Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2021, the United States seized over 700,000 barrels of crude oil from two tankers in the Mediterranean Sea. The government alleged that the oil belonged to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), an entity it claimed materially supported the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The government further asserted that NIOC’s activities included supplying, transporting, and selling oil to benefit the IRGC, which used these resources to fund terrorist activities targeting the United States. A Turkish commodities trading company, Aspan Petrokimya Co., claimed ownership of the seized oil and sought to recover the proceeds from its sale.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed the government’s forfeiture complaints without prejudice, finding that the government had not adequately pled that NIOC’s sale of oil affected foreign commerce. The government then filed an Amended Complaint consolidating the cases and providing additional factual detail. The district court denied Aspan’s renewed motion to dismiss, concluding that the amended allegations sufficiently addressed the jurisdictional element and all other statutory requirements. To expedite appellate review, Aspan admitted the complaint’s factual allegations, consented to judgment on the pleadings, and appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss de novo. The appellate court held that the government needed only to allege NIOC’s ownership of the property at the time of the offense, not at the time of seizure. The court also found that the Amended Complaint plausibly alleged that NIOC’s material support of the IRGC substantially affected foreign commerce, and that NIOC’s actions were calculated to influence the U.S. government. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v. All Petroleum-Product Cargo Onboard the M/T Arina" on Justia Law

Eighteen transgender women incarcerated in federal women’s prisons challenged a federal executive order that directed the Attorney General to ensure that “males”—defined by biological sex assigned at conception—are not detained in women’s facilities. These plaintiffs were a small group of transgender women whom the Bureau of Prisons had, after individualized assessments, placed in women’s facilities. Each had been diagnosed with gender dysphoria, received long-term hormone therapy, and some had undergone gender-affirming surgeries. The plaintiffs alleged that transferring them to men’s prisons would expose them to grave risks of violence, abuse, and psychological harm.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the plaintiffs preliminary injunctive relief, blocking their transfers and requiring the government to maintain their housing in women’s facilities. The district court found that transgender women are at a significantly higher risk of harm in men’s facilities and that the government was aware of these risks. The court also rejected government arguments that judicial review was barred or that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, holding instead that no effective administrative remedy was available.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that judicial review of constitutional claims was not barred by statute and that the government had not shown exhaustion of available administrative remedies. However, the court vacated the preliminary injunctions, finding that the district court’s broad, categorical reasoning was not defended by the plaintiffs on appeal, who instead advanced more individualized grounds. The record did not contain the necessary factual findings as to each plaintiff’s specific vulnerabilities. The case was remanded for further proceedings, and the expired injunctions were dismissed as moot. View "Doe v. Blanche" on Justia Law

KC Transport, an independent trucking company, provides hauling services for mining and other companies. It operates a maintenance facility for its haul trucks about a mile from one of its primary client’s active mines. During an inspection, a Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) inspector observed two KC Transport trucks at the facility undergoing maintenance in conditions that violated federal safety standards—specifically, the trucks were raised and unblocked, with one worker standing underneath. The inspector issued citations for these violations.In an administrative proceeding, KC Transport contested the citations, arguing that MSHA lacked jurisdiction over its facility and trucks since they were not located at an extraction site or on an appurtenant road. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that MSHA had jurisdiction, reasoning that the facility and trucks were “used in” mining-related activities and thus constituted a “mine” under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act. KC Transport appealed, and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission reversed the ALJ, holding that only facilities or equipment located at extraction sites or appurtenant roads qualify as “mines” under the Act and vacated the citations.The Secretary of Labor, acting through MSHA, petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review. After an intervening Supreme Court decision overruled Chevron deference, the D.C. Circuit independently interpreted the relevant statutory provisions. The court held that a “facility” constitutes a “mine” under the Mine Act when it is necessarily connected with the use and operation of extracting, milling, or processing minerals, even if not located directly at an extraction site or appurtenant road. Concluding that KC Transport’s facility met this definition, the court vacated the Commission’s decision and affirmed the Secretary’s citations. View "Secretary of Labor v. KC Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of individuals alleged to be members of Tren de Aragua, a Venezuelan criminal gang and foreign terrorist organization, were detained in Texas after the President, invoking the Alien Enemies Act, ordered their removal from the United States. On March 15, 2025, government officials placed several of these detainees, including the plaintiffs, on planes bound for El Salvador. Shortly after their departure, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) barring the government from removing the plaintiffs from the United States for 14 days. Despite the TRO, the planes continued to El Salvador, where the detainees were transferred to Salvadoran custody.The district court then began contempt proceedings against government officials, reasoning that the government’s actions violated the TRO, and threatened criminal contempt unless the government returned the plaintiffs to U.S. custody. The Supreme Court vacated the TRO, holding it was based on a legal error and filed in the wrong venue. Despite this, the district court persisted with contempt proceedings, seeking to identify and potentially prosecute the official responsible for the transfer. The government identified the Secretary of Homeland Security as the responsible party and provided declarations from involved officials. Unsatisfied, the district court ordered further hearings and investigation into the Executive Branch’s decision-making.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the government’s petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the district court’s investigation was a clear abuse of discretion. The appellate court found the TRO lacked the clarity required to support criminal contempt for transferring custody and that further judicial inquiry into Executive Branch deliberations was improper, especially given national security concerns. The court ordered the district court to terminate the contempt proceedings. View "In re: Donald Trump" on Justia Law

A U.S. citizen of Pakistani descent was denied boarding an international flight in 2019 and subsequently learned, after following the Department of Homeland Security’s redress process, that he was listed on the federal government’s No Fly List. He then sought to challenge his inclusion both on the No Fly List and the broader Terrorist Watchlist, which contains the names of individuals reasonably suspected of terrorism. Placement on the No Fly List is dependent on inclusion in the Terrorist Watchlist. The individual alleged ongoing travel and immigration-related harms due to his watchlist designations.He filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, raising constitutional and statutory claims and seeking removal from both lists. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over the No Fly List claims due to the statutory requirement that such challenges proceed in the circuit court under 49 U.S.C. § 46110, and transferred those claims accordingly. The district court retained the Terrorist Watchlist claims under general federal question jurisdiction. After further briefing, the district court dismissed the remaining Terrorist Watchlist claims for lack of Article III standing, finding it could not redress the alleged injuries because removing the plaintiff from the Terrorist Watchlist would necessarily set aside the TSA Administrator’s order keeping him on the No Fly List—an action reserved for the circuit court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court held that while the plaintiff suffered concrete injuries from his inclusion on the Terrorist Watchlist, the district court lacked authority to redress those injuries because any effective remedy would encroach on the circuit court’s exclusive jurisdiction to review and set aside TSA No Fly List orders under § 46110. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of standing. View "Khalid v. Blanche" on Justia Law

A United States citizen of Pakistani descent challenged his continued placement on the federal No Fly List, which prohibits individuals from boarding flights in U.S. airspace. After enhanced screening and questioning by the FBI in 2012 and being prevented from boarding a flight in 2019, he sought redress through the Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP). He received an unclassified summary stating that his listing was based on concerns about his associations and candor regarding activities in Pakistan. He contested these grounds, denied any terrorist associations, and argued that his inclusion was erroneous.While his DHS TRIP redress was pending, he filed suit in the United States District Court, which ultimately concluded it lacked jurisdiction, as exclusive review of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Administrator’s order rested with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The district court transferred his claims to the appellate court.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the TSA Administrator’s order, applying a “substantial evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious” standard, and reviewed constitutional claims de novo. The court dismissed the petitioner’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim for lack of standing, finding insufficient concrete plans to travel for religious purposes. It denied his other claims, holding that there is no fundamental right to air travel under substantive due process, and that the DHS TRIP process provides constitutionally adequate procedural protections. The court found that the Administrator’s order was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious. The court also rejected the argument that the major questions doctrine applied, finding TSA’s statutory authority adequate. The petition was dismissed in part and otherwise denied. View "Khalid v. TSA" on Justia Law

Several oil refineries with average daily crude oil throughput below 75,000 barrels in 2024 applied to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2025 for exemptions from their obligations under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program for the 2024 compliance year. The RFS program, established under the Clean Air Act, requires refineries to blend renewable fuels into transportation fuels. The Act provides for a “small refinery” exemption for facilities that do not exceed the 75,000-barrel threshold in a calendar year. The petitioning refineries did not seek exemptions for 2023 and based their applications solely on their 2024 throughput.After the refineries submitted their applications, the EPA informed them that, under its 2014 regulation, eligibility required a refinery to meet the “small refinery” definition both for "the most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension" and for "the year or years for which an exemption is sought." The EPA interpreted this to mean petitioners needed to satisfy the throughput limit in both 2023 and 2024. Since the refineries exceeded the threshold in 2023, the EPA denied the exemption requests. The refineries then sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The D.C. Circuit held that the EPA’s interpretation of its 2014 regulation was contrary to the regulation’s plain text. The court found that, because the applications were filed in 2025 for the 2024 compliance year, both the “most recent full calendar year prior to seeking an extension” and “the year for which an exemption is sought” referred to 2024. Since the petitioners met the threshold in 2024, they were eligible under the regulation. The court vacated the EPA’s denial orders and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alon Refining Krotz Springs, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

A trade association representing the majority of the world’s liner shipping services challenged a rule issued by the Federal Maritime Commission. Under recent amendments to the Shipping Act, Congress directed the Commission to define what constitutes an “unreasonable refusal to deal or negotiate” by ocean common carriers regarding vessel space accommodations. The Commission responded by adopting a rule specifying non-binding factors for evaluating unreasonable refusals, including whether a carrier quoted rates vastly above market value, required carriers to submit an annual “documented export policy,” and removed explicit reference to “business decisions” from its list of factors. The association objected, arguing that the rule exceeded the Commission’s authority and was arbitrary and capricious.After the Commission published its final rule, the association filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The association claimed that the Commission lacked authority to consider price in its analysis, that the requirement for a documented export policy was ultra vires and arbitrary, and that removal of the “business decisions” factor was likewise arbitrary. The Commission defended the rule’s approach, asserting its statutory power to require reports and to evaluate factors relevant to reasonableness.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the Commission’s consideration of price as an indicator of unreasonable refusal did not amount to unauthorized rate regulation, and that the requirement for a documented export policy was within the Commission’s statutory authority. The court also found that the omission of “business decisions” as a listed factor did not preclude their consideration in individual cases. The court concluded that the rule was neither beyond the Commission’s statutory authority nor arbitrary and capricious. View "World Shipping Council v. FMC" on Justia Law

Mine operators received citations from the Secretary of Labor under the Mine Act for alleged safety violations, some of which were designated as “significant and substantial” (S&S). The operators contested these citations before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. Subsequently, the Secretary sought to modify some citations by removing S&S designations and reducing penalties, or to vacate certain citations, as part of proposed settlements. The Secretary provided no explanations for these changes.Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) for the Commission denied the Secretary’s motions to settle or dismiss, emphasizing the lack of explanation for the modifications. Upon interlocutory review, the Commission affirmed the ALJs’ decisions, holding that section 110(k) of the Mine Act requires the Secretary to provide sufficient reasoning and justification when removing S&S designations or vacating citations in the context of settlement motions. The Secretary then petitioned for review of these nonfinal orders in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the Commission’s nonfinal orders, as these orders did not meet the requirements for immediate appeal under the collateral-order doctrine. The court found the Secretary’s interest in modifying or vacating citations via settlement agreements to be adequately protected by the availability of review after a final order. The court determined that delaying review would not imperil a substantial public interest. Therefore, the court dismissed the Secretary’s petitions for review for lack of jurisdiction. View "Secretary of Labor v. Knight Hawk Coal, LLC" on Justia Law

Florida sought approval from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to assume authority for issuing permits under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, which would allow parties to discharge pollutants into state waters. To streamline the process for permit applicants and reduce the burden of complying with the Endangered Species Act (ESA), Florida proposed a permitting program in which the state would monitor and protect ESA-listed species primarily through a “technical assistance process,” with only advisory input from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). The EPA and FWS approved Florida’s proposal after the FWS issued a programmatic Biological Opinion (BiOp) and Incidental Take Statement (ITS) that found no jeopardy to protected species and exempted permittees from further ESA liability, relying heavily on Florida’s assurances rather than detailed, up-front analysis.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the actions of the EPA and FWS after environmental groups challenged Florida’s permitting program, asserting violations of the ESA and Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court found that the FWS’s BiOp and ITS were unlawful because they failed to conduct the required analyses and deferred essential protections to a less rigorous state-run process. The court also determined the EPA’s reliance on these documents was impermissible and that the EPA had wrongly failed to consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). As a remedy, the district court vacated the EPA’s approval of Florida’s permitting program along with the BiOp and ITS.On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the environmental groups had standing and their claims were ripe. It concluded that the FWS’s BiOp and ITS did not comply with the ESA, that the EPA’s reliance on those documents was unlawful, and that the EPA erred by not consulting with the NMFS. The court required vacatur of the EPA’s approval of Florida’s permitting program and the associated ESA documents. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Zeldin" on Justia Law