Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

PCTC filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) seeking release of USGS records relating to the agency's coal tar sealant studies. USGS produced 52,000 pages of records, but withheld the modeling data and personally identifiable information relevant to this appeal. USGS withheld the model runs under Exemption Five on the ground that the release of the exploratory analysis would inhibit the ability to freely explore and analyze data without concern for external criticism. USGS withheld the house dust study participants' personal information under Exemption Six because release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and would not serve a public interest because the pertinent scientific data associated in this category of records is already released. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the district court granted USGS's motion.The DC Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court PCTC's claims regarding the urban lakes model runs withheld under Exemption Five, concluding that USGS failed to carry its burden to show that the model runs are pre-decisional. Furthermore, USGS failed to prove beyond dispute that the model runs are deliberative. Therefore, the absence of evidence establishing that the requested model runs are protected from disclosure amounts to the agency's failure to establish that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. However, the court affirmed the district court's decision to withhold the house dust study location information under Exemption Six. The court explained that the study participants have a greater than de minimis privacy interest in their addresses, household compositions, smoking and cooking habits, and the extensive personal details included in the questionnaires. The court further explained that releasing their addresses serves no cognizable public interest. View "Pavement Coatings Technology Council v. United States Geological Survey" on Justia Law

This case involves four subgroups of the Drone Advisory Committee (DAC), which provided advice to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The subgroups—one subcommittee and three task groups—provided advice to the DAC, but never directly to the FAA. At issue is whether section 10(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) applies to records that these subgroups created but never provided to the DAC.The DC Circuit held that the DAC subgroups were not themselves advisory committees and that section 10(b) of FACA does not extend to documents that the subgroups created but never gave to the DAC. The court found unpersuasive EPIC's contentions that the subcommittee and task groups satisfy FACA's definition of an advisory committee. Rather, the court concluded that the subgroups here provided no advice to the FAA directly, and the DAC functioned as more than a rubber-stamp for the subgroups' work product. As to section 10(b), the court concluded that the present dispute involves only records created by the subgroups and never given to the DAC; such records were neither "made available to" nor "prepared for or by" the DAC; and, instead, the records were "prepared for or by" the subgroups themselves. View "Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Drone Advisory Committee" on Justia Law

Webb, a disabled veteran, was referred to U.S. Vets, which administered the Supportive Housing Program, for participants to live with a roommate in multiple-occupancy units, and Shelter Plus Care, for chronically homeless veterans with disabilities to live in one-bedroom units without roommates or two-bedroom units with a roommate. Webb alleges that he qualified for a one-bedroom unit through Shelter Plus. Vets allegedly told him that no one-bedroom unit was available and placed him temporarily in a multiple-occupancy unit. . A few months later, Vets placed a female applicant in its Shelter Plus Care program although she had indicated on her application that she was not chronically homeless. Webb alleges that she was “given preferential treatment because she is a female” in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604(a).The district court dismissed Webb's suit, concluding that because Webb had paid no rent, he had “no legally protected interest.” The D.C. Circuit reversed. Under the Act, it is unlawful to “make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” Any person who . . . claims to have been injured by” conduct prohibited by section 3604 is an “aggrieved person.” Webb alleged that housing was made “unavailable” based on his sex, regardless of whether he paid rent. View "Webb v. United States Veterans Initiative and Community Partnership" on Justia Law

T-Mobile's call centers employ customer service representatives (CSRs). Since 2009, the union, CWA, has attempted to organize T-Mobile CSRs but has not filed a representation petition. In 2015, T-Mobile launched T-Voice to “Enhance Customers and Frontline experience by identifying, discussing, and communicating solutions for roadblocks for internal and external customers. Provide a vehicle for Frontline feedback and create a closed-loop communication with T-Mobile Sr. Leadership,” with T-Voice representatives at each call center. T-Mobile emailed all CSRs: You can raise issues by reaching out to your T-Voice representatives. Prospective T-Voice representatives were told that they would be “responsible for gathering pain points from your peers.”CWA alleged that T-Voice was a labor organization under the National Labor Relations Act (Section 2(5)), T-Mobile supported T-Voice (Section 8(a)(2)), and its operation of T-Voice constituted solicitation of grievances during an ongoing organizing campaign and an implied promise to remedy those grievances (Section 8(a)(1)). The Board concluded that T-Voice did not “deal with” T-Mobile as required for it to be a “labor organization” and its operation did not violate Section 8(a)(2); given the duration of CWA’s organizing campaign, there was no inference that T-Voice would tend to erode employee support for union organizing.The D.C. Circuit upheld the Board’s finding that the creation of T-Voice was not aimed at interfering with union organizing but remanded with respect to whether T-Voice constitutes a labor organization. The Board has two lines of precedent: one holding an organization is not engaged in “dealing with” an employer unless the organization makes “group proposals,” the other has no such requirement. The Board needs to identify what standard it has adopted for separating “group proposals” from proposals of employee representatives. View "Communications Workers of America v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 301, sets forth separate and detailed regimes for the regulation of medical products classified as drugs or devices. Since 2017, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has exercised its claimed discretion to classify Genus’s “Vanilla SilQ” line of diagnostic contrast agents as drugs, notwithstanding the FDA’s recognition that the products “appear” to satisfy the statutory definition for devices. Contrast agents are used in medical imaging to improve the visualization of tissues, organs and physiological processes. The FDA claims that, if a medical product satisfies the statutory definitions of both a “drug” and a “device,” the Act’s overlapping definitions grant by implication the FDA broad discretion to regulate the product under either regime. Genus challenged the FDA’s classification decision as inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2), and the FDCA.The D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Genus. The FDCA unambiguously forecloses the FDA’s interpretation. “It would make little sense, then, for the Congress to have constructed such elaborate regulatory regimes—carefully calibrated to products’ relative risk levels—only for the FDA to possess the authority to upend the statutory scheme by reclassifying any device as a drug, no matter its relative risk level.” View "Genus Medical Technologies LLC v. United States Food and Drug Administration" on Justia Law

Wilton Rancheria, a Sacramento area Indian tribe, was federally recognized in 1927. The 1958 Rancheria Act disestablished Wilton and 40 other reservations. In 1979, several California rancherias, including Wilton, sued. The government agreed to restore Indian status. Wilton was erroneously excluded from the settlement. In 2009, the Department of the Interior restored Wilton’s federal recognition and agreed to “accept in trust certain lands formerly belonging to” Wilton. Wilton petitioned to acquire 282 acres near Galt for a casino. A draft environmental impact statement (EIS), under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321–4347, identified alternatives, including a 30-acre Elk Grove parcel. Wilton changed its preference and requested that the Department acquire the Elk Grove location. Objectors responded that acquiring the Elk Grove location would moot pending state-court suits.The Department’s final EIS identified the Elk Grove location as the preferred alternative. The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary– Indian Affairs, Roberts, signed the Record of Decision (ROD) pursuant to delegated authority. Roberts had served as Acting Assistant Secretary– Indian Affairs (AS–IA), but after his acting status lapsed under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, Roberts continued to exercise the non-exclusive AS–IA functions. Black, who became Acting AS–IA in the new administration, signed off on the acquisition.Objectors filed suit before the issuance of the Department’s ROD and unsuccessfully sought a temporary restraining order. The D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Department, rejecting claims that the Department impermissibly delegated the authority to make a final agency action to acquire the land to an official who could not wield this authority, was barred from acquiring land in trust on behalf of Wilton’s members, and failed to comply with NEPA. View "Stand Up For California! v. United States Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

After the Indian Health Service agreed to pay the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community to run a health program on the Swinomish Reservation, Swinomish filed suit under the Contract Disputes Act and Declaratory Judgment Act, claiming that it was owed additional sums in direct and indirect contract support for costs calculated as percentages of the money it received from insurers and spent on health services. The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the government's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act does not require Indian Health Service to pay for contract support costs on insurance money received by Swinomish. Neither does Swinomish's contract with Indian Health Service. View "Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. Becerra" on Justia Law

CREW filed a citizen complaint with the Federal Election Commission against New Models, a now-defunct non-profit entity, alleging violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act’s (FECA) registration and reporting requirements for “political committees,” 52 U.S.C. 30109(a)(1). After an initial investigation, the Commission deadlocked 2–2 on whether to proceed; an affirmative vote of four commissioners is required to initiate enforcement proceedings. With only two votes in favor of an enforcement action against New Models, the Commission dismissed CREW’s complaint. Two Commissioners explained that New Models did not qualify as a “political committee” under FECA but stated they were also declining to proceed with enforcement in an "exercise of ... prosecutorial discretion,” given the age of the activity and the fact that the organization appears no longer active.The district court granted the Commission summary judgment, reasoning that a nonenforcement decision is not subject to judicial review if the Commissioners who voted against enforcement “place[] their judgment squarely on the ground of prosecutorial discretion.” The Commission’s “legal analyses are reviewable only if they are the sole reason for the dismissal of an administrative complaint.” The D.C. Circuit affirmed. While FECA allows a private party to challenge a nonenforcement decision by the Commission if it is “contrary to law,” this decision was based in part on prosecutorial discretion and is not reviewable. View "Citizens for Responsibility v. Federal Election Committee" on Justia Law

Appellant, who was convicted in 2011 of federal narcotics charges based partly on GPS surveillance conducted by DEA, submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to DEA for a CD "containing the DEA computer file of all tracking information collected via GPS devices attached to [his] vehicles with all images and proprietary software associated with that information from January 23, 2009 thr[ough] July 30, 2009, the very same file used by DEA to prepare exhibits for trial." DEA produced 351 spreadsheet pages listing latitude and longitude coordinate data generated by the tracking device. Appellant found the data unusable without access to the internet or topographical maps.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to DEA, concluding that because DEA does not possess the GPS mapping software or any related map images and never created or retained the map images introduced at appellant's trial, FOIA does not obligate DEA now to create such map images in the first instance. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of appellant's motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint where appellant failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion. View "Aguiar v. Drug Enforcement Administration" on Justia Law

VoteVets claims that the Federal Advisory Committee Act applies to an entity allegedly established by President Trump and the Department of Veterans Affairs to advise the Department. VoteVets calls the entity the "Mar-a-Lago Council." VoteVets alleged that although the Council operated for nearly two years and provided advice on various topics, the Department failed to comply with the Act's requirements.After determining that VoteVets has standing to sue, the DC Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of VoteVets' complaint, concluding that VoteVets plausibly alleges that the Council was a governmentally established or utilized advisory group within the meaning of the Act. In this case, the complaint states a claim under the Act based on the alleged advisory committee having been "established" by the President, possibly together with the agency. The court need not reach VoteVets' alternative theory that the group was "utilized" by the government. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "VoteVets Action Fund v. United States Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law