Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The City of Salisbury, North Carolina relies on the Yankin River for its drinking water. The City constructed a pump station on the Yankin River, which the City believed was threatened by a plan proposed by the operator of a nearby hydroelectric damn and approved by FERC. The City challenged the plan and FERC's approval.The D.C. Circuit dismissed the City's petition, finding that the proposed rule was within the license granted to the dam operator and was not arbitrary. The operator of the dam was required to implement a flood protection plan, including 1.) physical modifications to the facilities such as a protective dike for the pump station, 2.) improved access to the pump station with the road consistent with the City of Salisbury’s design or 3.) other feasible options for achieving the same benefits. The proposed plan meets the requirement of the flood protection plan. Additionally, the court determined that FERC's approval of the plan was not arbitrary. View "City of Salisbury, North Carolina v. FERC" on Justia Law

Various members of the Hemp Industries Association ("Association") sought declaratory and injunctive relief following a DEA rule passed in the wake of the Farm bill. The Association specifically wanted to prevent the DEA from enforcing the CSA as it related to two byproducts of the hemp-extract production process. The district court dismissed the Association's claim, finding that it impermissibly challenged the DEA rule by failing to use the statutory review provision for rules promulgated under the Controlled Substances Act.The D.C. Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court did not err in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Association's claims seek review of issues that were outside the scheme set forth in 21 U.S.C. Sec. 877. View "Hemp Industries Association v. DEA" on Justia Law

Various members of the Hemp Industries Association ("Members") challenged a DEA rule emoving Epidiolex as a Schedule V controlled substance as well as the accompanying import-export controls over the substance. The DEA removed Epidiolex after the passage of the Farm Bill, which relaxed regulation of the cannabis plant.The D.C. Circuit dismissed the Members' petition, finding that they lacked standing. The Members were unable to show that they suffered any injury as a result of the DEA rule. The Members did not claim that they produce Epidiolex or that Epidiolex manufacturers compete with the Members. View "Hemp Industries Association v. DEA" on Justia Law

In this claim brought by an organization dedicated to ocean preservation against the National Marine Fisheries Service, a division of the U.S. Department of Commerce, the DC Circuit affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of the government defendants. In doing so, the court rejected both of the organization's claims that the National Marine Fisheries Service failed to provide sufficient protection for the dusky shark.The court held that the National Marine Fisheries Service did not violate the Magnuson-Stevens Act by failing to actually limit bycatch of the overfished dusky shark or hold fisheries accountable to any level of dusky shark bycatch. Nor did the national Marine Fisheries Service violate the Magnuson-Stevens Act by failing to establish a reasonable likelihood that training measures, communication protocols, and minor gear changes would reduce dusky shark bycatch by 35 percent, which is the minimum reduction needed to meet the statutory requirement to rebuild the dusky shark population. View "Oceana, Inc. v. Gina Raimondo" on Justia Law

Appellant, a suspected terrorist, plotted with a confidential informant to rob and murder a diamond dealer. Appellant was arrested after he provided two semi-automatic guns for use in the crime. While in pretrial detention, Appellant orchestrated a plot to prevent the informant from testifying against him. Appellant eventually pleaded guilty to the felon-in-possession count, and the government agreed to drop tampering and obstruction charges.In 2015, Appellant sought all FBI records containing his name, and any terrorism investigation he may have been a part of. The FBI denied the request. Citing the Appellant's plea agreement from the felon-in-possession case from years before, the district court granted summary judgment to the FBI.FOIA waivers must serve a legitimate criminal-justice interest to be enforceable. Here, the D.C. Circuit found that the waiver served such interests because it protected the safety of the confidential informant. The court also concluded that the waiver covered all documents requested by Appellant. View "Jihad Barnes v. FBI" on Justia Law

Appellant used an email application on his laptop to send Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") records requests to fourteen components of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). Not having received any response, he filed a complaint in district court almost seven months later seeking an order to require the DOD to conduct a search for and promptly produce the requested records. Appellant attached copies of the emails to the complaint. The DOD responded by moving for summary judgment, relying on a DOD official’s declaration that all fourteen components had searched for but had not received any request from Appellant. The district court granted the DOD’s motion, concluding that Appellant had not created a genuine dispute as to the DOD’s “receipt” of the requests under 5 U.S.C. Section 552(a)(6)(A)(i).   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment to the DOD. First, Appellant argued that it “goes well beyond any agency deference and borders on vacuous” to allow the government to prevail based solely on a declaration that it could not find a request. But, the court reasoned, Appellant’s framing—that any declaration denying receipt after a search would warrant granting summary judgment to the government—is flawed. The court affords a presumption of good faith only if we conclude that an agency’s declaration is “relatively detailed and non-conclusory, and . . . submitted in good faith.”  The court explained that Appellant, who filed suit over six months after saving the requests on his computer, has presented insufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute regarding the DOD’s “receipt” of his FOIA requests View "Patrick Eddington v. DOD" on Justia Law

Arthur Gary, General Counsel of the Justice Management Division at the Department of Justice, sent a letter to the Census Bureau requesting the addition of a citizenship question to the 2020 Census. Then-Secretary of Commerce relied on the Gary Letter to direct the Census Bureau to include a citizenship question on the Census questionnaire.Shortly after the Department of Justice sent the Gary Letter, the Campaign Legal Center filed a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request with the Justice Department seeking documents that would explain how and why the agency came to request the citizenship question. The Department withheld more than 100 pages of responsive documents under FOIA Exemptions 5 and 6. The district court held that some of the Justice Department’s withholdings based on the deliberative process privilege were improper, and ordered the Department to produce those documents.   The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment as to all drafts of the Gary Letter and most of the associated emails. The court remanded the withholding decision regarding the five emails identified above for further consideration. The court held that the Justice Department properly withheld non-final drafts of the letter and that most of the Department’s redactions of associated emails were lawful. The court reasoned that the process of drafting the Gary Letter to request the addition of a citizenship question in a way that protected the Department’s litigation and policy interests involved the exercise of policymaking discretion, and so the letter’s content itself was a relevant final decision for purposes of FOIA’s deliberative process privilege. View "Campaign Legal Center v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of organizations devoted to animal welfare and individuals who work with those organizations and with marine mammals, sued the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) and its parent agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), seeking to enforce conditions in permits held by SeaWorld, a business operating several marine zoological parks. The permits authorize the capture and display of orcas and require display facilities to transmit medical and necropsy data to the NMFS following the death of an animal displayed under the terms of a permit. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ suit for lack of standing.   The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court reasoned that to establish standing, a plaintiff “must show (1) an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct; and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Ent., Inc., 659 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011).   Here, the court found that Plaintiffs failed to allege a favorable decision would lead the NMFS to enforce the permit conditions and thus redress their alleged injury. Their allegation to the contrary relies upon unadorned speculation that the NMFS would choose to enforce the necropsy permit conditions and that SeaWorld would voluntarily send necropsy information to an agency that had not enforced permit conditions in twenty-three years should the court determine that the NMFS retains its discretion to enforce permits it issued prior to 1994. View "Lori Marino v. NOAA" on Justia Law

Petitioner is an experienced airline pilot. When he was interviewing for a new position, he was asked to take a urine test. Unable to provide an adequate sample, Petitioner left the site. Under FAA guidelines, walking out before providing a drug test sample is considered a refusal. The potential employer reported Petitioner's refusal to the FAA. The FAA sought to revoke Petitioner's pilot and medical certifications. However, at a hearing in front of the National Safety Transportation Board, the Board agreed with the FAA in sustaining the refusal, but reduced Petitioner's sanction to a 180-suspension.The D.C. Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, finding that by walking out before providing a sufficient urine sample, Petitioner's conduct was properly considered a refusal. In so holding, the court noted that the trial court credited the FAA witnesses while questioning the veracity of Petitioner's testimony.The D.C. Circuit also granted the FAA's cross-petition, finding that the Board was required to defer to the FAA under these circumstances. View "Ydil Pham v. NTSB" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of blood plasma companies, challenged a U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") rule precluding aliens from entering the U.S. using B-1 business visitor visas to sell plasma. Plaintiffs claimed that they invested substantial resources to develop plasma collection facilities near the border and that the CPB rule failed to take Plaintiffs' interests into account when creating the new rule.The district court denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the Plaintiffs' interests were not within the Administrative Procedure Act's "zone of interests." The district court, determining the zone-of-interest determination was jurisdictional, dismissed the complaint.The D.C. Circuit reversed. For the Plaintiffs to sue under the APA, they must have been “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." However, the zone-of-interests determination is a merits issue, not a jurisdictional one. From there, the D.C. Circuit considered the merits, finding that the Plainitffs' case interests should have been considered under the B-1 analysis. Thus, the court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CSL Plasma Inc. v. United States Customs and Border Protection" on Justia Law