Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Michael Solondz, a commercial airline pilot, was diagnosed with anxiety and prescribed mirtazapine after experiencing side effects from another medication. Mirtazapine effectively managed his anxiety without significant side effects. Solondz sought medical clearance from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to resume flying, but the FAA categorically disallows pilots from flying while taking mirtazapine, despite allowing conditional approvals for other antidepressants.The FAA denied Solondz's request for a Special Issuance medical certificate multiple times, citing his use of mirtazapine, anxiety, sleep apnea, optic neuritis, and a history of atrial fibrillation. Solondz provided evidence that his conditions were well-managed and that mirtazapine did not cause significant side effects. The FAA's final denial letter reiterated these reasons and added a concern about a potential malignant melanoma diagnosis, which Solondz disputed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the FAA failed to provide a reasonable explanation for categorically disallowing pilots taking mirtazapine from obtaining medical certification. The court noted that the FAA's process for conditionally approving other antidepressants involves a six-month waiting period and individualized medical assessments, which could also apply to mirtazapine.The court vacated the FAA's final denial letter and remanded the case for further explanation. The court emphasized that the FAA must articulate a clear rationale for its policy and avoid offering explanations that contradict the evidence. The petition for review was granted, and the case was remanded to the FAA for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Solondz v. FAA" on Justia Law

A group of entities managing a university hospital and a union representing the hospital’s service workers have been negotiating a successor agreement since 2016. The hospital proposed three key changes: granting itself unilateral control over employment terms, imposing a no-strike clause, and eliminating binding arbitration. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that these proposals collectively constituted bad faith bargaining, as they would leave union employees worse off than if no contract existed.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) initially sustained the complaint against the hospital, concluding that the hospital violated Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by bargaining in bad faith. The ALJ found that the hospital’s proposals, including a restrictive grievance-arbitration procedure and a broad management rights clause, indicated an intent to undermine the bargaining process. The hospital’s regressive bargaining tactics further supported this conclusion.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB’s findings, agreeing that the hospital’s conduct amounted to bad faith surface bargaining. The court found substantial evidence supporting the NLRB’s conclusion that the hospital’s proposals, taken together, would strip the union of its representational role and leave employees with fewer rights than they would have without a contract. The court also upheld the NLRB’s procedural decisions, including vacating an earlier decision due to a board member’s financial conflict of interest and seating a new member for the final decision.The court denied the hospital’s petition for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement, affirming the NLRB’s order for the hospital to recognize and bargain with the union, rescind unilateral changes, compensate affected employees, and submit periodic reports on bargaining progress. View "District Hospital Partners, L.P. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The case involves two organizations, Doc Society and International Documentary Association (IDA), which promote documentary filmmaking globally. They challenged a policy by the Secretary of State requiring visa applicants to disclose their social media information from the past five years. The plaintiffs argued that this policy violated the First Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act, claiming it impeded their core activities and harmed their members.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that the plaintiffs had organizational standing but dismissed their claims on the merits, stating they failed to state a claim under the First Amendment or the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege that a favorable decision would redress their claimed injuries. The court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not provide specific allegations showing that their partners and members would return to their prior use of social media or reconsider their willingness to travel to the United States if the policy were vacated. The court reversed the district court's determination that the plaintiffs had standing, vacated the remainder of the district court's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings, including whether the plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend their complaint. View "Doc Society v. Rubio" on Justia Law

Radio Communications Corporation (RCC), a telecommunications and media company, petitioned for review of a final order issued by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) implementing the Low Power Protection Act (LPPA). The LPPA allows low power television (LPTV) stations to apply for an upgrade to a Class A license if they meet certain criteria, including operating in a Designated Market Area (DMA) with not more than 95,000 television households. The FCC's order adopted this limitation and used Nielsen’s Local TV Report to determine a station’s DMA.RCC operates an LPTV station, W24EZ-D, in Connecticut, which is licensed to serve Allingtown, a neighborhood of West Haven with fewer than 15,000 television households. However, the station is part of the Hartford-New Haven DMA, which has approximately one million television households. RCC challenged the FCC's order, arguing that the size limitation should apply to a station’s community of license, not its DMA. RCC also raised other statutory and constitutional arguments, including claims that the order contravenes section 307(b) of the Communications Act, violates the Commerce Clause, improperly delegates legislative authority to Nielsen, and restricts programming content in violation of the First Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the FCC's order adheres to the best reading of the LPPA, which clearly limits Class A license eligibility to LPTV stations operating in a DMA with not more than 95,000 television households. The court found that the FCC properly defined DMA according to Nielsen’s data, as authorized by Congress, and that the statute does not reference "community of license." The court also rejected RCC's constitutional arguments, finding that the FCC's interpretation did not violate the Commerce Clause or the nondelegation doctrine. Consequently, the court denied RCC's petition for review. View "Radio Communications Corporation v. FCC" on Justia Law

N.S. was arrested for robbery and destruction of property and was released on his own recognizance by a Magistrate Judge. However, before he could leave the courthouse, U.S. Marshals detained him based on an ICE detainer. N.S. filed a class complaint alleging that the Marshals acted beyond their statutory authority by making a civil immigration arrest, violating the Administrative Procedure Act.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia certified the proposed class and granted N.S.'s request for a permanent injunction, prohibiting Marshal Dixon and his agents from arresting and detaining criminal defendants in the Superior Court for suspected civil immigration violations. The court held that the Marshals were not authorized to make civil immigration arrests as they had not undergone the required training. The court also found that the 2002 Order delegating authority to the Marshals lacked sufficient legal support.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Marshals were not authorized to make civil immigration arrests due to the lack of required training. However, the court found that the class-wide injunction issued by the district court was barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), which prohibits lower courts from enjoining the operation of certain immigration provisions. The court vacated the injunction and remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the appropriate remedy. View "N.S. v. Dixon" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima (Lima) and Rutas de Lima S.A.C. (Rutas) entered into a Concession Contract for the construction and operation of urban roads in Lima, Peru. Rutas agreed to finance and manage the project in exchange for toll revenue, while Lima was responsible for preliminary infrastructure activities. Subsequent agreements transferred these preliminary responsibilities to Rutas in exchange for toll rate increases. Social protests erupted in response to these increases, leading Lima to close a toll unit and refuse further rate hikes. Rutas initiated two international arbitrations, claiming Lima breached the contract. Lima argued the contract was void due to bribery by Rutas’s parent company, Odebrecht S.A.The District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case after two arbitration tribunals ruled in favor of Rutas, finding insufficient evidence of corruption linked to the Concession Contract. Lima sought to vacate the arbitration awards, citing violations of U.S. public policy against corruption, fraud by Rutas in discovery, and misconduct by the second tribunal in excluding evidence. The District Court denied Lima’s petitions and confirmed the awards, concluding that Lima failed to prove the contract was obtained through bribery and that any alleged discovery misconduct did not prejudice Lima’s case.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The court held that the arbitration tribunals’ findings were supported by the record and that there was no sufficient evidence linking Odebrecht’s bribes to the Concession Contract. The court also found no merit in Lima’s claims of discovery fraud and tribunal misconduct, noting that Lima suffered no prejudice from the exclusion of evidence. The court concluded that enforcing the arbitration awards did not violate U.S. public policy. View "Metropolitan Municipality of Lima v. Rutas De Lima S.A.C." on Justia Law

The case involves the Center for Biological Diversity and other petitioners challenging the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) Program for the years 2023, 2024, and 2025. The petitioners include environmental organizations, refiners, a renewable fuel producer, and a biofuel trade association. They argue that the EPA's rule, known as the Set Rule, fails to adequately address the environmental impacts, particularly greenhouse gas emissions and effects on endangered species.The lower court, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, reviewed the EPA's RFS Program standards for 2020-2022 in a previous case, Sinclair Wyo. Refin. Co. LLC v. EPA. In that case, the court upheld the EPA's standards. In the current case, the petitioners argue that the EPA did not adequately explain its reliance on outdated data for greenhouse gas emissions and failed to properly consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) regarding the impact on endangered species.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the EPA's use of outdated data for greenhouse gas emissions was arbitrary and capricious. The court also found that the FWS's concurrence with the EPA's determination that the Set Rule would have "no effect" on endangered species was not adequately explained. The court remanded the Set Rule to the EPA and FWS for further consideration and explanation without vacating the rule. The court denied the petitions of Neste and the Refiner Petitioners and dismissed SABR's petition for untimeliness and lack of standing. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Mady Marieluise Schubarth pursued compensation for land allegedly seized from her family in Soviet-occupied Germany after World War II. She sued BVVG Bodenverwertungs-und-Verwaltungs GmbH (BVVG), an agent of Germany, under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). BVVG argued that U.S. courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the taking was a domestic matter, not subject to the expropriation exception. The district court disagreed and denied BVVG’s motion to dismiss.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed Schubarth’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Germany but reversed and remanded as to BVVG, allowing the case to proceed. On remand, the district court directed jurisdictional discovery, and BVVG again moved to dismiss, claiming the expropriation was a domestic taking. The district court denied this motion, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of BVVG’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the 1945 expropriation of the Estate was not a domestic taking because it implicated both Germany and the Soviet Union, thus interfering with relations among states. The court concluded that the expropriation could not be considered a domestic taking and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the expropriation constituted a taking in violation of international law. View "Schubarth v. BVVG Bodenverwertungs- Und -Verwaltungs GMBH" on Justia Law

Kimball Wind, LLC operates a wind facility in Nebraska, generating electricity transmitted on a network owned by the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Before operations began, WAPA determined that a substation expansion was necessary to safely transmit the facility's electricity. WAPA offered to cover part of the expansion costs, requiring Kimball Wind to pay the rest. Kimball Wind agreed under protest, believing WAPA wrongfully made it responsible for most of the costs. Kimball Wind petitioned the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for an order directing WAPA to reimburse its contribution to the substation expansion.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission determined that section 211A of the Federal Power Act does not provide for the relief sought by Kimball Wind. The Commission found that Kimball Wind did not seek an order for transmission services, which is the sole form of relief provided by section 211A. Kimball Wind then filed a request for rehearing, arguing that the order was internally inconsistent and unsupported by substantial evidence. The Commission denied the request for rehearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the Commission that section 211A does not authorize the Commission to issue an order directing WAPA to reimburse Kimball Wind for its contribution to the substation expansion. The court found that Kimball Wind did not seek an order for transmission services, the only type of order the Commission may issue under section 211A. Consequently, the court denied the petition for review. View "Kimball Wind, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

David J. Rudometkin was found guilty of several offenses by a military judge in 2018 and sentenced to seventeen years of confinement. His post-trial motion for a mistrial was denied by another military judge after the original judge was suspended for inappropriate conduct. Rudometkin then submitted FOIA requests to the Army and the Department of Defense for records related to the judges involved. The government either did not respond meaningfully or rejected the requests under FOIA exemptions.Rudometkin filed a pro se complaint in the District Court in 2020, challenging the government's withholding of records. He later amended his complaint to focus solely on records related to the appointment of the Chief Trial Judge. The District Court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the government had adequately searched for records and appropriately withheld information under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege. The court also denied Rudometkin’s motions to amend his complaint to include his original FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the government did not establish that it properly withheld records under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege and had not shown that it released all reasonably segregable information. The court reversed and remanded on the segregability issue. However, the court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Rudometkin’s motion to amend his complaint, as his FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge was now live in a separate action. View "Rudometkin v. USA" on Justia Law