Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mingo Logan applied to the Corps for a permit under section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1344, to discharge dredged or fill material from a mountain-top coal mine in West Virginia into three streams and their tributaries. The Corps issued the permit to Mingo Logan, approving the requested disposal sites for the discharged materials. Four years later, the EPA invoked its subsection 404(c) authority to "withdraw" the specifications of two of the streams as disposal sites, thereby prohibiting Mingo Logan from discharging them. Mingo Logan then filed this action challenging the EPA's withdrawal of the specified sites. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Mingo Logan and concluded that the EPA had post-permit withdrawal authority. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA" on Justia Law

Defenders sued the EPA based on the EPA's alleged failure to promptly promulgate revisions to certain effluent limitations and effluent limitations guidelines under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. UWAG, an association of energy companies and three national trade associations of energy companies, appealed the denial of intervention and also asserted that the court should vacate the district court's order entering a consent decree between Defenders and the EPA because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court affirmed the denial of intervention because UWAG lacked Article III standing and, as there was no appellant with standing, dismissed the remainder of the appeal. View "Defenders of Wildlife, et al v. Jackson" on Justia Law

After a three-year rulemaking process, the FWS found that, due to the effects of global climate change, the polar bear was likely to become an endangered species and faced the threat of extinction within the foreseeable future (Listing Rule). The agency thus concluded that the polar bear should be listed as a threatened species. A number of industry groups, environmental organizations, and states challenged the Listing Rule as either overly restrictive or insufficiently protective of the polar bear. After a hearing on the parties' submissions, the district court granted summary judgment to the FWS and rejected all challenges to the Listing Rule. Given the evident thoroughness and care of the agency's explanation for its decision, the court concluded that the challenges to the Listing Rule "amount to nothing more than competing views about policy and science." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re: Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule Litigation" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Congress's amendment of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7545(o), to establish a renewable fuel standard (RFS) program. API objected to the EPA's 2012 projection for cellulosic biofuel and to its refusal to reduce the applicable advanced biofuels volume for 2012. The court rejected API's argument that the EPA failed to justify its determination not to reduce the applicable advanced biofuels volume for 2012. However, because the EPA's methodology for making its cellulosic biofuel projection did not take neutral aim at accuracy, the court held that it was an unreasonable exercise of agency discretion. Accordingly, the court vacated the 2012 RFS rule and remanded for further proceedings. View "American Petroleum Institute v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Sierra Club sought review of the EPA's regulations regarding particulate matter less than 2.5 micrometers under Section 166 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7476. After the Sierra Club filed its petition, the EPA acknowledged that portions of the rule establishing Significant Impact Levels (SILs) did not reflect its intent in promulgating the SILs, and requested that the court vacate and remand some parts of its regulations. Notwithstanding the EPA's concession, the Sierra Club maintained that the EPA lacked authority to establish SILs. The court vacated and remanded to the EPA for further consideration the portions of the EPA's rule addressing SILs, except for the parts of its ruling in 40 C.F.R. 51.165(b)(2). The court granted Sierra Club's petition as to the parts of the EPA's rule establishing the Significant Monitoring Concentration (SMC), and vacated them because these parts of the rule exceeded the EPA's statutory authority. View "Sierra Club v. EPA" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the EPA's administration of a cap-and-trade program regulating the production and consumption of hydrochlorofluorcarbons (HCFCs) under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7671d(c), 7671e(b). The program entailed overall caps on production and consumption of various HCFCs for each year, as well as EPA-administered baseline allowances of HCFCs for each participating company. Companies were then permitted to transfer their allowances subject to certain statutory and regulatory restrictions. Honeywell complained that certain 2008 transfers made by their competitors Arkema and Solvay were deemed to permanently increase those competitors' future baseline allowances of HCFCs. The court concluded that Honeywell's claim was foreclosed by the court's decision in Arkema, Inc. V. EPA, which held that the EPA, having approved the 2008 interpollutant transfers, had to honor them in the future at least so long as the EPA continued to set baselines by considering the historical usage of HCFCs by participating companies. The Arkema Court necessarily concluded that permanent interpollutant transfers were permissible under the statute. Absent en banc review, the court must adhere to circuit precedent. Because Honeywell's other challenges to the 2008 transfers were meritless, the court denied the petition for review. View "Honeywell International, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

ARTBA challenged the EPA's regulations relating to nonroad engines and vehicles several years after the regulations were promulgated. As such, ARTBA's challenges to the regulations were time-barred under the Clean Air Act's, 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1), 60-day filing period. ARTBA also challenged the EPA's approval of California's State Implementation Plan, but that challenged must be brought in the Ninth Circuit. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "American Road & Transportation v. EPA, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of two final rules, promulgated pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7501-7509a, 7513-7513b, which governed implementation of the national ambient air quality standard (NAAQS) for "fine" particulate matter. The court held that the EPA erred in applying the provisions of Subpart 1 of Part D of Title 1 of the Act rather than the particulate-matter-specific provisions of Subpart 4 of Part D of Title I. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review and remanded for further proceedings. View "Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA" on Justia Law

Appellees sued to compel the Service to comply with deadlines set forth in the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(3), for determining whether to list species as endangered or threatened. As the case neared settlement, the Safari Club moved to intervene pursuant to Rule 24 in the order to oppose the settlements which would include three species that its members hunt. On appeal, the Safari Club challenged the district court's denial of intervention, contending that it qualified for intervention as of right, as well as permissively. Because the Safari Club failed to identify a violation of a procedural right afforded by the ESA that was designed to protect its interests, the district court did not err in ruling that the Safari Club lacked standing and therefore was ineligible to intervene as of right. The court affirmed the decision of the district court without reaching the Safari Club's objections to the settlement agreements. View "In re: Endangered Species Act Section 4" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA's rulemaking regarding hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). At issue was whether section 112(c)(6) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7412(c)(6), required the EPA to impose the same stringency levels in standards for non-112(c)(6) HAPs occurring at section 112(c)(6) sources that it did for section 112(c)(6) HAPs. The EPA rejected the claim that section 112(c)(6)'s cross-reference to section 112(d)(2) required that the EPA subject all HAPs emitted by a section 112(c)(6) source to standards at the stringency level specified by section 112(d)(2). The EPA also made clear that, despite language in the Gold Mine Rule arguably suggesting that it covered "fugitive emissions" - namely emissions from certain sources - in fact the rule did not address such emissions. The court rejected petitioners' claims challenging the EPA's rulemaking and affirmed the EPA's order. View "Desert Citizens Against Pollution, et al v. EPA, et al" on Justia Law