Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioners challenged the EPA's final rule establishing emission standards for sewage sludge incinerators under section 129 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7429. The court remanded to the EPA portions of the rule for further explanation without vacating the current maximum achievable control technology (MACT) standards. Specifically, the court directed the EPA to clarify why its Clean Water Act Part 503, 40 C.F.R. pt. 503, regulations controlled for other non-technology factors; to clarify issues related to its upper prediction limit and variability analysis; and to elaborate on how it could use a statistical method to determine whether a limited dataset was representative of incinerators for which it had no data, and to explain why it chose the variables it did for that statistical analysis. In all other respects, the court upheld the EPA's rule against petitioners' challenges. View "Nat'l Assoc. of Clean Water Agencies v. EPA, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants - safari clubs, hunters, and international conservationists - alleged that the Service's failure to take actions concerning the straight-horn markhor was arbitrary and capricious. The court concluded that appellants' claims relating to the 1999 downlisting petition were moot where appellants have obtained all the relief that they sought; appellants' claims concerning the alleged failure of the Service to timely process four applications to import straight-horn markhor trophies were moot and the hunters' related due process claims were necessarily moot as well; and there was no record evidence to support the claim that any of appellants suffered an injury-in-fact from the Services' alleged ongoing policy of delay. Accordingly, the court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The portion of the district court's order addressing the claims raised on appeal was vacated. View "Conservation Force, Inc., et al. v. Jewell, et al." on Justia Law

These appeals challenged the EPA's promulgation of rules in response to the Supreme Court's holding that greenhouse gases unambiguously qualify as an "air pollutant" under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401. At issue was implementation of Part C of Title I of the Act permitting requirements in several States without implementation plans for greenhouse gases as of January 2, 2011, when the emission standards in the Tailpipe Rule took effect. The court held that under the plain text of sections 165(a) and 167, the permitting requirements were self-executing without regard to previously approved state implementation plans. The court concluded that petitioners lacked Article III standing to challenge the rules because industry petitioners failed to show how they have been injured in fact by rules enabling issuance of the necessary permits and state petitioners failed to show how vacating the rules would redress their purported injuries. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction. View "State of Texas, et al. v. EPA" on Justia Law

Petitioners petitioned for review of the EPA's most recent revisions to the primary and secondary National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ozone. The court rejected Mississippi and the industry groups' challenge to the primary and secondary NAAQS standards; the court denied the governmental and environmental petitions with respect to the primary standard; but the court granted their petition with respect to the secondary standard. Because EPA failed to determine what level of protection was "requisite to protect the public welfare," EPA's explanation for the secondary standard violated the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401. Accordingly, the court remanded the secondary NAAQS to the EPA for reconsideration and denied the petition in all other respects. View "State of Mississippi v. EPA" on Justia Law

Seeking to construct a natural gas compressor station in Maryland, Dominion applied for and received a certificate of public convenience and necessity from FERC. The Department subsequently twice refused to process Dominion's application for an air quality permit and Dominion sought expedited review from the court. The court granted Dominion's petition and remanded for further action because the Department's failure to act to grant, condition, or deny Dominion's air quality permit was inconsistent with federal law. View "Dominion Transmission, Inc. v. Summers, et al." on Justia Law

Environmental groups petitioned for review of the EPA's "Deferral Rule," which deferred regulation of biogenic carbon dioxide for three years. The EPA justified this Deferral Rule on the basis of the de minimis, one-step-at-a-time, and administrative necessity doctrine. Concluding that the dispute was ripe for review, the court rejected the EPA's use of the de minimus doctrine where EPA expressly disavowed this doctrine, explaining that the Deferral Rule had a three-year sunset provision whereas the de minimis doctrine was used to establish permanent exemptions; the EPA's invocation of the one-step-at-a-time doctrine was arbitrary and capricious where the EPA failed to explain in the Deferral Rule what "full compliance" with the "statutory mandate" means; the court rejected the administrative necessity doctrine where the EPA rejected a proposed middle-ground option; and the court rejected the absurd results doctrine that the EPA raised for the first time in its brief. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA" on Justia Law

Appellants, hunters and hunting organizations, challenged the Service's bar against the importation of polar bear trophies under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 16 U.S.C. 1361 et seq., and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq. In regard to statutory challenges, the court concluded that Congress intended to extend the protections of sections 101(a)(3)(B) and 102(b)(3) of the MMPA to all depleted species, regardless of their depleted status; although section 104(c)(5) did authorize trophy importation, that provision remained subject to the MMPA's more stringent protections for depleted species; section 102(b)(3) referred not only to mammals taken from species the Secretary had designated as depleted but instead mammals taken from species the Secretary has so designated; and section 101(a)(3)(B) could not permit what section 102(b)(3) expressly prohibited. In regards to procedural challenges, the court concluded that section 115(a) was inapplicable because an ESA listing resulted in a depleted designation under the MMPA but entailed no "determination" to that effect. Finally, the Listing Rule provided adequate notice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re: Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing" on Justia Law

The Institute challenged the final rule promulgated by the FRA to implement section 104 of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432 section 104(a)(1), 122 Stat. 4848, 4857. Section 104 required a qualifying rail carrier to submit an implementation plan to install a "positive train control" (PTC) system no later than December 31, 2015 on certain tracks used for passenger service or for transporting "poison- or toxic- by-inhalation" hazardous material (PIH or TIH). The court concluded that the Institute's challenge was not ripe because it had not established that its members now faced a present or imminent injury from the 2012 Final Rule's omission of a two-part risk assessment test. Accordingly, the court dismissed the Institute's petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Chlorine Institute, Inc. v. FRA, et al." on Justia Law

Millard petitioned for review of the Commission's affirmance of citations issued to Millard for committing violations of emergency response, training, record-keeping, and other requirements after more than 30,000 pounds of anhydrous ammonia escaped from one of Millard's refrigerated storage facilities. The court concluded that Millard's challenges to the two process safety management violations, Millard's contention that OSHA was estopped from asserting that the company violated agency regulations, and Millard's ten remaining challenges either lacked merit or merited neither reversal nor further discussion. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Millard Refrigerated Services v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA's revised emissions standards for secondary lead smelting facilities. In 2012, acting pursuant to sections 112(d)(6) and 112(f)(2) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7412(d)(6), (f)(2), EPA revised the 1995 emissions standards for secondary lead smelting facilities, reducing allowable emissions by 90% and requiring smelters to totally enclose certain "fugitive" emission sources. Industry petitioners first argued that the Secondary Lead Rule impermissibly regulated elemental lead as hazardous air pollutants (HAP). The court concluded, inter alia, that industry petitioners' first contention was time-barred and the second contention also failed because the Rule set HAP emissions standards at levels designed to attain the primary lead national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), not the converse. In regards to environmental petitioners' challenges, the court concluded that environmental petitioners have shown that their members would have standing under Article III to sue in their own right. However, environmental petitioners' challenge failed on the merits. Their primary argument that, when EPA revised emissions standards under section 112(d)(6), it must recalculate the maximum achievable control technology in accordance with sections 112(d)(2) and (d)(3), was barred by NRDC v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the court denied in part and dismissed in part the petitions for review. View "Assoc. of Battery Recyclers v. EPA, et al" on Justia Law