Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
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Schwab Multimedia received a construction permit from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). But Schwab never built its station. Though the FCC granted Schwab’s first three requests for more time, it denied Schwab’s fourth. Schwab appealed the FCC’s decision, claiming that it was arbitrary and capricious.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that the FCC based its denial of Schwab’s tolling request on three underlying determinations, and those determinations were reasonable. First, the FCC reasonably found that Schwab had no construction site. Indeed, Schwab admitted as much. It told the Media Bureau that the landlord of the original site had “rescinded [its] verbal agreement . . . to use the site.” And it offered no evidence to suggest that it had since secured the landlord’s permission. Second, it was reasonable for the FCC to conclude that site loss was the real reason Schwab could not build. Third, the FCC reasonably held that site loss is not a legitimate basis for tolling. Further, Schwab produced no evidence to show that good cause would support a waiver. View "Levine/Schwab Partnership v. FCC" on Justia Law

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The International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, ILA, AFL-CIO (“the Union” or “IOM”), has been the lawful bargaining agent for the Licensed Deck Officers (“LDOs”) on four container ships that carry goods between ports in California and Hawaii. The Pasha Group purchased the ships, and its wholly owned subsidiary, Sunrise Operations, LLC (“Sunrise”), now operates the vessels and is the most recent successor employer of the LDOs. The Union filed unfair labor practice (“ulp”) charges with the National Labor Relations Board (“Board” or “NLRB”). The Board’s General Counsel then filed a complaint alleging that Sunrise had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”), when it failed to provide information to the Union and declined to participate in arbitration proceedings in Maryland.   The DC Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded the case for reconsideration. The court held that it is clear that the majority opinion for the Board purports to decide the case without regard to the parties’ principal claims presented to the ALJ, and it rests on a position that was never advanced by Sunrise either before the ALJ or in its exceptions to the Board. Sunrise never argued that the disposition of this case should turn on the employer’s subjective beliefs about whether the LDOs were supervisors. Thus, the court found that the Board’s holding, in this case, lacks support in the record, defies established law, and creates a new rule without reasoned justification. It thus fails substantial evidence review and is arbitrary and capricious for want of reasoned decision-making. View "International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, ILA, AFL-CIO v. NLRB" on Justia Law

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The States of Illinois and Nevada (collectively referred to as “the States” or “Plaintiffs”) filed a mandamus action in the district court, seeking to compel the Archivist of the United States to certify and publish the Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”) as part of the Constitution of the United States. The States argued that the Archivist had a duty to certify and publish the ERA because it was ratified by the requisite three-fourths of the States of the Union as required by Article V of the Constitution. The district court agreed, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the States have not clearly and indisputably shown that the Archivist had a duty to certify and publish the ERA or that Congress lacked the authority to place a time limit in the proposing clause of the ERA. Under the rigid standard required for mandamus actions, the court wrote it must affirm the district court’s dismissal of the States’ complaint on the ground that the lower court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. View "State of Illinois v. David Ferriero" on Justia Law

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The Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”) investigates allegations of practitioner misconduct before the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). Appellant sued the IRS under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), seeking disclosure of documents relating to the OPR’s investigation of a misconduct report on him. The district court ruled that the four documents were protected from disclosure by FOIA Exemption 5’s deliberative process privilege and granted summary judgment to the IRS. Appellant contends that the withheld documents are nondeliberative and, therefore, unprotected by Exemption 5.   The DC Circuit affirmed in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the IRS and reversed in part as to the Marchetti Memo and the Kelly Memo. The court explained that withholding the contested documents, with the exception of the Kelly Memo and the unprotected portion of the Marchetti Memo, is consonant with Exemption 5’s purposes. At least some of the recommendations in the contested documents were not adopted in the OPR’s ultimate determination, so disclosure of the authors’ potentially mistaken recommendations might have a chilling effect on their willingness to make such recommendations. Further, the court wrote that insofar as the OPR’s ultimate determination departs from the course of action proposed by at least some of the contested documents or from their reasoning, the release of those predecisional documents might well mislead the public about the OPR’s view of Appellant’s conduct. View "Bradley Waterman v. IRS" on Justia Law

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Petitioners PF Sunset Plaza, LLC (“Sunset Plaza”) and PF Holdings, LLC (“Holdings”) were each assessed monetary penalties by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) for violations of their duty to provide “decent, safe, and sanitary housing” to low-income families under Section 8. Petitioners petitioned to reverse ALJ decisions dismissing these HUD enforcement actions against them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. At issue on appeal is whether the statute operates to bar the appeal of a civil monetary penalty should a respondent miss the fifteen-day deadline to request an administrative hearing?   The DC Circuit answered yes, and denied both petitions. The court explained that Petitioners claim that because the deadline falls under a subheading entitled “Final Orders,” a final order from HUD must occur before operation of the deadline commences. Petitioners argued that HUD’s issuance of a complaint is simply an invitation to engage in litigation, not a triggering of the fifteen-day deadline. Because HUD issued no final order here, they contest that the fifteen-day period never began. The court held that Petitioners misunderstand the statutory subheading. Congress entitled the section “Final Orders” because it enumerates two examples of how HUD’s penalties become final. View "PF Holdings, LLC v. HUD" on Justia Law

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Appellant, an intelligence analyst at the FBI, wants his employer to use available software that is accessible to blind employees like himself. Both parties agree that Section 794d of the Rehabilitation Act generally requires federal agencies, including the FBI, to use technology that is accessible to employees with disabilities. But the district court dismissed Appellant’s action on the ground that the Rehabilitation Act does not give him any right to bring a lawsuit against the FBI to enforce that obligation.   The DC Circuit reversed. The court held that the plain text of Section 794d extends a private right of action to all persons with disabilities who file administrative complaints requesting accessible technology and who seek only injunctive and declaratory relief. The court explained that Congress amended 29 U.S.C. Section 794d to make sure that agencies would fulfill their responsibility to procure technology that allows employees with disabilities to participate fully in the workplace. To enforce that duty, Congress expressly provided a private right of action to any individual with a disability, including a federal employee, who first files an administrative complaint about inaccessible technology—a group of which Appellant is undoubtedly a member. View "Jahinnslerth Orozco v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

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The Edison Electric Institute and NorthWestern Corporation, d/b/a NorthWestern Energy (collectively, “Utilities”) petition for review of an order by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“Commission”) in which the Commission granted Broadview Solar’s application to become a qualifying facility under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”). The Solar Energy Industries Association (“SEIA”) petitions for review of the Commission’s denial of its motion to intervene in the adjudication of Broadview’s application.   The DC Circuit concluded that the Commission’s interpretation of the statute is entitled to deference and that the Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously and accordingly denied the Utilities’ petitions. The court explained that the Utilities challenge the Commission’s decision to look at Broadview’s instantaneous net power output and not its power output over time. The statute measures “power production capacity” in “megawatts.” But power production over time is measured in “megawatt-hours.” Rather than being arbitrary and capricious, the Commission’s focus on instantaneous power production adhered to the statutory language.   Further, the court dismissed SEIA’s petitions because it lacks Article III standing. The court explained that SEIA’s failure to timely intervene is the result of its own mistaken judgment. The effect of that mistake—SEIA’s inability to participate in the Commission’s proceedings—does not give rise to an Article III injury. View "Solar Energy Industries Association v. FERC" on Justia Law

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The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (“the CFPB”) promulgated the Prepaid Rule, which regulates digital wallets and other prepaid accounts. As relevant here, the Rule requires financial institutions to make certain disclosures by using model language or other “substantially similar” wording. Challenging the Rule on statutory, administrative, and constitutional grounds, PayPal sued the CFPB. The district court reached only PayPal’s statutory claims, vacating part of the Rule because it mandated a “model clause” in violation of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (“EFTA”). In this case, PayPal and the CFPB proceed on the assumption that EFTA prohibits mandatory model clauses, and so the DC Circuit considered only whether the Prepaid Rule mandates such a clause.   The DC Circuit reversed. The court concluded the CFPB’s Prepaid Rule does not mandate a “model clause” in contravention of EFTA. That the Rule’s content and formatting requirements do not fall within the meaning of “model clause” does not necessarily mean the CFPB can impose whatever content and formatting requirements it chooses. The court directed that on remand, the district court may consider PayPal’s other challenges to the Rule, including the APA and constitutional claims, which remain to be addressed. View "PayPal, Inc. v. CFPB" on Justia Law

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In 2019, the Department of Justice announced that it would resume federal executions using a new lethal agent: the drug pentobarbital. Shortly thereafter, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for the Bureau of Prisons’ records related to its procurement of pentobarbital. The Bureau of Prisons supplied some records but withheld any information that could identify companies in the government’s pentobarbital supply chain. The Bureau invoked FOIA Exemption 4, which protects, among other things, trade secrets and confidential commercial information. The district court sustained those withholdings and entered judgment for the Bureau.   The DC Circuit reversed. The court concluded that on de novo review that the Bureau of Prisons has not met its burden to justify the challenged nondisclosures. In particular, the Bureau has not provided the detailed and specific explanation required to justify withholding the information as “commercial” and “confidential” under Exemption 4. The court remanded to the district court to determine in the first instance whether and to what extent any information in the public domain is the basis on which the government seeks to withhold any records or reasonably segregable portions thereof under Exemption 4. View "CREW v. DOJ" on Justia Law

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The petitions for review sought reversal of a refund order by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission) upon finding a discrepancy in petitioner Ameren Illinois’s self-reported operational costs. Instead of reporting construction-related materials and supplies costs on line 5 of page 227 of Form 1, Ameren Illinois reported these costs on line 8 with the result that it over-collected for transmission costs. The Commission found that this reporting error was contrary to Ameren Illinois’s filed rate, which, prior to June 1, 2020, did not allow it to recover costs recorded to line 5 of page 227.   The DC Circuit affirmed the Order, denying review and reconsideration. The court explained that the Commission’s decision that Ameren lacked the discretion to report construction-related costs on line 8 was not unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, or otherwise contrary to law. The court reasoned that although the Commission “may not retroactively alter a filed rate to compensate for prior over- or underpayments,” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. FERC, 571 F.3d 1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2009), that is not what occurred here. All the Commission has done is require Ameren Illinois to correct a reporting error that resulted in overcharging customers for expenses not allowed under Ameren Illinois’s then-registered formula rate. Its contrary arguments fail to demonstrate that the refund order was unjust or contrary to the law. View "Ameren Illinois Company v. FERC" on Justia Law