Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves a group of Afghan and Iraqi nationals who served the United States during recent armed conflicts and are now facing serious threats due to their service. They applied for special-immigrant visas, but their applications were delayed. Congress had authorized the Secretary of State to issue these visas and later mandated that the government should improve its efficiency to process the applications within nine months, except in cases involving unusual national-security risks. However, the plaintiffs' applications had been pending for more than nine months.The district court held that the government had unreasonably delayed processing these applications. In 2020, the court approved a plan requiring the prompt adjudication of applications filed by class members and pending for more than nine months as of May 21, 2020. In 2022, the Secretary moved to terminate or modify the plan based on changed circumstances in the two years since 2020. The district court recognized that changed circumstances warrant modifying the plan, but it refused to terminate the plan. The government appealed the refusal to terminate.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the district court reasonably responded to the changes and that some continued judicial involvement remains appropriate. The court also noted that the government's increased difficulties in processing visa applications cannot retroactively make past unreasonable delays reasonable. The court concluded that the district court permissibly balanced the various competing interests in declining to terminate the 2020 adjudication plan. View "Afghan and Iraqi Allies v. Blinken" on Justia Law

For over four decades, immigration judges employed by the Executive Office for Immigration Review have collectively bargained through a certified union. Four years ago, that office asked the Federal Labor Relations Authority to determine that immigration judges are management officials barred from inclusion in a bargaining unit. The Authority agreed. Following an unsuccessful reconsideration motion, and with a second reconsideration motion still pending before the Authority, the union petitioned this court for review of both the Authority’s initial decision and its decision denying reconsideration. The union contends that, in issuing those decisions, the Authority violated the union’s substantive and procedural due process rights.   The DC Circuit dismissed the petition. The court explained that the Union’s petition for review was incurably premature—including with respect to the Initial Order—even though the Union’s second reconsideration motion sought reconsideration of only the First Reconsideration Order, not the Initial Order. The court wrote that a contrary conclusion would disserve the central purpose of the incurable prematurity doctrine. “There is good reason to prohibit any litigant from pressing its cause concurrently upon both the judicial and the administrative fronts: a favorable decision from the agency might yet obviate the need for review by the court.” And here, as in Tennessee Gas, a favorable agency decision on the second reconsideration motion pending before it could have obviated the need for judicial review of both the order initially denying reconsideration and the underlying order. View "National Association of Immigration Judges v. FLRA" on Justia Law

The H-1B visa program allows foreign nationals to work in the United States in specialized positions for sponsoring employers. By regulation, any such employer must file amended paperwork with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services whenever it makes a “material change” in the terms of covered employment. In Simeio Solutions, LLC, 26 I & N Dec. 542 (AAO 2015), USCIS interpreted that phrase to include a change in the place of employment. And in an ensuing guidance document, USCIS memorialized this interpretation and exercised discretion to limit its retroactive enforcement. ITServe Alliance, Inc., a trade association representing employers, seeks a declaratory judgment that Simeio and the guidance document are unlawful. ITServe contends that Simeio was a procedurally defective rulemaking and that USCIS lacks statutory authority to require the amended filings.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and held that ITServe has Article III standing to raise these arguments, but the court rejected them on the merits. The court explained that because USCIS may consider LCA-related issues in exercising its own authority to approve, disapprove, or revoke H-1B petitions, it may require new or amended petitions corresponding to changes in the place of employment that necessitate the filing of new LCAs. View "ITServe Alliance, Inc. v. DHS" on Justia Law

Appellant applied for a visa to enter the United States. But the Government denied his application, fearing that he was part of a criminal organization. Appellant and his wife (collectively “Appellants”) — who is an American citizen — filed this suit to challenge that decision. But their suit faced an uphill struggle: With narrow exceptions, a court may not review the government’s decision to deny a visa. To show that their suit fits within an exception, Appellants pointed to a rule allowing American citizens to challenge visa denials that burden their constitutional rights. Appellant’s wife argued that the rule applies because denying her husband a visa interfered with her constitutional right to marriage. The district court rejected that argument and dismissed it.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that though marriage is a fundamental right, it does not include the right to live in America with one’s spouse. So the right is not burdened when the government denies a spouse’s visa application. Further, the court wrote that even if the exception applied, allowing us to review the Government’s visa denial, Appellant’s wife’s challenge would fail on the merits. To survive judicial review, the Government need only cite a statute listing a factual basis for denying a visa. It did that here. View "Kristen Colindres v. DOS" on Justia Law

The Government removed Appellant from the United States. Back in his home country, Appellant filed a habeas petition, arguing that his removal was unlawful. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition. It concluded that habeas proceedings are available only to those in government custody. Because Appellant did not file his petition until he was back home and out of custody, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear his case. Appellant appealed to the DC Circuit.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that an alien may seek judicial review of an expedited removal order in “habeas corpus proceedings.” And habeas corpus proceedings are available only to those in custody. Here, Appellant was not in custody. So the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider his habeas petition. Further, the court noted that it cannot adopt an extreme-circumstances exception because it has no statutory basis. The court wrote that creating exceptions to jurisdictional rules is a job for Congress, not the courts. View "I.M. v. United States Customs and Border Protection" on Justia Law

Appellant is a dual citizen of the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia who entered the United States on a visa to receive graduate medical education. He sought to adjust his immigration status to that of a legal permanent resident under Section 1255 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”). The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) determined that he was ineligible for adjustment of status and denied his applications. Appellant and his wife challenged that decision by filing suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).   The DC Circuit affirmed and held that the district court correctly dismissed Appellants’ case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Based on the plain meaning of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), and the reasoning of Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614, USCIS’s decision to deny Appellants’ application for adjustment of status is unreviewable by a federal district court. The court explained that to avoid the dismissal of their case, Appellants sought to confine Patel’s holding to petitions for review of removal orders. Although Patel addressed a judgment made in a removal proceeding before an immigration judge and reserved ruling on whether Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars review of analogous judgments by USCIS that are challenged under the APA in a federal court. The court saw no basis for the distinction that Appellants attempt to draw. Section 1252(a)(2)(B) specifically provides that the relevant jurisdiction-stripping language applies “regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings.” View "Adil Abuzeid v. Alejandro Mayorkas" on Justia Law

The Secretary of Homeland Security promulgated the challenged OPT Rule pursuant to the Executive’s longstanding authority under the INA to set the “time” and “conditions” of nonimmigrants’ stay in the United States. Washington Alliance of Technology Workers (Washtech) argues that the statutory definition of the F-1 visa class precludes the Secretary from exercising the time-and-conditions authority to allow F-1 students to remain for school-recommended practical training after they complete their coursework. The district court sustained the OPT Rule’s authorization of a limited period of post-coursework Optional Practical Training if recommended and overseen by the school and approved by DHS, for qualifying students on F-1 visas.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court explained that Washtech is right that section 1324a(h)(3) is not the source of the relevant regulatory authority; it just defines what it means for an alien to be “unauthorized” for employment. But that was never the government’s point. What matters is that section 1324a(h)(3) expressly acknowledges that employment authorization need not be specifically conferred by statute; it can also be granted by regulation, as it has been in rules promulgated pursuant to DHS’s statutory authority to set the “conditions” of nonimmigrants’ admission to the United States. The OPT Rule’s authorization for F-1 students to work in jobs that provide practical training related to their course of study is just such a rule. Washtech’s claim that the OPT Rule conflicts with the congressional prohibition against unauthorized aliens’ employment therefore fails. View "WA Alliance of Tech. Workers v. DHS" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of blood plasma companies, challenged a U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") rule precluding aliens from entering the U.S. using B-1 business visitor visas to sell plasma. Plaintiffs claimed that they invested substantial resources to develop plasma collection facilities near the border and that the CPB rule failed to take Plaintiffs' interests into account when creating the new rule.The district court denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the Plaintiffs' interests were not within the Administrative Procedure Act's "zone of interests." The district court, determining the zone-of-interest determination was jurisdictional, dismissed the complaint.The D.C. Circuit reversed. For the Plaintiffs to sue under the APA, they must have been “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." However, the zone-of-interests determination is a merits issue, not a jurisdictional one. From there, the D.C. Circuit considered the merits, finding that the Plainitffs' case interests should have been considered under the B-1 analysis. Thus, the court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CSL Plasma Inc. v. United States Customs and Border Protection" on Justia Law

In a public-health emergency, 42 U.S.C. 265 authorizes the Executive Branch to "prohibit, in whole or in part, the introduction of persons and property from such countries or places as he shall designate." The Executive exercised that power during the COVID-19 pandemic, issuing a series of orders prohibiting "covered aliens" from entering the United States by land from Mexico or Canada.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction in part, finding that it is likely that aliens covered by a valid section 265 order have no right to be in the United States and concluding that the Executive may expel plaintiffs under section 265, but only to places where they will not be persecuted or tortured. The court addressed plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits and rejected their arguments that section 265 covers only transportation providers such as common carriers; that the Executive has no power to expel aliens for violating a valid section 265 order; and that they are entitled to apply for asylum. However, the court concluded that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their narrow argument that under section 1231 the Executive cannot expel them to places where they face persecution or torture. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the equities require a preliminary injunction to stop the Executive from expelling plaintiffs to places where they will be persecuted or tortured. The court remanded for further proceedings and ultimate resolution of the merits, including plaintiffs' claim that the section 265 order is arbitrary and capricious. View "Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

Miriyeva, a citizen of Azerbaijan, lawfully entered the U.S. and sought naturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1440. She enlisted in the U.S. Army through the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest program, under which noncitizens have an expedited path to citizenship by serving honorably in the military without first having lawful permanent residence. In 2018, USCIS approved Miriyeva’s application. Before the agency scheduled Miriyeva’s oath of citizenship ceremony, the Army sent her to basic training. During training, a medical condition ended her service. The Army described Miriyeva’s separation as “uncharacterized” since her service ended while she was still at “entry-level.” After her medical discharge, Miriyeva scheduled her oath ceremony but the agency reversed its approval of her naturalization application because the military did not describe her separation as “honorable.”Miriyeva argued that the military refers to “uncharacterized” as “separated under honorable conditions,” when required to do so and that the Army’s policy of treating an uncharacterized separation as not under honorable conditions violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Constitution’s Uniform Rule of Naturalization Clause, and the Due Process Clause. The district court dismissed Miriyeva’s declaratory judgment suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1421(c), which precluded Miriyeva’s Administrative Procedure Act and constitutional claims; her Declaratory Judgment Act claim failed without a different, standalone source of jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Miriyeva strayed from the statutory path for judicial review of claims intertwined with denied naturalization applications. View "Miriyeva v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services" on Justia Law