Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Immigration Law
by
Appellant applied for a visa to enter the United States. But the Government denied his application, fearing that he was part of a criminal organization. Appellant and his wife (collectively “Appellants”) — who is an American citizen — filed this suit to challenge that decision. But their suit faced an uphill struggle: With narrow exceptions, a court may not review the government’s decision to deny a visa. To show that their suit fits within an exception, Appellants pointed to a rule allowing American citizens to challenge visa denials that burden their constitutional rights. Appellant’s wife argued that the rule applies because denying her husband a visa interfered with her constitutional right to marriage. The district court rejected that argument and dismissed it.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that though marriage is a fundamental right, it does not include the right to live in America with one’s spouse. So the right is not burdened when the government denies a spouse’s visa application. Further, the court wrote that even if the exception applied, allowing us to review the Government’s visa denial, Appellant’s wife’s challenge would fail on the merits. To survive judicial review, the Government need only cite a statute listing a factual basis for denying a visa. It did that here. View "Kristen Colindres v. DOS" on Justia Law

by
The Government removed Appellant from the United States. Back in his home country, Appellant filed a habeas petition, arguing that his removal was unlawful. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition. It concluded that habeas proceedings are available only to those in government custody. Because Appellant did not file his petition until he was back home and out of custody, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear his case. Appellant appealed to the DC Circuit.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that an alien may seek judicial review of an expedited removal order in “habeas corpus proceedings.” And habeas corpus proceedings are available only to those in custody. Here, Appellant was not in custody. So the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider his habeas petition. Further, the court noted that it cannot adopt an extreme-circumstances exception because it has no statutory basis. The court wrote that creating exceptions to jurisdictional rules is a job for Congress, not the courts. View "I.M. v. United States Customs and Border Protection" on Justia Law

by
Appellant is a dual citizen of the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia who entered the United States on a visa to receive graduate medical education. He sought to adjust his immigration status to that of a legal permanent resident under Section 1255 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”). The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) determined that he was ineligible for adjustment of status and denied his applications. Appellant and his wife challenged that decision by filing suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).   The DC Circuit affirmed and held that the district court correctly dismissed Appellants’ case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Based on the plain meaning of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), and the reasoning of Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614, USCIS’s decision to deny Appellants’ application for adjustment of status is unreviewable by a federal district court. The court explained that to avoid the dismissal of their case, Appellants sought to confine Patel’s holding to petitions for review of removal orders. Although Patel addressed a judgment made in a removal proceeding before an immigration judge and reserved ruling on whether Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars review of analogous judgments by USCIS that are challenged under the APA in a federal court. The court saw no basis for the distinction that Appellants attempt to draw. Section 1252(a)(2)(B) specifically provides that the relevant jurisdiction-stripping language applies “regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings.” View "Adil Abuzeid v. Alejandro Mayorkas" on Justia Law

by
The Secretary of Homeland Security promulgated the challenged OPT Rule pursuant to the Executive’s longstanding authority under the INA to set the “time” and “conditions” of nonimmigrants’ stay in the United States. Washington Alliance of Technology Workers (Washtech) argues that the statutory definition of the F-1 visa class precludes the Secretary from exercising the time-and-conditions authority to allow F-1 students to remain for school-recommended practical training after they complete their coursework. The district court sustained the OPT Rule’s authorization of a limited period of post-coursework Optional Practical Training if recommended and overseen by the school and approved by DHS, for qualifying students on F-1 visas.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that Washtech is right that section 1324a(h)(3) is not the source of the relevant regulatory authority; it just defines what it means for an alien to be “unauthorized” for employment. But that was never the government’s point. What matters is that section 1324a(h)(3) expressly acknowledges that employment authorization need not be specifically conferred by statute; it can also be granted by regulation, as it has been in rules promulgated pursuant to DHS’s statutory authority to set the “conditions” of nonimmigrants’ admission to the United States. The OPT Rule’s authorization for F-1 students to work in jobs that provide practical training related to their course of study is just such a rule. Washtech’s claim that the OPT Rule conflicts with the congressional prohibition against unauthorized aliens’ employment therefore fails. View "WA Alliance of Tech. Workers v. DHS" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs, a group of blood plasma companies, challenged a U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") rule precluding aliens from entering the U.S. using B-1 business visitor visas to sell plasma. Plaintiffs claimed that they invested substantial resources to develop plasma collection facilities near the border and that the CPB rule failed to take Plaintiffs' interests into account when creating the new rule.The district court denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the Plaintiffs' interests were not within the Administrative Procedure Act's "zone of interests." The district court, determining the zone-of-interest determination was jurisdictional, dismissed the complaint.The D.C. Circuit reversed. For the Plaintiffs to sue under the APA, they must have been “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." However, the zone-of-interests determination is a merits issue, not a jurisdictional one. From there, the D.C. Circuit considered the merits, finding that the Plainitffs' case interests should have been considered under the B-1 analysis. Thus, the court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CSL Plasma Inc. v. United States Customs and Border Protection" on Justia Law

by
In a public-health emergency, 42 U.S.C. 265 authorizes the Executive Branch to "prohibit, in whole or in part, the introduction of persons and property from such countries or places as he shall designate." The Executive exercised that power during the COVID-19 pandemic, issuing a series of orders prohibiting "covered aliens" from entering the United States by land from Mexico or Canada.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction in part, finding that it is likely that aliens covered by a valid section 265 order have no right to be in the United States and concluding that the Executive may expel plaintiffs under section 265, but only to places where they will not be persecuted or tortured. The court addressed plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits and rejected their arguments that section 265 covers only transportation providers such as common carriers; that the Executive has no power to expel aliens for violating a valid section 265 order; and that they are entitled to apply for asylum. However, the court concluded that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their narrow argument that under section 1231 the Executive cannot expel them to places where they face persecution or torture. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the equities require a preliminary injunction to stop the Executive from expelling plaintiffs to places where they will be persecuted or tortured. The court remanded for further proceedings and ultimate resolution of the merits, including plaintiffs' claim that the section 265 order is arbitrary and capricious. View "Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

by
Miriyeva, a citizen of Azerbaijan, lawfully entered the U.S. and sought naturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1440. She enlisted in the U.S. Army through the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest program, under which noncitizens have an expedited path to citizenship by serving honorably in the military without first having lawful permanent residence. In 2018, USCIS approved Miriyeva’s application. Before the agency scheduled Miriyeva’s oath of citizenship ceremony, the Army sent her to basic training. During training, a medical condition ended her service. The Army described Miriyeva’s separation as “uncharacterized” since her service ended while she was still at “entry-level.” After her medical discharge, Miriyeva scheduled her oath ceremony but the agency reversed its approval of her naturalization application because the military did not describe her separation as “honorable.”Miriyeva argued that the military refers to “uncharacterized” as “separated under honorable conditions,” when required to do so and that the Army’s policy of treating an uncharacterized separation as not under honorable conditions violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Constitution’s Uniform Rule of Naturalization Clause, and the Due Process Clause. The district court dismissed Miriyeva’s declaratory judgment suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1421(c), which precluded Miriyeva’s Administrative Procedure Act and constitutional claims; her Declaratory Judgment Act claim failed without a different, standalone source of jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Miriyeva strayed from the statutory path for judicial review of claims intertwined with denied naturalization applications. View "Miriyeva v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law

by
In 2002, Meza was served with a notice to appear, at a removal hearing, 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1), charging that he entered the country “at or near Brownsville, Texas,” and that he was “not then admitted or paroled after inspection by an Immigration Officer,” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). An agent had observed him “wading the Rio Grande River.” An IJ ordered Meza removed in absentia. Meza neither appeared at his removal hearing nor filed a timely petition for review in the Eleventh Circuit. He remained in the U.S. In 2017, Meza applied for an adjustment of status. USCIS denied the application for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that Meza was not an arriving alien, so the immigration courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the application. Meza argued that a checkbox on his notice to appear labeled him as an arriving alien and that immigration officers had paroled him into the U.S.The D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court that it lacked jurisdiction to review USCIS’s decision because Meza had not exhausted his administrative remedies. To succeed, Meza must show that he was an arriving alien, even though the IJ concluded otherwise; he seeks to contest a question of fact arising from his removal proceeding, which he could have done only by filing a timely petition for review of his removal order in the Eleventh Circuit. View "Meza v. Renaud" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
by
iTech filed an I-140 (petition for alien worker) immigrant visa petition on behalf of Reddy. USCIS approved the petition two months later. In its application, iTech produced evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage and evidence that Reddy had obtained a bachelor’s degree, “in the form of a degree certificate from the University of Madras along with transcripts.” About 18 months later, USCIS issued a notice of intent to revoke the approval based on “inconsistencies in the record calling into question whether the beneficiary meets the educational requirements of the labor certification” and whether iTech “continues to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.”iTech provided additional documentation but USCIS revoked its approval on the basis that iTech misrepresented Reddy’s degree-conferring institution and employment qualifications, and did not establish its ability to pay the proffered wage. iTech brought suit, alleging that USCIS’s decision to revoke its I-140 petition was arbitrary and capricious because the agency failed to engage in rational decision-making based on the record. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The statute preserves the Secretary’s ability to revoke an I-140 petition at any time and for any reason and renders USCIS’s revocation decision discretionary under 8 U.S.C. 1155; section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) deprives the courts of jurisdiction to review the decision. View "iTech U.S., Inc v. Renaud" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
by
In 1994, Farrell, a U.S. citizen, moved to Switzerland. He married a Swiss citizen; they had a child. In 2004, he naturalized as a Swiss citizen, allegedly with the intent of relinquishing his U.S. nationality; 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(1) refers to “voluntarily … with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality … obtaining naturalization in a foreign state.” He subsequently made no use of his U.S. citizenship and did not enter the U.S. In 2013, Farrell was arrested in Spain and extradited to the U.S. He pled guilty to interstate travel with intent to engage in sex with a minor and possession of child pornography, which he committed 10 years earlier in the U.S., and was sentenced to imprisonment in the U.S.Farrell corresponded with the State Department, requesting a certificate of loss of nationality (CLN). He was told he would have to sign forms in person in front of a consular officer. Farrell argued that he had already committed the expatriating act when he naturalized in Switzerland and was now attesting that he did so voluntarily with the intent to lose his nationality. The Embassy responded that Farrell could not lose his citizenship while he was imprisoned in the U.S. Farrell sued, claiming that the in-person requirement was contrary to statute and arbitrary. The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court. While the Department has statutory authority to impose an in-person requirement, it acted arbitrarily in denying Farrell a CLN by offering conflicting and ever-evolving reasons for denying the CLN. View "Farrell v. Blinken" on Justia Law