Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

EPA exercised its authority under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q, to issue a Final Rule designating 29 areas as not meeting its new sulfur dioxide standards. Treasure State Resource Industry Association challenged the one designation for part of Yellowstone County, Montana, and U.S. Steel challenged the one for part of Wayne County, Michigan. The court upheld the Final Rule's designation of part of Yellowstone County as nonattainment and rejected the Association's argument that the data on which EPA relied were so unreliable that its reliance was arbitrary and capricious, and the Association's argument that EPA's application of the Act was retroactive within the meaning of Landgraf v. U.S.I. Film Products. The court rejected the Association's remaining claims. The court concluded that U.S. Steel meets the requirements of standing by demonstrating a rederessable injury in fact, and rejected EPA's argument that its Final Rule is not final. On the merits, the court upheld EPA's designation of part of Wayne County as nonattainment because the court found neither a violation of the Act nor any arbitrariness in EPA's action. The court denied the petitions for review of the Final Rule and EPA's denial of petitions for reconsideration. View "Treasure State Resource v. EPA" on Justia Law

Sierra Club filed suit against the government seeking to set aside several federal agencies' regulatory approvals relating to the Flanagan South pipeline and to enjoin the pipeline's construction and operation in reliance on any such approvals. The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief and entered summary judgment in favor of the agencies and Enbridge. The court held that the federal government was not required to conduct National Environment Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321-4370h, analysis of the entirety of the Flanagan South pipeline, including portions not subject to federal control or permitting; the court rejected Sierra Club’s Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251-1387, challenge to the Corps’s verifications of Flanagan South’s water crossings under Nationwide Permit 12 because the Corps was authorized to conduct its review on a regional rather than nationwide basis, and the Corps’s District Managers adequately supported their verification decisions; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sierra Club’s motion to supplement and amend its complaint, because the proposed new allegations would not have affected the dispositive legal analysis. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the Commission's issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Columbia Gas conditionally authorizing the company to extend a natural gas pipeline in Maryland. The court concluded that petitioners satisfied the requirements of Article III standing; the court has jurisdiction over the present controversy and the case is not moot; but petitioners' interest in protecting its members property from eminent domain in the face of alleged non-compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), and Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1), does not fall within the zone of interest protected by the NEPA, the CWA, and the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 71. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review for want of a legislatively conferred cause of action. View "Gunpowder Riverkeeper v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenge the EPA's 2012 regulation revising Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7412(d), standards for emissions of hexavalent chromium. The new rule imposes more stringent emissions limitations than its predecessor and mandates the phase-out of a category of fume suppressants containing the toxic compound perfluorooctyl sulfonate (PFOS). The court rejected, as contrary to the court's precedent, environmental petitioners' contention that EPA was required to calculate a new maximum achievable control technology (MACT) floor when it revised emissions standards pursuant to its technology review under section 112(d)(6) of the CAA; the court deferred to EPA’s methodology as well as its ultimate balancing decisions where it took into account the statutorily required considerations, inter alia, cost, emissions reductions, and health risk, as well as provided a transparent, reasoned explanation of its decision; the court was satisfied with the EPA's data-gathering and analysis and therefore, rejected the Association's argument that EPA unreasonably determined in its technology review that “developments” had occurred after the original rulemaking that required revision of the existing emissions standards; it suffices for EPA to show that non-PFOS based suppressants are as effective at controlling surface tension as PFOS-based suppressants; and EPA's risk review under section 112(f)(2) was reasonable. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review and upheld the rule. View "Nat'l Assoc. for Surface Finishing v. EPA" on Justia Law

Petitioners, several biofuel producers and others, want EPA to approve E30, which is a fuel that contains about 30% ethanol, for use as a test fuel. EPA has adopted regulations that require vehicle manufacturers to test the emissions of new vehicles. Vehicle manufacturers must conduct emissions testing using a “test fuel” that must be a fuel that is “commercially available.” As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that petitioners have Article III standing to maintain their suit; petitioners are within the zone of interests protected by the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1); petitioners' challenge is timely; and petitioners' suit is ripe. On the merits, the court concluded that it is entirely commonsensical and reasonable for EPA to require vehicle manufacturers to use the same fuels in emissions testing that vehicles will use out on the road. Moreover, the regulation is rooted in (if not compelled by) the statute, which says that EPA must ensure that “vehicles are tested under circumstances which reflect the actual current driving conditions under which motor vehicles are used, including conditions relating to fuel.” Because the “commercially available” requirement is not arbitrary and capricious, the court denied the petition for review. View "Energy Future Coalition v. EPA" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged EPA’s anticipated rule restricting carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants. Petitioners argue that section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7411(d), does not grant EPA authority to limit carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants and therefore, petitioners ask the court to enjoin EPA from issuing a final rule limiting those carbon dioxide emissions. The court concluded that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a), does not authorize a court to circumvent finality principles in order to review proposed agency rules; EPA's public statements about its legal authority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions does not constitute final agency action subject to judicial review; and the court rejected petitioners' challenge of a 2011 settlement agreement that EPA reached with several other states and environmental groups. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review and the petition for a writ of prohibition where the court does not have authority to review proposed agency rules. View "In Re: Murray Energy Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of EPA's final rule, which determined that supercritical carbon dioxide injected into Class VI underground wells for purposes of geologic sequestration is “solid waste” within the meaning of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6903(27). The court dismissed the petitions for review because petitioners lacked Article III standing. In this case, neither Southern nor Occidental can show any injury sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III; Carbon Sequestration Council lacks standing because Southern lacks standing; and American Petroleum Institute lacks standing because Occidental lacks standing. View "Carbon Sequestration Council v. EPA" on Justia Law

WRC, operator of an oil refinery, seeks review of EPA's denial of its petition for an extension of its exemption from EPA's renewable fuels program. The court rejected WRC’s various challenges other than those identifying two mathematical errors in EPA’s independent analysis of WRC’s financial data. EPA concedes those errors. Because the conceded errors significantly alter important figures in EPA’s independent analysis of WRC’s financial data, the court cannot conclude with sufficient certainty that the agency would have made the same decision absent its errors.Therefore, the court vacated EPA’s decision and remanded to allow the agency to reevaluate WRC’s petition using the correct figures. View "Hermes Consol. v. EPA" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA’s determination that certain geographic areas are, or are not, in “attainment” with the EPA’s ground-level ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). The court concluded that the EPA’s final designations of Delaware and Connecticut counties are consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.; EPA's designation of Uinta Basin, Utah as "unclassifiable" is rational and in accordance with the CAA; EPA's refusal to use uncertified 2011 air-quality data during the designation process is rational and in accordance with the CAA; the EPA's use of 2008 to 2010 data to classify the counties within the Memphis, Tennessee area is rational and in accordance with the CAA; and the court rejected the remaining challenges. Accordingly, the court denied the consolidated petitions. View "MS Comm. Environ. Quality v. EPA" on Justia Law

Petitioners, PVC manufacturers, challenged EPA's 2012 rule setting first-time-ever limits on the emission of most hazardous air pollutants from PVC productions. Petitioners raised many of their objections for the first time in petitions for reconsideration with EPA that are awaiting resolution. The court concluded that it was precluded from reviewing these objections under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7412. In regards to petitioners' objections that are ready for review, the court held that EPA acted reasonably and in accordance with the CAA where EPA’s PVC-combined process vent limits do not conflict with other emissions limits, and EPA’s decision not to subcategorize process vents on the basis of their emissions control technology was reasonable; EPA’s bypass opening requirements are not arbitrary and capricious, and its requirement that PVC manufacturers install monitoring equipment on pressure relief devices is not irrational; and petitioners’ argument that some of EPA’s bypass regulations are unlawful beyond-the-floor MACT requirements stems from misapprehension of the CAA and is without merit. Therefore, the court denied the petition View "Mexichem Specialty Resins v. EPA" on Justia Law