Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The burden of producing judicial records may not permanently foreclose their unsealing. After plaintiffs, a journalist and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, applied to the district court to unseal certain electronic surveillance orders and related filings in closed investigations, the district court withheld some of the requests due to the administrative burden of unsealing. The requests relate to judicial warrants issued under the Stored Communications Act (SCA) and court orders issued under the Pen Register Act.The DC Circuit held that the public's right of access to judicial records is a fundamental element of the rule of law. Administrative burden is relevant to how and when a judicial record may be unsealed, but not to whether it may be released at all. The court explained that precluding public access because of the personnel-hours required to produce those records is no more warranted than precluding public access to high-profile trials because of the costs of crowd control. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to determine, in its sound discretion, how and when greater access can be provided. View "In re: In the Matter of the Application of Jason Leopold to Unseal Certain Electronic Surveillance Applications and Orders" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit dismissed petitions for review of several Federal Aviation Administration actions related to the proposed expansion of the Paulding Northwest Atlanta Airport. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction because none of petitioners' challenges involves an ongoing case or controversy. In this case, petitioners lack standing to pursue their challenge to the FAA's decision to withdraw its concurrence in GDOT's written reevaluation, because petitioners' injuries are not fairly traceable to the challenged action. Furthermore, petitioners' remaining challenges concerning the FAA's concurrence in GDOT's written re-evaluation, the FAA's denial of reconsideration of that concurrence, and the FAA's withdrawal of the airport expansion from the then-pending commercial service environmental assessment are all moot. View "Louie v. Dickson" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit denied a petition for review of the Commission's order of disclosure of certain financial data related to Inbound Letter Post. The court held that the Postal Service's statutory argument hinges on a misreading of the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, and its arguments that the Commission's decision was arbitrary and capricious fail to overcome the deference the court owes to the Commission's reasoned decisions. In this case, the Commission hoped to facilitate public participation in discussions of possible reforms and to help the public understand why Inbound Letter Post was so unprofitable. The court found unpersuasive the Postal Service's contention that the Commission's reasoning was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to properly take into account substantial risk of commercial harm, to respond to the dissenting opinions of two Commissioners, and to provide a meaningful standard for when Postal Service confidential submissions can remain under seal. View "United States Postal Service v. Postal Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit denied the Commission's and Intervenor's motions to dismiss the petitions filed after thirty days of Commission inaction. The court explained that, before a party aggrieved by an order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission can obtain judicial review, that party must file an application for rehearing with the Commission. Congress directed that, if the Commission fails to act on that rehearing application within thirty days, the application may be deemed denied, allowing the aggrieved party to proceed to federal court. The court held that under the plain statutory language and context of the Natural Gas Act, such tolling orders are not the kind of action on a rehearing application that can fend off a deemed denial and the opportunity for judicial review.In this case, because the Commission's Tolling Order could not prevent the Homeowners and Environmental Associations from seeking judicial review, the initial petitions for review that they filed challenging the Certificate Order in Nos. 17-1098 and 17-1128 are properly before this court for review, and the motions to dismiss those petitions for lack of jurisdiction are denied. The court held that the Homeowners' and Environmental Associations' challenge to the Certificate Order falls short because the Commission did not rely on precedent agreements alone to find that the pipeline would be a matter of public convenience and necessity. Therefore, the court denied all four petitions for review, as well as the Commission's and Transco's motions to dismiss the petitions for review in Nos. 17-1098 and 17-1128. View "Allegheny Defense Project v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit granted the petition for writ of mandamus in part and ordered the district court to grant the government's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48 motion to dismiss the charges against Michael Flynn, former National Security Advisor to President Donald J. Trump, who pleaded guilty to making false statements under 18 U.S.C. 1001. The court held that the district court's orders appointing an amicus and scheduling a proposed hearing constitute legal error. The court also held that this is not the unusual case where a more searching inquiry is justified, and there is no adequate remedy for the intrusion on "the Executive's long-settled primacy over charging decisions."The court stated that, although Rule 48 requires "leave of court" before dismissing charges, "decisions to dismiss pending criminal charges—no less than decisions to initiate charges and to identify which charges to bring—lie squarely within the ken of prosecutorial discretion." The court reasoned that, whatever the precise scope of Rule 48's "leave of court" requirement, this is plainly not the rare case where further judicial inquiry is warranted. The court explained that Flynn agrees with the government's motion to dismiss and there has been no allegation that the motion reflects prosecutorial harassment, and the government's motion includes an extensive discussion of newly discovered evidence casting Flynn's guilt into doubt. The court stated that the government specifically points to evidence that the FBI interview at which Flynn allegedly made false statements was "untethered to, and unjustified by, the FBI's counterintelligence investigation into Mr. Flynn." In light of this evidence, the government maintains that it cannot "prove either the relevant false statements or their materiality beyond a reasonable doubt." The court also stated that the government's representations about the insufficiency of the evidence are entitled to a "presumption of regularity," and, on the record before the district court, there is no clear evidence contrary to the government’s representations. Therefore, the court held that these clearly established legal principles and the Executive's "long-settled primacy over charging decisions" foreclose the district court's proposed scrutiny of the government's motion.The court also held that the district court's appointment of the amicus and demonstrated intent to scrutinize the reasoning and motives of the Department of Justice constitute irreparable harms that cannot be remedied on appeal. The court stated that the district court's actions will result in specific harms to the exercise of the Executive Branch's exclusive prosecutorial power, and the contemplated proceedings would likely require the Executive to reveal the internal deliberative process behind its exercise of prosecutorial discretion, interfering with the Article II charging authority. Furthermore, circumstances of this case demonstrate that mandamus is appropriate to prevent the judicial usurpation of executive power.The court denied Flynn's petition to the extent that he seeks reassignment of the district judge where the district judge's conduct did not indicate a clear inability to decide this case fairly. The court vacated the district court's order appointing an amicus as moot. View "In re: Michael Flynn" on Justia Law

Associations filed suit contending that the Secretary's decision to expand the reach of the expedited removal process to its statutory limit, sweeping in all individuals without documentation who have resided in the United States for less than two years, violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Suspension Clause. The district court granted a preliminary injunction against the expansion based only on the APA claims, but did not address the INA and constitutional claims.The DC Circuit held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1252(e) over the Associations' case. However, because Congress committed the judgment whether to expand expedited removal to the Secretary's "sole and unreviewable discretion," 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I), the Secretary's decision is not subject to review under the APA's standards for agency decisionmaking. Furthermore, the Secretary's decision is not subject to the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Make The Road New York v. Wolf" on Justia Law

Drug manufacturers challenged the Department's rule that broadly requires drug manufacturers to disclose in their television advertisements the wholesale acquisition cost of many prescription drugs and biological products for which payment is available under Medicare or Medicaid.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the drug manufacturers, holding that the Department acted unreasonably in construing its regulatory authority to include the imposition of a sweeping disclosure requirement that is largely untethered to the actual administration of the Medicare or Medicaid programs. The court explained that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the price that the rule compels manufacturers to disclose bears little resemblance to the price beneficiaries actually pay under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Therefore, the court held that there is no reasoned statutory basis for the Department's far-flung reach and misaligned obligations, and thus the rule is invalid and is hereby set aside. View "Merck & Co., Inc. v. United States Department of Human and Health Services" on Justia Law

Appellants, conservative organizations and a safari guide, filed suit challenging the Service's actions governing the import of sport-hunted animal trophies from Africa. Initially, appellants challenged certain findings the Service made, the Service then withdrew some findings following the outcome of a similar case, and then the Service announced that in the future it would proceed by informal adjudication.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of appellants' claims on appeal, holding that appellants' challenges to the 2017 Zimbabwe findings are moot because the March Memo had already eliminated their legal effects. The court rejected appellants' challenges to the March Memo's withdrawal of more than twenty prior enhancements and on-detriment findings, and held that the district court's approach of evaluating the effect of each withdrawal in the March Memo individually was proper under the circumstances. Finally, the court rejected appellants' argument that it was unlawful for the Service to announce it would proceed in the future to implement the Endangered Species Act through informal adjudication. View "Friends of Animals v. Bernhardt" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed suit challenging the SEC's adoption of a Pilot Program, Rule 610T, which was designed to gather data so that the Commission might be able to determine in the future whether regulatory action was necessary.The DC Circuit granted the petitions for review, holding that the SEC acted without delegated authority from Congress when it adopted Rule 610T. The court explained that the Pilot Program emanates from an aimless "one-off" regulation, i.e., a rule that imposes significant, costly, and disparate regulatory requirements on affected parties merely to allow the Commission to collect data to determine whether there might be a problem worthy of regulation. In this case, the Commission acted solely to "shock the market" to collect data so that it might ponder the "fundamental disagreements" between parties affected by Commission rules and then consider whether to regulate in the future. The court held that this was an unprecedented action that clearly exceeded the SEC's authority under the Exchange Act. Accordingly, the court vacated the rule and remanded. View "New York Stock Exchange LLC v. Securities and Exchange Commission" on Justia Law

Solenex challenged the Secretary's cancellation of its oil and gas lease in the Badger-Two Medicine Area. The district court ruled in favor of Solenex, concluding that the amount of time that had elapsed between the lease's issuance and its cancellation violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Secretary failed to consider Solenex's reliance interests before cancelling the lease.The DC Circuit held that delay by itself is not enough to render the lease cancellation arbitrary and capricious. The court also held that the Secretary did consider, and in fact compensated, Solenex's identified reliance interests. Therefore, the district court's determinations were erroneous and the court vacated the judgment. View "Solenex LLC v. Bernhardt" on Justia Law