Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1994, Farrell, a U.S. citizen, moved to Switzerland. He married a Swiss citizen; they had a child. In 2004, he naturalized as a Swiss citizen, allegedly with the intent of relinquishing his U.S. nationality; 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(1) refers to “voluntarily … with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality … obtaining naturalization in a foreign state.” He subsequently made no use of his U.S. citizenship and did not enter the U.S. In 2013, Farrell was arrested in Spain and extradited to the U.S. He pled guilty to interstate travel with intent to engage in sex with a minor and possession of child pornography, which he committed 10 years earlier in the U.S., and was sentenced to imprisonment in the U.S.Farrell corresponded with the State Department, requesting a certificate of loss of nationality (CLN). He was told he would have to sign forms in person in front of a consular officer. Farrell argued that he had already committed the expatriating act when he naturalized in Switzerland and was now attesting that he did so voluntarily with the intent to lose his nationality. The Embassy responded that Farrell could not lose his citizenship while he was imprisoned in the U.S. Farrell sued, claiming that the in-person requirement was contrary to statute and arbitrary. The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court. While the Department has statutory authority to impose an in-person requirement, it acted arbitrarily in denying Farrell a CLN by offering conflicting and ever-evolving reasons for denying the CLN. View "Farrell v. Blinken" on Justia Law

The State Department posted to its website a list of frequently asked questions about international adoptions, stating that “a soft referral is not [an] acceptable practice.” This sentence sparked confusion because many adoption advocates had never heard the phrase “soft referral.” After receiving numerous questions, State updated its website in March 2018 to define “soft referrals” as either informing prospective adoptive parents about a specific child before the country of origin has determined that the child is eligible for intercountry adoption or matching a child to a family before approval of the prospective adoptive parents (“holding the child”). In May 2018, State again updated its website, stating an adoption service provider may sometimes informally match a child to prospective parents before parents complete their home study but cannot “hold” the child’s file in a way that prevents other providers from referring the child to other parents, discourages other parents from adopting the child, or prevents authorities from considering alternative parents. The new webpage claimed to clarify existing policies based on regulations that have been in place since 2006.The district court dismissed, for lack of standing, a suit by members of the National Council For Adoption, which helps prospective parents adopt children. The D.C. Circuit reversed. At least one member of the Council can establish injury, causation, and redressability, so the Council has associational standing. The guidance is a legislative rule and was issued without the required notice-and-comment process. View "National Council for Adoption v. Blinken" on Justia Law

Competitive carriers” compete with legacy “incumbent carriers,” descendants of AT&T’s broken-up monopoly that typically own local phone networks. Competitive carriers lease or purchase the use of incumbent networks to deliver services and, therefore, have greater geographic flexibility to pursue profitable markets. Servicing toll conference centers has been a particularly lucrative business; fee structures create an incentive to route calls through rural areas and encourage toll conference centers to operate there. As a result, some sparsely populated rural areas receive a disproportionate number of calls, resulting in overloaded networks, call blocking, and dropped calls. Long-distance carriers complained to the FCC.In a 2011 rule, the FCC designated carriers who exploited this regulatory loophole as “access stimulators” and imposed sanctions. The rule was not entirely successful. In 2018, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, targeting harmful access stimulation practices. After the close of the comment period, AT&T and NTCA (a trade association ) met with the FCC, which adopted rules largely following those proposed in its draft order but incorporating differentiated definitions proposed by AT&T and NTCA. The rule was intended to "properly align financial incentives by making the access-stimulating [carrier] responsible for paying for the part of the call path that it dictates.”The D.C. CIrcuit rejected a challenge by competitive carriers and companies that offer conference calls. The rule does not exceed the Commission’s statutory authority and is not arbitrary or unreasonable. View "Great Lakes Communication Corp v. Federal Communications Commission" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulates the transmission and wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce, 16 U.S.C. 824(b), and must approve changes to any rate or charge. PJM, a regional transmission organization that manages an electric grid covering 13 Mid-Atlantic and Midwestern states and the District of Columbia, meets its obligation to ensure sufficient generating capacity by conducting a yearly auction in which electricity suppliers submit offers to be available to provide capacity during a one-year period, three years in the future. The Variable Resource Requirement Curve (VRR Curve) represents the prices that consumers should pay for varying quantities of capacity. The intersection of the VRR and supply curves dictates the amount of capacity committed and the price suppliers are paid. The VRR Curve is set based on the amount of capacity that must be produced to meet peak demand to allow no more than one power outage every decade and how much revenue a hypothetical new generator (Reference Resource) would need to earn in the capacity market to justify construction.The Commission accepted PJM;s proposed revisions to the capacity market auction mechanism: keeping a combustion turbine plant as its Reference Resource and increasing the value of the Reference Resource’s estimated offer to supply energy by 10% (10% adder). The D.C. Circuit affirmed the approval of the Reference Resource as just and reasonable but vacated the approval of the 10% adder. View "Delaware Division of the Public Advocate v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs are residents of Gujarat, India, an Indian governmental entity, and a nonprofit focused on fish workers' rights. IFC is an international organization of 185 member countries. The plaintiffs allege that they have been injured by operations of India's coal-fired Tata Mundra Power Plant, owned and operated by CGPL. IFC loaned funds for the project and conditioned disbursement of those funds on CGPL’s compliance with certain environmental standards. The plaintiffs allege that IFC negligently failed to ensure that the Plant’s design and operation complied with these environmental standards but nonetheless disbursed funds to CGPL. These supervisory omissions and disbursement decisions allegedly took place at IFC’s Washington, D.C. headquarters.On remand from the Supreme Court, which held that organizations such as IFC possess more limited immunity equivalent to that enjoyed by foreign governments, the district court again ruled that IFC was immune from the claims. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. United States courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides that foreign states are immune from the jurisdiction of United States’ courts, 28 U.S.C. 1604; the commercial activity exception does not apply because the gravamen of the complaint is injurious activities that occurred in India. View "Jam v. International Finance Corp." on Justia Law

Defendants who enter into SEC consent decrees gain certain benefits: they may settle a complaint without admitting the SEC’s allegations, and often receive concessions. The SEC does not permit a defendant to consent to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while denying the allegations, 17 C.F.R. 202.5(e)). Cato alleged that SEC defendants are, therefore, unable to report publicly that the SEC threatened them with unfounded charges or otherwise coerced them into entering into consent decrees, impermissibly stifling public discussion of the SEC’s prosecutorial tactics. Cato has not entered into any SEC consent decree but alleges that it has contracted to publish a manuscript written by someone who is subject to such a consent decree and has been contacted by other such individuals, who would otherwise participate in panel discussions hosted by Cato on the topic of the SEC’s prosecutorial overreach, and allow Cato to publish their testimonials.Cato’s complaint invoked the First Amendment and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Cato’s complaint for lack of standing. Cato’s alleged injury is not redressable through this lawsuit; the no-deny provisions that bind the SEC defendants whose speech Cato wishes to publish would remain unable to allow Cato to publish their speech, given their consent decrees. View "Cato Institute v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

Educational Center treats patients with severe mental disabilities, some of whom suffer from severe self-injurious and aggressive behaviors that are difficult or impossible to treat using conventional behavioral and pharmacological techniques. Some patients have suffered brain trauma, broken and protruding bones, and blindness as a result of their behaviors. Before the ban, the Center treated some self-injurious and aggressive patients with an electrical stimulation device called a graduated electronic decelerator, which briefly shocks patients causing them to reduce or cease their self-injurious behaviors. The Center is the only facility in the country that uses electric shock therapy to treat individuals who severely self-injure or are aggressive. Other health care practitioners administer electrical stimulation devices to treat a wide variety of other conditions, including tobacco, alcohol, and drug addictions, as well as inappropriate sexual behaviors following traumatic brain injuries. The Center manufactures its own devices, which are regulated by the FDA, 21 U.S.C. 360c(a)(1)(B).In 2020, the FDA determined that the devices presented a substantial and unreasonable risk to self-injurious and aggressive patients and banned the devices for that purpose. The D.C. Circuit vacated the rule. Banning a medical device for a particular purpose regulates the practice of medicine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 396. View "The Judge Rotenberg Educational Center, Inc. v. United States Food and Drug Administration" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Consumer Product Safety Commission revised its safety standard for infant bath seats, stating: “Each infant bath seat shall comply with all applicable provisions of ASTM F1967–19, Standard Consumer Safety Specification for Infant Bath Seats.” When Milice, a then-expectant mother, contacted Commission staff about inspecting the ASTM standard, they were told they would have to purchase the standard from its developer. Milice challenged the 2019 Rule on the grounds that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the First and Fifth Amendments because its content is not freely available to the public. The D.C. Circuit declined to address Milice’s arguments, finding her petition for review was untimely, having been filed more than 60 days after the 2019 Rule was published in the Federal Register, 15 U.S.C. 2060(g)(2). A revised voluntary safety standard issued by an outside organization that serves as the basis of a Commission standard “shall be considered to be a consumer product safety standard issued by the Commission” effective 180 days after the Commission is notified, “unless . . . the Commission notifies the organization that it has determined that the proposed revision does not improve the safety of the consumer product covered by the standard,” 15 U.S.C. 2056a(b)(4)(B). View "Milice v. Consumer Product Safety Commission" on Justia Law

FBI agents impersonated members of the press so that they could trick an unknown student who had threatened to bomb his school into revealing his identity. When news of the FBI’s tactics became public, media organizations were incensed that their names and reputations had been used to facilitate the ruse. The Reporters Committee filed Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(3), requests seeking more information about the FBI’s ploy. The district court ruled that the government could withhold from disclosure dozens of the requested documents under FOIA Exemption 5, which states that agencies need not disclose “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” The court ruled that the documents are protected by the common law deliberative process privilege and that their disclosure would likely cause harm to the agency’s deliberative processes going forward.The D.C. Circuit affirmed in part. The government properly withheld the emails in which FBI leadership deliberated about appropriate responses to media and legislative pressure to alter FBI undercover tactics and internal conversations about the implications of changing undercover practices going forward. The government did not satisfy its burden to show either that the other documents at issue were deliberative or that their disclosure would cause foreseeable harm. View "Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. Federal Bureau of Investigation" on Justia Law

In 2018, the President directed the EPA to initiate rulemaking to consider expanding Reid Vapor Pressure waivers for fuel blends containing gasoline and up to 15 percent ethanol (E15), and to “increase transparency in the Renewable Identification Number (RIN) market,” a feature of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program. EPA issued a final rule in June 2019, after notice and comment, revising its regulations on fuel volatility and the RIN market. In Section II, EPA announced a new interpretation of when the limits on fuel volatility under the Clean Air Act could be waived under 42 U.S.C. 7545(h)(4), and relatedly reinterpreted the term “substantially similar” in Subsection 7545(f)(1)(A). The petroleum and ethanol industries and the Small Retailers Coalition challenged EPA’s decision to grant a fuel volatility waiver to E15.The D.C. Circuit vacated part of the E15 Rule. Section II exceeds EPA’s authority under Section 7545, which provides for a waiver: For fuel blends containing gasoline and 10 percent denatured anhydrous ethanol. The statute is straightforward in limiting waivers to 10 percent blends. A “petroleum engineer would not read instructions directing the preparation of a solution containing ‘10 percent denatured anhydrous ethanol’ to require the addition of anything other than 10 percent denatured anhydrous ethanol, and no more.” View "American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law