Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

New York City filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that Amtrak was liable for rehabilitation of a bridge carrying a public highway over a parcel of land in the Bronx. In this appeal, the City asserts that a 1996 agreement obligating Amtrak's predecessor to maintain and repair the bridge is a covenant running with the land which survived the land's subsequent Rail Act, 45 U.S.C. 743(b)(2), conveyance made "free and clear of any liens or encumbrances." The City also seeks to recoup payments it made to Amtrak in exchange for Amtrak's removal of electrical equipment attached to the bridge. The district court granted summary judgment to Amtrak on both claims. The district court held that the Rail Act extinguished the obligation and the City was not entitled to recover its already-incurred costs under the narrow theory of restitution it advanced. The court agreed with the district court that the City's claim against Amtrak for the rehabilitation of the bridge should be rejected. The court rejected the City's reformulated restitution claim as an "unjust enrichment" claim because the City failed to file a Rule 59(e) or 60(b)(6) motion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "City of New York v. Nat'l Railroad Passenger Corp." on Justia Law

Janet Howard and Joyce Megginson appealed the dismissal of their complaint on the grounds that the district court erred in failing to adhere to the time limits in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court held that the six-year statute of limitations for suits against the United States, 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), does not apply to claims filed pursuant to Title VII as amended to apply to federal employees. Because the district court erred in applying section 2401(a)'s six-year statute of limitations to appellants' Title VII claims, the court reversed and remanded to the district court for consideration of the second amended complaint. View "Howard v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

In 2008, EPA revised and strengthened the standards for ozone under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. At issue are two challenges to EPA's regulations: first, EPA allowed affected regions more time to attain the new ozone standards as compared with the previous revision; and second, EPA revoked certain requirements, known as transportation conformity requirements, applicable to areas that had yet to attain governing ozone standards or that had recently come into attainment but remained under obligations aimed to prevent any reversion to nonattainment status. The court concluded that both challenged aspects of EPA's regulations exceed the agency's authority under the CAA. With regard to the attainment deadlines, all statutory indications militate against allowing the agency's lengthening of the periods for achieving compliance with revised air quality standards. With regard to the revocation of transportation conformity requirements, the terms of the statute straightforwardly require maintaining those requirements for affected areas. Accordingly, the court vacated the pertinent portions of the EPA's regulations. View "NRDC v. EPA" on Justia Law

101 environmental groups filed a petition with EPA asking it to regulate spent lead bullets and shot. The environmental groups invoked section 21 of the Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2601(a)(1), which allows any person to petition EPA for a rulemaking proceeding to regulate "chemical substances" that "present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment[.]" The district court held that EPA had authority to classify the petition as non-cognizable under the Act and dismissed the complaint. The court disagreed with the district court where nothing in section 21 allowed EPA to dismiss the petition as non-cognizable. Nonetheless, the court affirmed the judgment because the environmental groups have suggested no way in which EPA could regulate spent lead bullets and shot without also regulating cartridges and shells, precisely what section 3(2)(B)(v) of the Act prohibits. View "Trumpeter Swan Society v. EPA" on Justia Law

TPI filed a rate complaint with the STB, alleging that numerous CSX common carrier rates were unreasonable and CSX moved for an expedited procedure with respect to questions related to market dominance. The Board granted the motion and bifurcated the adjudication into a market dominance phase and a second rate reasonableness phase. Then the Board issued a decision, concluding that CSX had market dominance over 51 contested rates. The Board rejected requests for reconsideration and CSX sought review of the Board's interlocutory ruling regarding the 51 rates. The court agreed with the Board that the appeal must be dismissed because the contested dominance decision is a non-final order. There is no final order because the Board has yet to inquire into the reasonableness of CSX's rates and has issued no adverse ruling with respect to any rates. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for review. View "CSX Transportation v. STB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a trade group representing federal contractors, filed suit challenging the Department's revision of regulations requiring contractors to extend an invitation to job applicants to advise the contractor whether they believed they were covered by Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 793(a), as well as to analyze the resulting data. The revised regulations also adopted a utilization goal to serve as a target for the employment of individuals with disabilities. The OFCCP explained that these requirements are important means by which the Government can contribute to reducing the employment disparity between those with and without disabilities. Applying Chevron deference, the court concluded that the Department did not exceed its statutory authority, and the agency's exercise of rulemaking authority is a product of reasoned rulemaking and was not arbitrary nor capricious. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Assoc. Builders and Contractors v. Shiu" on Justia Law

Relator filed suit against defendants under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729, alleging that defendants imported pencils that they knew were made in China, avoided paying substantial antidumping duties imposed on Chinese-made pencils, and falsely declared to U.S. Customs officials that they were made elsewhere in Asia. On appeal, relator challenged the district court's conclusions that his FCA claim is based on publicly disclosed information and that he failed to demonstrate original-source status. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because relator's claim is jurisdictionally barred and the court had no reason to determine whether the complaint failed to state a viable FCA claim. View "United States ex rel. John Doe v. Staples, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in these consolidated cases is whether a regulatory accommodation for religious nonprofit organizations that permit them to opt out of the contraceptive coverage requirement under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4), itself imposes an unjustified substantial burden on plaintiffs' religious exercise in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb. The court concluded that the challenged regulations do not impose a substantial burden on plaintiffs' religious exercise under RFRA. All plaintiffs must do to opt out is express what they believe and seek what they want via a letter or two-page form. Religious nonprofits that opt out are excused from playing any role in the provision of contraceptive services, and they remain free to condemn contraception in the clearest terms. The ACA shifts to health insurers and administrators the obligation to pay for and provide contraceptive coverage for insured persons who would otherwise lose it as a result of the religious accommodation. Because the regulatory opt-out mechanism is the least restrictive means to serve compelling governmental interests, it is fully consistent with plaintiffs' rights under RFRA. The court also found no merit in plaintiffs' additional claims. The court rejected all of plaintiffs' challenges to the regulations and affirmed the district court's opinion in Priests for Life in its entirety. As for the RCAW decision, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment for Thomas Aquinas and its holding as to the unconstitutionality of the non-interference provision and affirmed the remainder of the decision. View "Priests For Life v. HHS" on Justia Law

PIABA filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., request seeking records related to the SEC's audits, inspections, and reviews of FINRA's arbitration program. The Commission argued that Exemption 8 of FOIA allows it to withhold documents it collected while examining FINRA's program for arbitrating disputes between securities brokers and their customers. The district court granted the Commission's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the requested records related to the agency's examinations of FINRA and that Exemption 8 therefore protects them from disclosure. The court concluded that the contested records implicated a relevant Commission "examination" and they are related to a particular "report." Because the Commission satisfied both of Exemption 8's requirements and properly withheld the responsive documents, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Public Investors Arbitration v. SEC" on Justia Law

Alaska filed suit challenging the Forest Service's Roadless Rule in 2011. In 2001, the Forest Service adopted the Rule, which prohibited road construction, road reconstruction, and timber harvesting on millions of acres of national forest lands, including national forest land in Alaska. In 2005, the Forest Service repealed the Rule, but, in 2006, the District Court for the Northern District of California ordered reinstatement of the Rule. The court concluded that when the Rule was reinstated in 2006 after its repeal in 2005, a new right of action accrued. Under 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), Alaska had six years from the time of the Rule's reinstatement in 2006 to file a lawsuit challenging the rule. Therefore, Alaska's suit is timely because it filed in 2011. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of Alaska's complaint and remanded for further consideration. View "State of Alaska v. Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law