Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves the U.S. Sugar Corporation and other industry petitioners challenging the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) 2022 rule that classified certain industrial boilers as "new" sources of hazardous air pollutants, even though they were built before the applicable emission standards were proposed in 2020. The EPA used a 2013-era dataset to establish these standards, excluding more recent data to maintain consistency with still-valid 2013 standards. Environmental petitioners argued that this exclusion violated the Clean Air Act.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The lower court had previously remanded the EPA's 2011 rule without vacatur, allowing the invalid standards to remain while the EPA revised them. The industry petitioners argued that the EPA's classification of boilers built after June 4, 2010, as "new" sources was incorrect, as these boilers were constructed before the 2020 proposal of the new standards. The environmental petitioners contended that the EPA's decision to use outdated data was arbitrary and capricious.The D.C. Circuit held that the EPA's classification of boilers built before August 24, 2020, as "new" sources was incorrect under the Clean Air Act. The court found that the proper date to determine whether a boiler is "new" should be when each specific emission standard is first proposed, not when any standard for the category was first proposed. Therefore, the court set aside the EPA's 2022 rule to the extent that it defined sources constructed before August 24, 2020, as "new."The court also held that the EPA's decision to rely on the 2013-era dataset was neither unlawful nor arbitrary and capricious. The court found that the EPA's choice was reasonable given the limited nature of the remand and the need for consistency across standards. Thus, the court denied the environmental petitioners' petition for review. View "United States Sugar Corporation v. EPA" on Justia Law

Holtec International applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a license to construct and operate a spent nuclear fuel storage facility in New Mexico. The NRC denied multiple requests for intervention and a hearing from various petitioners, including Beyond Nuclear, Sierra Club, and Fasken Land and Minerals. These petitioners argued that the NRC acted unreasonably and contrary to law in denying their requests.The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board) found the petitioners' contentions inadmissible and denied their petitions to intervene. The NRC affirmed the Board’s decisions. Beyond Nuclear, Environmental Petitioners (including Sierra Club), and Fasken each petitioned for review of the orders denying intervention. The case was held in abeyance until the NRC issued Holtec a license, after which the case was removed from abeyance for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the petitions and found that the NRC reasonably declined to admit the petitioners' factual contentions and complied with statutory and regulatory requirements. The court held that Beyond Nuclear did not raise a genuine dispute of law or fact regarding the NRC’s authority to consider Holtec’s application. The court also found that Environmental Petitioners failed to demonstrate any genuine disputes of material fact or law in their contentions related to statutory authority, alleged misrepresentations by Holtec, and compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Additionally, the court determined that Fasken’s late-filed contentions were procedurally defective, untimely, and immaterial.The court denied all the petitions for review, affirming the NRC’s decisions to deny the requests for intervention. View "Beyond Nuclear, Inc. v. NRC" on Justia Law

United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) challenged the Postal Regulatory Commission's (Commission) handling of the United States Postal Service's (Postal Service) pricing of competitive products, arguing that the Postal Service underprices these products by not accounting for "peak-season" costs incurred during the holiday season. UPS claimed that these costs, driven by increased demand for package deliveries, should be attributed to competitive products rather than being treated as institutional costs.The Commission denied UPS's petition to initiate rulemaking proceedings and its subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Commission found that UPS's methodology for calculating peak-season costs was flawed and did not produce reliable estimates. It also concluded that the existing cost-attribution framework already accounted for the costs caused by competitive products during the peak season. The Commission explained that the Postal Service's costing models, which use an incremental-cost approach, appropriately attribute costs to competitive products and that the remaining costs are correctly treated as institutional costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the Commission's decision, finding that the Commission's rejection of UPS's methodology was reasonable and well-explained. The court noted that the Commission had addressed UPS's concerns about the Postal Service's costing models and had initiated further proceedings to explore potential updates to the models. The court also rejected UPS's argument that the Commission failed to consider whether peak-season costs are institutional costs uniquely associated with competitive products, noting that this issue was not properly presented in this case.The court denied UPS's petition for review, affirming the Commission's orders. View "United Parcel Service, Inc. v. PRC" on Justia Law

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) and the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) have a longstanding dispute over PG&E's obligation to wheel energy to SFPUC's customers. SFPUC generates power and sells it to end users in San Francisco but relies on PG&E to distribute this energy. The disagreement centers on which consumers are entitled to wheeled service under a grandfathering clause in PG&E's 2015 Tariff, which incorporates a statutory provision allowing wheeling for consumers served by SFPUC as of October 24, 1992.Initially, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rejected SFPUC's class-based approach, which argued that PG&E should wheel energy to the same types of customers served in 1992. FERC's 2019 order was vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which remanded the case for FERC to provide a reasoned analysis of the statutory requirements. On remand, FERC adopted a class-based interpretation, allowing wheeling to all customers of the same class served in 1992, not just specific end users.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed FERC's orders and found them contrary to law. The court held that the plain meaning of "ultimate consumer" in the statutory provision refers to specific end users, not classes of consumers. The court emphasized that the statutory text does not support a class-based interpretation and that such an interpretation would undermine the primary restriction against FERC-ordered wheeling. Consequently, the court vacated FERC's orders and remanded the case for FERC to apply the plain meaning of the statute and determine which of SFPUC's consumers qualify for wheeled service under the 2015 Tariff. View "Pacific Gas and Electric Company v. FERC" on Justia Law

A collection of Dutch and Luxembourgish energy companies invested in solar power projects in Spain, relying on promised economic subsidies. Following the 2008 financial crisis, Spain withdrew these subsidies, prompting the companies to challenge Spain's actions through arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). The companies won multi-million-euro awards in arbitration. However, the European Union argued that the ECT's arbitration provision does not apply to disputes between EU Member States, rendering the awards invalid under EU law. The companies sought to enforce the awards in the United States, invoking the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the cases. In NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain and 9REN Holding S.A.R.L. v. Kingdom of Spain, the court held it had jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) arbitration exception and denied Spain's motion to dismiss. The court also granted anti-anti-suit injunctions to prevent Spain from seeking anti-suit relief in foreign courts. Conversely, in Blasket Renewable Investments LLC v. Kingdom of Spain, the district court found Spain immune under the FSIA and dismissed the case, denying the requested injunction as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the cases. The court held that the district courts have jurisdiction under the FSIA’s arbitration exception to confirm the arbitration awards against Spain. However, it found that the district court in NextEra and 9REN abused its discretion by enjoining Spain from pursuing anti-suit relief in Dutch and Luxembourgish courts. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part in NextEra, reversed in 9REN and Blasket, and remanded for further proceedings. View "NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain" on Justia Law

The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) issued new and revised safety standards for pipelines in 2022. The Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA), representing pipeline companies, challenged five of these standards, arguing that PHMSA failed to justify the benefits outweighing the costs as required by law.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that four of the five challenged standards were inadequately justified. Specifically, PHMSA failed to properly analyze the costs associated with the high-frequency electric resistance welding (ERW) standard, the crack maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP) standard, the dent-safety-factor standard, and the corrosive-constituent standard. The court noted that PHMSA either did not recognize new costs imposed by these standards or provided inconsistent explanations regarding the costs.The court vacated the high-frequency-ERW standard as applied to seams formed by high-frequency ERW, the crack-MAOP standard, the dent-safety-factor standard and related provisions, and the corrosive-constituent standard. The court also vacated the high-frequency-ERW standard but only as applied to seams formed by high-frequency ERW.However, the court upheld the pipeline-segment standard. INGAA had argued that a change in terminology from "SCC segment" to "covered pipeline segment" would significantly increase the number of required excavations. PHMSA clarified that there was no substantive difference between the proposed and final versions of the rule. The court accepted PHMSA's explanation and found no basis to challenge the cost-benefit analysis for this standard.In summary, the court granted INGAA's petition in part, vacating several standards due to inadequate cost-benefit analyses, but denied the petition regarding the pipeline-segment standard. View "Interstate Natural Gas Association of America v. PHMSA" on Justia Law

The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its denial of small refinery exemptions under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program. The RFS program mandates that refineries blend renewable fuels into fossil fuels or purchase credits to comply. Small refineries can petition for exemptions if compliance causes disproportionate economic hardship. In 2022, the EPA denied all pending exemption petitions, arguing that compliance costs are passed on to consumers, thus no refinery faces economic hardship due to the RFS program. The EPA also provided alternative compliance options for certain refineries whose exemptions were initially granted but later denied.Previously, the EPA had granted exemptions based on a Department of Energy (DOE) study and a scoring matrix that considered various economic factors. However, following a Tenth Circuit decision and the Supreme Court's ruling in HollyFrontier, the EPA revised its approach, focusing solely on compliance costs and the RIN cost passthrough theory. This led to the denial of all pending petitions, including those of Sinclair Wyoming Refining Company and Wynnewood Refining Company, which had initially received exemptions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the EPA's rationale for denying the exemptions was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the EPA's interpretation of "disproportionate economic hardship" was too narrow and inconsistent with the Clean Air Act. The court also found that the EPA failed to adequately support its assumption that refineries could always purchase RINs ratably and pass the costs to consumers. Consequently, the court vacated the EPA's denial actions, except for two refineries deemed ineligible on other grounds, and dismissed Growth Energy's petition for lack of standing. The court denied Sinclair's petition challenging the alternative compliance action and dismissed Wynnewood's petition for not challenging a final agency action. View "Sinclair Wyoming Refining Company LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Jacquelyn N’Jai filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Education, New York University (NYU), Long Island University (LIU), Immediate Credit Recovery, Inc. (ICR), and FMS Investment Corporation (FMS), alleging various violations of federal law. N’Jai claimed that she had repaid her student loans but was falsely certified for additional loans by a bank analyst, with NYU and LIU allegedly signing her name on fraudulent loan applications. She contended that the Department of Education and its debt collectors used unlawful practices to collect on these loans, including garnishing her tax refund and threatening to garnish her Social Security checks.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed N’Jai’s claims against LIU, NYU, ICR, and FMS for lack of personal jurisdiction, citing the government contacts exception. This exception prevents the assertion of personal jurisdiction based solely on a defendant’s contact with federal government agencies in the District of Columbia. The court dismissed the claims against the remaining defendants for other reasons.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case, focusing on whether the government contacts exception under D.C. law is limited to First Amendment activities. The court noted the ongoing uncertainty about the scope of this exception, referencing previous cases where the D.C. Court of Appeals had not definitively resolved whether the exception is confined to First Amendment activity. Due to this uncertainty, the appellate court certified two questions to the D.C. Court of Appeals: whether the government contacts exception is limited to First Amendment activity and, if so, whether the contacts alleged in this case fall under that exception. The appellate court did not make a final ruling on the personal jurisdiction issue, pending the D.C. Court of Appeals' response to the certified questions. View "N'Jai v. Department of Education" on Justia Law

A chemical manufacturer and two trade associations challenged an EPA rule regulating emissions from certain facilities, specifically disputing the EPA’s assessment of cancer risk from ethylene oxide emissions. The EPA had determined that emissions from these sources posed an unacceptable risk to public health and tightened emissions standards accordingly. The EPA’s assessment concluded that the maximum lifetime individual risk of cancer from exposure to ethylene oxide was significantly higher than what is generally considered acceptable.The petitioners initially raised their complaints during the EPA’s rulemaking process and sought reconsideration after the final rule was issued. The EPA granted reconsideration and solicited further public comment, ultimately affirming its decision to use its existing cancer-risk assessment and rejecting an alternative assessment proposed by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ). The petitioners then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and found that the EPA had adequately explained its modeling approach and decisions. The court held that the EPA’s reliance on its 2016 cancer-risk assessment was not arbitrary or capricious and that the EPA had properly considered and rejected the TCEQ’s alternative assessment. The court also found that the EPA had provided sufficient opportunities for public comment and had not violated any procedural requirements. The court denied the petitions for review, upholding the EPA’s rule and its assessment of the cancer risk from ethylene oxide emissions. View "Huntsman Petrochemical LLC v. EPA" on Justia Law

In 2001, China and Nigeria signed a bilateral investment treaty to encourage investment between the two countries, agreeing to treat each other's investors fairly and protect their investments. Zhongshan Fucheng Industrial Investment, a Chinese company, invested in Nigeria by participating in a joint venture with Ogun State to develop a free-trade zone. After years of development and significant investment, Ogun State abruptly terminated its relationship with Zhongshan, and Nigerian federal authorities expelled the company's executives. Zhongshan initiated arbitration proceedings, and an arbitrator found that Nigeria had breached its obligations under the treaty, awarding Zhongshan over $55 million in damages.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that it had jurisdiction over the case, finding that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s (FSIA) arbitration exception applied because the award was governed by the New York Convention, an international arbitration treaty. Nigeria appealed, arguing that it was immune from suit under the FSIA.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the FSIA’s arbitration exception applied because the arbitration award arose from a legal relationship considered commercial, governed by the New York Convention. The court found that Nigeria had an arbitration agreement with Zhongshan, an arbitration award was issued, and the award was governed by the New York Convention. The court rejected Nigeria's argument that the New York Convention only applies to private acts, holding that the treaty covers arbitral awards arising from sovereign acts when a state consents to arbitration. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's jurisdiction and the enforceability of the arbitration award. View "Zhongshan Fucheng Industrial Investment Co. Ltd v. Federal Republic of Nigeria" on Justia Law