone of interest protected by the NEPA, the CWA, and the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 71. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review for want of a legislatively conferred cause of action. View "Gunpowder Riverkeeper v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenge the EPA's 2012 regulation revising Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7412(d), standards for emissions of hexavalent chromium. The new rule imposes more stringent emissions limitations than its predecessor and mandates the phase-out of a category of fume suppressants containing the toxic compound perfluorooctyl sulfonate (PFOS). The court rejected, as contrary to the court's precedent, environmental petitioners' contention that EPA was required to calculate a new maximum achievable control technology (MACT) floor when it revised emissions standards pursuant to its technology review under section 112(d)(6) of the CAA; the court deferred to EPA’s methodology as well as its ultimate balancing decisions where it took into account the statutorily required considerations, inter alia, cost, emissions reductions, and health risk, as well as provided a transparent, reasoned explanation of its decision; the court was satisfied with the EPA's data-gathering and analysis and therefore, rejected the Association's argument that EPA unreasonably determined in its technology review that “developments” had occurred after the original rulemaking that required revision of the existing emissions standards; it suffices for EPA to show that non-PFOS based suppressants are as effective at controlling surface tension as PFOS-based suppressants; and EPA's risk review under section 112(f)(2) was reasonable. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review and upheld the rule. View "Nat'l Assoc. for Surface Finishing v. EPA" on Justia Law

Petitioners, several biofuel producers and others, want EPA to approve E30, which is a fuel that contains about 30% ethanol, for use as a test fuel. EPA has adopted regulations that require vehicle manufacturers to test the emissions of new vehicles. Vehicle manufacturers must conduct emissions testing using a “test fuel” that must be a fuel that is “commercially available.” As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that petitioners have Article III standing to maintain their suit; petitioners are within the zone of interests protected by the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1); petitioners' challenge is timely; and petitioners' suit is ripe. On the merits, the court concluded that it is entirely commonsensical and reasonable for EPA to require vehicle manufacturers to use the same fuels in emissions testing that vehicles will use out on the road. Moreover, the regulation is rooted in (if not compelled by) the statute, which says that EPA must ensure that “vehicles are tested under circumstances which reflect the actual current driving conditions under which motor vehicles are used, including conditions relating to fuel.” Because the “commercially available” requirement is not arbitrary and capricious, the court denied the petition for review. View "Energy Future Coalition v. EPA" on Justia Law