Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The TSA screens passengers and property moving by passenger aircraft, 49 U.S.C. 44901(a) and is authorized to impose a “uniform fee . . . on passengers . . . in air transportation and intrastate air transportation originating at airports in the United States.” Airlines collect the fees from passengers and remit the funds to TSA. In 2013, Congress reset the fee to “$5.60 per one-way trip in air transportation or intrastate air transportation that originates at an airport in the United States.” TSA implemented the amendment; a “one-way trip” means a continuous trip from one point to another with no stopover exceeding specified limits, so that a trip from New York to Los Angeles to San Francisco and back to New York, with stopovers exceeding four hours would be three one-way trips. Airlines challenged TSA’s rules, arguing that TSA lacked authority to impose fees in excess of $11.20 on roundtrip itineraries that involved multiple “one-way trips.” While the case was pending, Congress amended the statute, mooting that claim. The airlines also claimed that the statute precludes TSA from charging a fee on travel that begins abroad but includes a connecting flight within the U.S. The D.C. Circuit held that the airlines have standing but accepted TSA’s explanation that its construction of ambiguous text better aligns the imposition of the fee with those who benefit from the security services provided. View "Airlines for Am. v. Transp. Sec. Admin" on Justia Law

The Immigration and Nationality Act limits the number of annual visas, 8 U.S.C. 1101, creates categories for which visas may be granted, and imposes country-based limits. The category at issue, “Skilled workers, professionals, and other workers” (EB-3) has a general limit of about 40,000 visas annually in three subcategories. Xie fits within the subcategory EW for workers in occupations that require less than two years of training, education, or experience, and for which qualified workers are not available in the U.S. The subcategory is subject to a separate cap of 5,000. The government indicated that the current annual EW limit for China is 319. Under a complicated system of cut-off dates, Xie has waited for over eight years. She argued that widely differing cutoff dates for Chinese EW applicants, other Chinese EB-3 applicants, and EW applicants from other countries violate section 203’s temporal priority mandate. The district court dismissed, stating that Xie failed “to identify any discrete agency action that DOS is required to take” and failed to point to any authority requiring that action. The D.C. Circuit reversed. Xie specifically sought application of 8 U.S.C. 1153(e)(1), which directs State to process applications in the order of their filing. While varying lengths of wait among categories may comply with the mandate, Xie is entitled to have her claim assessed. View "Xie v. Kerry" on Justia Law

In these consolidated petitions, Carriers challenged FERC's authority to approve a cost pooling agreement among the Carriers that allocates most fixed costs on the basis of each Carrier's share of combined interstate and intrastate utilization of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS). The court found that the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), 49 U.S.C. App. 13(6)(b), permits incidental regulation of intrastate commerce pursuant to approval of a pooling agreement under section 5(1); that any regulation of intrastate commerce challenged here was incident to the Pooling Agreement that FERC found just and reasonable for interstate commerce; and that the Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in approving the Pooling Agreement or make findings unsupported by the evidence. Therefore, FERC did not have statutory authority to approve the settlement; did not improperly regulate intrastate commerce; and did comply with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., requirements in reaching the order challenged in this case. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions. View "Tesoro Alaska Co. v. FERC" on Justia Law

The FTC initiated an enforcement proceeding against Boehringer after the pharmaceutical company failed to comply with an administrative subpoena seeking various documents related to a settlement agreement between the company and Barr, a generic drug manufacturer. Boeringer subsequently certified compliance with the subpoena but withheld hundreds of responsive documents under the work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege. Te court rejected the FTC's assertion that the district court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that settlement documents pertaining to a co-promotion agreement between Boehringer and Barr were prepared in anticipation of litigation. The court held that a settlement term may have independent economic value and still be considered part of a settlement for purposes of work product protection. The court also found that the district court reasonably concluded that the bulk of the contested co-promotion materials were prepared in anticipation of the Boehringer-Barr litigation, with a single exception pertaining to post-settlement documents. Therefore, the court generally affirmed the district court's finding on this issue but remanded for further consideration with respect to post-settlement documents. The court agreed with the FTC that the district court misapprehended the proper distinction between fact and opinion work product and reversed and remanded on this issue. View "FTC v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm." on Justia Law

EPIC made a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, request for Standard Operating Procedure 303 (SOP 303), which DHS describes as a protocol for shutting down wireless networks during critical emergencies. On appeal, DHS challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to EPIC. The court held that the plain text of Exemption 7(F) protects law enforcement records the disclosure of which "could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual," during a critical emergency, without requiring the withholding agency to specifically identify the individuals who would be endangered. In this case, much if not all of SOP 303 is exempt from disclosure. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to determine whether any reasonable segregable portions of SOP 303 can be disclosed. View "Electronic Privacy Info. v. DHS" on Justia Law

Maurice McGinnis sought a loan through federal farm credit programs and alleges that he was denied access to such programs by the Department because of his race. This appeal concerns McGinnis' participation in a claims process established by a class action settlement agreement to resolve his and other farmers' discrimination claims. The court concluded that Paragraph 13 of the Consent Decree empowers the District Court to correct an error by the facilitator in transmitting a claim to the wrong track. If it is true that McGinnis selected Track B and the facilitator nevertheless sent his claim package to the adjudicator, the district court did no more than enforce the parties' agreement. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that it could review the facilitator's claim processing and vacate the adjudicator's determination. The court concluded that McGinnis' request to change his claim to Track B was sufficiently close in time to his submission of the claim package, and the language of the Consent Decree defining what constitutes a "completed claim package" is sufficiently ambiguous, to justify the district court in granting his petition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Pigford v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

After the FTC voted to hold POM and the associated parties liable for violating the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1) and 52(a), and ordered them to cease and desist from making misleading and inadequately supported claims about the health benefits of POM products, POM petitioned for review. The court denied most of petitioners' challenges; the court saw no basis to set aside the Commission's conclusion that many of POM's ads made misleading or false claims about POM products; and the Commission had no obligation to adhere to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. Further, the court held that the Commission's order is valid to the extent it requires disease claims to be substantiated by at least one randomized and controlled human clinical trial (RCT); the order fails Central Hudson scrutiny because it categorically requires two RCTs for all disease-related claims; the Commission has failed to adequately justify an across-the-board two-RCT requirement for all disease claims by petitioners; and, therefore, Part I of the Commission's order will be modified to require petitioners to possess at least one RCT. The court denied the petition for review in all other respects. View "POM Wonderful LLC v. FTC" on Justia Law

After the FAA suspended petitioner's license as an airplane mechanic, the NTSB vacated the suspension and found that the FAA's position had been unreasonable and not substantially justified. Petitioner filed suit seeking recovery of legal fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U.S.C. 504(a)(1). The NTSB denied fee-shifting under the Act because it concluded that petitioner had not "incurred" the fees associated with his legal defense in the license suspension proceedings. The court held that the NTSB's conclusion was arbitrary and capricious where the NTSB should have considered that under the Alabama law of quantum meruit, petitioner was obligated to pay his attorneys for the value of their services. Therefore, petitioner "incurred" fees and may obtain EAJA fee-shifting. The court granted the petition, vacated the decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Roberts v. NTSB" on Justia Law

MVH and Holy Family Communications each applied to the Federal Communications Commission for a license to operate a noncommercial educational radio station in the vicinity of Buffalo, New York. To do so, the agency used its comparative selection criteria, which it had promulgated through a notice-and-comment rulemaking. By application of those criteria, the Commission found Holy Family had the superior application and awarded it the license. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the criterion upon which the outcome turned--the weight given to an applicant’s plan to broadcast to underserved populations-- either violated the Communications Act of 1934, which requires the Commission to distribute licenses fairly, or was arbitrary and capricious. That criterion is part of a reasonable framework for achieving goals consistent with the Commission’s statutory mandate, and because MVH offered no support for a waiver except that it came close to the threshold it needed to get the license. View "Mary V. Harris Found. v. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n" on Justia Law

After issuing an environmental impact statement (EIS), the National Park Service adopted a plan for the management of deer in Rock Creek National Park in Washington, D.C. The plan involved the killing of white-tailed deer. Objectors argued that the plan violated statutes governing management of the Park and was not adopted in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, and that the EIS did not meet the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Noting that the Organic Act expressly provides that the Secretary of the Interior “may also provide in his discretion for the destruction of such animals and of such plant life as may be detrimental to the use of any said parks, monuments, or reservations,” so that the agency’s interpretation of its enabling act is reasonable. Given the impact of deer on plant life and vehicle collisions, the decision is not arbitrary. Finding no violation of NEPA, the court concluded that the EIS was not required to consider the psychological harm that some visitors may suffer from simply knowing that the intentional killing of deer happens at Rock Creek Park. View "Grunewald v. Jarvis" on Justia Law