Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the case between East Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc., and others, against the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and American Electric Power Service Corporation (AEP), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed FERC's decision regarding AEP's calculation of its 2019 transmission rates. The petitioners, customers of AEP, challenged the calculation, but FERC rejected their claims. The petitioners then sought a review of the agency's decision.The court stated that FERC had correctly interpreted AEP's tariff terms and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. FERC's ruling was upheld on several points, including the denial of retroactive relief for alleged errors in previous rate years, the inclusion of certain coal-related costs in the 2019 rate, the classification of certain tax credits as prepayments for tax liabilities, and the classification of employee pension and benefit costs as non-contingent liabilities. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review. View "East Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the Federal Election Commission's (FEC) dismissal of an administrative complaint by the Campaign Legal Center (CLC). The CLC alleged campaign finance violations by two presidential campaign committees, claiming that they concealed over $750 million in expenditures by routing them through sham payments to two LLCs. The FEC dismissed the complaint, invoking prosecutorial discretion. The CLC argued that the FEC's invocation of discretion was dependent on legal analysis and was thus subject to judicial review under the Federal Election Campaign Act. The district court concluded that the FEC's reliance on considerations of prosecutorial discretion was separate from its legal analysis and precluded judicial review.On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the FEC's reasons for dismissal, which included resource allocation concerns, potential litigation risks, and a shifting regulatory landscape, were distinct considerations of prosecutorial discretion that did not solely rest on legal interpretation, and therefore were not reviewable by the court. The court rejected the CLC's argument that the FEC's invocation of discretion was intertwined with its legal analysis, stating that the agency's estimation of the resource demands of the proposed investigation and its potential size and scope bore no discernable relationship to any legal inquiry. View "Campaign Legal Center v. FEC" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit examined a case involving the City of Lincoln, also known as Lincoln Electric, a public utility providing electricity to the Lincoln, Nebraska area. Lincoln Electric had invested in the Laramie River Station facilities (LRS) in eastern Wyoming as a source of generation and transmission, despite only serving customers in the Lincoln area.When Lincoln Electric joined the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) in 2009, it transferred control of all its facilities in the Lincoln area to SPP, but retained control of its LRS interest. In 2021, the SPP proposed that Lincoln Electric recover its LRS costs from Zone 19 customers, where LRS is physically located. Other co-owners of the LRS facilities recover their costs from Zone 19 customers.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rejected the SPP proposal as unjust and unreasonable because Zone 19 customers neither caused Lincoln Electric's LRS investment nor benefited from it, thus violating the cost-causation principle. Lincoln Electric petitioned for review of the relevant FERC orders and the SPP intervened on Lincoln Electric's behalf.The court upheld FERC's decision, ruling that Lincoln Electric failed to demonstrate that the proposed rates were just and reasonable. The court concluded that cost allocation must reflect the costs actually caused by the customer who must pay them. In this case, Lincoln Electric's investment in the LRS was for the benefit of its own Zone 16 customers, not Zone 19 customers. As such, the court found that allocating Lincoln Electric's LRS costs to Zone 19 would violate the cost-causation principle. The petition for review was denied. View "City of Lincoln v. FERC" on Justia Law

In this case, an unincorporated association, Saline Parents, and six individuals sued the Attorney General of the United States, Merrick Garland, alleging that the Department of Justice (DOJ) was unlawfully attempting to silence them and others who opposed progressive curricula and policies in public schools. This lawsuit was in response to a memorandum issued by the Attorney General, expressing concern over the increase in reported incidents of harassment, intimidation, and threats of violence against school administrators, board members, teachers, and staff. The memorandum instructed the DOJ staff to investigate the issue and discuss strategies to address it. The plaintiffs argued that their protest activities, which included constitutionally protected conduct and did not involve threats of criminal violence, had been unfairly targeted by the DOJ.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the dismissal of the case by the District Court on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue this action. The court agreed with the government's argument that the plaintiffs' lawsuit was not ripe for adjudication, indicating that the plaintiffs' claims were based on hypothetical future events that may not occur. The court also found that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that the government had in any way threatened imminent enforcement action against them or had labeled them in a way that impugned their reputations. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' claim was based on contingencies and speculation, making the dispute premature for judicial resolution. View "Saline Parents v. Garland" on Justia Law

Thrifty Payless, Inc., doing business as Rite Aid, seeks judicial review of the National Labor Relations Board’s decision that Rite Aid committed unfair labor practices. The Board has cross-applied for enforcement of its order. An Administrative Law Judge concluded that Rite Aid had committed unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act when it unilaterally implemented its proposal. The ALJ determined that Rite Aid violated its duty to bargain in good faith because it took unilateral action even though the parties had not yet reached an impasse. The main issue here is whether Rite Aid was entitled to implement its own proposal instead of continuing negotiations with the union.   The DC Circuit denied Rite Aid’s petition for review. The court denied the Board’s cross-application for enforcement and remanded the order. The court found that the record contains enough evidence to support the Board’s finding that the parties were not at an impasse. An impasse arises when neither side is open to compromise. Further, the court explained that any reasonable consideration of exigency must consider “an employer’s need to run its business” and the inherently uncertain task of making corporate decisions in the face of a potential crisis. Here, the Board acknowledged that it was “impossible” for Rite Aid “to predict what claims might come in and how that would impact the reserves.” Rite Aid asserts without contest that the reserves as of November 2019 could only cover a few weeks’ worth of healthcare coverage for Rite Aid employees. So Rite Aid’s concern that inaction could have had damaging consequences is understandable. View "Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

In 2022, the Commission promulgated a rule that set stringent safety standards for the operating cords on custom-made window coverings based on a finding that such cords pose a strangulation risk to young children. The rule sought to eliminate the risk of injury by essentially prohibiting corded window products, and it set an aggressive timeline for industry compliance with the new standards. The Window Covering Manufacturers Association (“WCMA”) filed a petition in this court challenging the rule and its compliance deadline.   The DC Circuit granted WCMA’s petition for review and vacated the rule. The court held that the Commission breached notice-and-comment requirements, erroneously relied on certain data in its cost-benefit analysis, and selected an arbitrary effective date for the rule. The court reasoned that the Commission did not explain why it chose to credit the opinion of Safe T Shade’s company president over the contrary feedback that it received from 401 other commenters, the Small Business Association, and its own staff.  The court explained that if the Commission wishes to extend a safety standard’s effective date, it must find good cause to do so, and regardless of such an extension, the Commission must find that the effective date. View "Window Covering Manufacturers Association v. CPSC" on Justia Law

Hospitals treating Medicare beneficiaries receive greater reimbursements to the extent that the beneficiaries are also entitled to supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The Secretary of Health and Human Services understands this population to include only patients receiving cash payments during the month in question. Various hospitals contend that this population also includes patients receiving a subsidy under Medicare Part D and vocational training. The district court disagreed and granted summary judgment to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the hospitals argued that Empire compels their construction of the phrase “entitled to supplementary security income benefits.” The court wrote that this s argument misses key distinctions between the Part A and SSI schemes. First, Part A benefits extend well beyond payment for specific services at specific times. Moreover, the court explained that age or chronic disability makes a person eligible for Part A benefits “without an application or anything more,” and individuals rarely, if ever lose this eligibility over time.   Moreover, the court explained that the hospitals contend that HHS arbitrarily excluded patients whose SSI benefits were withheld under the so-called “cross-program recovery” scheme. The court reasoned that this assertion is mistaken. Next, the court explained that the hospitals contend that HHS unreasonably focused on whether patients receive SSI payments when hospitalized because the payments depend on income and resource levels from earlier months. But “eligibility” for the SSI benefit “for a month” depends on the individual’s income, resources, and other characteristics “in such month.” View "Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Xavier Becerra" on Justia Law

Hospitals receive greater payment if their Medicare patients are disproportionately low-income individuals entitled to federal supplemental security income benefits. Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center contends that the Department of Health and Human Services undercounted the number of its Medicare patients who were entitled to SSI benefits and thus undercompensated the hospital for treating them. Pomona sought to prove the undercount through data from state benefit programs that piggyback on SSI. In an administrative proceeding, Pomona introduced expert testimony explaining how the state data derives from and overlaps with the federal SSI data. The Provider Reimbursement Review Board held that Pomona failed to prove the undercount, but the district court set aside its decision and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that using statewide statistics, Pomona estimated that fewer than 10 such patients would likely show up in its SSI-fraction calculations in any given year. And neither the Board nor the Contractor countered these estimates. Given the lack of contrary evidence in the record, such discrepancies appear immaterial and suggest no substantial flaw in Pomona’s methodology. Further, the court explained that Pomona provided uncontroverted evidence that two potential difficulties with its approach amounted to little more than rounding errors. It proffered creditable testimony from two experts indicating that the only explanation for the discrepancy was some error in CMS’s collection or matching of data. By contrast, the Contractor remained silent. Given the strength of the hospital’s showing, and the absence of any countervailing evidence, the Board’s conclusion that Pomona had failed to prove an undercount was unreasonable View "Pomona Valley Hospital Med v. Xavier Becerra" on Justia Law

Ascendium Education Solutions (“Ascendium”) is a Program guarantor that previously charged debt-collection costs to defaulting Program borrowers who entered loan rehabilitation agreements. Ascendium challenged the Department of Education’s Rule, 34 C.F.R. Section 682.410(b)(2)(i), under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), arguing that the Department of Education and its Secretary (collectively, the “Department”) did not have statutory authority to promulgate the Rule because the Rule conflicts with the Act. The district court ruled that Ascendium lacked standing to challenge the Rule as it applies to borrowers who enter repayment agreements. But the district court held that the Rule exceeded the Department’s authority under the Act with respect to borrowers who enter rehabilitation agreements. Both Ascendium and the Department appealed.   The DC Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. The court concluded that Ascendium has standing to challenge the entirety of the Rule, that the Rule is consistent with the Act and therefore is lawful, and that the Rule is not arbitrary or capricious. The court explained that the Rule prohibits a guarantor from charging collection costs to a borrower who enters a repayment plan or a rehabilitation agreement during the initial default period: It implicitly deems such costs “unreasonable” under the circumstances. The court concluded that the Rule is consistent with the Act’s requirement that “reasonable” collection costs must be passed on to borrowers. Further, the court explained that the Department’s response to Ascendium’s comment adequately refuted Ascendium’s assumption that the purpose of the Rule should be to incentivize guarantors to enter rehabilitation agreements by allowing them to charge collection costs. View "Ascendium Education Solutions, Inc. v. Miguel Cardona" on Justia Law

After the FDA promulgated regulations applying the Act to vaping products, Fontem US, LLC, submitted numerous applications to market its flavored and unflavored vaping products. The FDA denied all of them, concluding Fontem had not shown its products were “appropriate for the protection of the public health.” Fontem petitioned for review, arguing the denial was unlawful.   The DC Circuit denied the petition for review as to Fontem’s flavored products and granted the petition for review with respect to the unflavored products. The court explained that as to Fontem’s flavored products, the FDA reasonably found a lack of evidence that the benefits of such products to adult smokers sufficiently outweighed the potential risks to young non-smokers. The court wrote that as to Fontem’s unflavored products, however, the FDA acted unlawfully by failing to engage in the holistic public health analysis required by the statute. The court concluded that the agency did not take into account the potential benefits of unflavored products or weigh those benefits against risks to public health. Instead, the agency identified highly granular deficiencies but failed to evaluate the potential effects of such deficiencies on public health or to weigh these deficiencies against the potential benefits of Fontem’s products. View "Fontem US, LLC v. FDA" on Justia Law