Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Secretary issued regulations that effectively prohibit physicians who lease medical equipment to hospitals from referring their Medicare patients to these same hospitals for outpatient care involving that equipment. The association challenged the regulations as exceeding the Secretary's statutory authority and violating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., and the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601-612. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary. Although one majority agrees with the district court that the statute is ambiguous as to the regulation of leases that charge on a per-use basis, a different majority concludes that the Secretary’s explanation for prohibiting these leases is unreasonable; the court unanimously concludes that the Secretary’s interpretation of the statute to apply to the physician-groups performing the procedures is reasonable, and that the Secretary complied with the RFA; and therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the district court with instructions to remand the regulation relating to leases charging by use to the Secretary for further proceedings. View "Council for Urological Interests v. Burwell" on Justia Law

The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (Act), 15 U.S.C. 18a, added section 7A to the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. 12 et seq., to establish notification and waiting requirements for large acquisitions and mergers. The principal purpose of the Act is to facilitate Government identification of mergers and acquisitions likely to violate federal antitrust laws before the proposed deals are consummated. In 2013, the FTC modified its reportable asset acquisition regulations to clarify that, even if patent holders retain limited manufacturing rights or co-rights, transfers of patent rights within the pharmaceutical industry constitute reportable asset acquisitions if all commercially significant rights are transferred. PhRMA filed suit challenging the FTC's Rule and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the FTC. The court concluded that the Rule does not violate the plain terms of the Act; the court owes deference to the FTC because the contested rule embodies a permissible construction of the Act; and the Commission's action also survives review under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Because the FTC's action is supported by reasoned decisionmaking and PhRMA's claims are without merit, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Pharmaceutical Research v. FTC" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged EPA’s anticipated rule restricting carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants. Petitioners argue that section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7411(d), does not grant EPA authority to limit carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants and therefore, petitioners ask the court to enjoin EPA from issuing a final rule limiting those carbon dioxide emissions. The court concluded that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a), does not authorize a court to circumvent finality principles in order to review proposed agency rules; EPA's public statements about its legal authority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions does not constitute final agency action subject to judicial review; and the court rejected petitioners' challenge of a 2011 settlement agreement that EPA reached with several other states and environmental groups. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review and the petition for a writ of prohibition where the court does not have authority to review proposed agency rules. View "In Re: Murray Energy Corp." on Justia Law

The Postal Service and others sought review of the Commission's order (Order 1926) where the Commission agreed that the recession that started in 2008 was an “extraordinary or exceptional circumstance” that warranted some rate increase, but the Commission only permitted the Postal Service to recover $2.8 billion in lost revenue. Applying a deferential standard of review, the court upheld most of Order 1926 as neither arbitrary nor capricious, and as supported by substantial evidence. However, the court reversed the Commission’s determination that lost mail volume can only be counted for one year, as the rationale that the Postal Service should have been able to identify and adjust to that downturn immediately is at war with the Commission’s “new normal” holding, which openly endorsed a longer period of time for such adjustments. According, the court granted the Postal Service’s petition for review in part, vacated the “count once” portion of the Commission’s order, and otherwise denied the petition. The court also denied the Mailers’ petition for review. The case is remanded for further proceedings. View "Alliance of Nonprofit Mailers v. PRC" on Justia Law

PLN filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., request to the Bureau seeking all documents showing money the Bureau paid in connection with lawsuits and claims brought against it between January 1, 1996, and July 31, 2003. The Bureau subsequently withheld information pursuant to exemption 6 and 7(C) of FOIA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bureau. The court reversed, agreeing with PLN that the Bureau’s use of a categorical explanation for the redactions was improper because of the varied nature of the documents and of the individuals shielded from disclosure, and that the district court did not adequately balance the privacy and public interests at stake. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings View "Prison Legal News v. Samuels" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit stemming from the workers' compensation benefits owed to class members under the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. 1651 et seq., for injuries suffered while working for United States government contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. Members of the class suffered lost limbs in massive explosions, suffered traumatic brain injuries from “concussive blasts, mortars, rockets, and bombs,” and developed post-traumatic stress disorder after witnessing “gruesome scenes of carnage.” The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ class-wide tort claims in light of Hall v. C&P Telephone Company as well their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-68, claims because plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action under the statute and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901-950, claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; however, this dismissal does not preclude any individual plaintiff from bringing independent claims outside of the Base Act’s statutory scheme; with respect to the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., claims brought by three individual plaintiffs, the court remanded to the district court to reconsider and explain its denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "Brink v. Continental Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After Abu Wa’el (Jihad) Dhiab, a detainee at Guantanamo Bay, went on a hunger strike, he was forcibly extracted from his cell and force-fed. The district court examined 32 classified videotapes of Dhiab's forcible cell extractions and force-feedings in order to grant Dhiab's motion to enjoin the government from forcibly extracting him from his cell and force-feeding him. At issue is the district court's grant of media organizations' motion to unseal and release the videotapes. The court concluded that, the district court’s decision did not terminate the action, and it does not qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order. Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction. Further, this case does not present the extraordinary circumstances required for mandamus relief. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied the request for a writ of mandamus View "Dhiab v. Obama" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, hospitals that participate in Medicare, filed suit against the Secretary, claiming that she violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., by engaging in arbitrary and capricious decision-making. This dispute arose from plaintiffs' belief that the Secretary set the monetary threshold for outlier payments too high in 2004, 2005, and 2006. The court affirmed the district court’s partial denial of the motion to supplement the administrative record and its rejection of the APA challenges to the 2005 and 2006 outlier thresholds. The district court erred, however, in concluding that the Secretary adequately explained the 2004 outlier threshold. Therefore, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment on this claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "District Hosp. Partners v. Burwell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against DHS, alleging twenty-one causes of action stemming from the Government's collection, maintenance, and use of information about him. The court affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss each claim except those brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. Plaintiff alleged that DHS is in possession of his full and specific credit card number, along with information regarding the type and issuer of the card. That plaintiff possesses a major credit card of a specific type and number bears on his mode of living for purposes of the definition of "consumer report" within the meaning of the Act. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's ruling that the Act's claims failed on the first prong of the definition of "consumer report" and remanded for further proceedings. View "Abdelfattah v. DHS" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Postal Service amended its mail preparation requirements so that mail pieces prepared according to the “basic-service Intelligent Mail” standard would no longer be eligible for a discounted “automation” rate available to mailers who use technologies to increase the Postal Service’s efficiency. In subsequent rate change proceedings before the Commission, mailers objected that this change in mail preparation requirements constituted a classification change resulting in an increase in rates that must be counted against the Postal Service’s price cap. The Commission agreed and the Postal Service petitioned for review. The court held that the price cap statute and the applicable regulations do not entirely foreclose the Commission from determining that some mail preparation requirements constitute “changes in rates;" however, the Commission's decision in this case is arbitrary and capricious for lack of reasoned decisionmaking; the court remanded to the Commission to enunciate an intelligible standard and then reconsider its decision in light of that standard; and, because the changes to the Domestic Mail Manual should continue to be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the remand, it is unnecessary for the court to vacate the Commission’s decision. View "USPS v. PRC" on Justia Law