Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

While providing security for a U.S. State Department convoy in the Gaza Strip, Mark Parsons was killed by a roadside bomb. Parsons's estate and his family sued the Palestinian Authority under the Antiterrorism Act of 1991, 18 U.S.C. 2333, alleging that the Authority had provided material support for and conspired with the terrorist or terrorists who detonated the bomb. The court held that, although it agreed with the district court that the family's conspiracy claim theories were too speculative to survive summary judgment, the court believed a reasonable juror could conclude that Authority employees provided material support to the bomber. Accordingly, the court affirmed with respect to the conspiracy claim but reversed as to material support.

Appellee alleged that six U.S. Postal Inspectors wrongly caused him to be criminally prosecuted in retaliation for his public criticism of the United States Postal Service (USPS) and its personnel. The Postal Inspectors appealed the district court's qualified immunity, on appellee's claim of retaliatory inducement to prosecution in violation of his right to free speech under the First Amendment. Insofar as the appeal challenged the district court's determination that there were genuine issues of material fact, the court dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Insofar as the district court declined to find the Postal Inspectors protected by qualified immunity based on "arguable probable cause," the court affirmed. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court for trial on the merits.

Plaintiffs, Americans taken hostage in Iran in November 1979, and their families brought a new complaint, five years after the dismissal of their suit, in the district court relying on Congress's 2008 amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891. At issue was whether the 2008 amendments to the FSIA reneged on the promise of the United States in the Algiers Accords to bar plaintiffs' suit. The court held that because the ambiguity in section 1083(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 28 U.S.C. 1605A(a), regarding whether plaintiffs, whose case was not pending at the time of enactment, could file under the new terrorism cause of action, the court was required again to conclude that Congress had not abrogated the Algiers Accords. The court also rejected plaintiffs' alternative argument that the reenactment and partially revised jurisdictional provisions of the FSIA abrogated the Algiers Accord where these provisions were not meaningfully different than they were when presented to the court in plaintiffs' original suit. Accordingly, the order of the district court was affirmed.

This case stemmed from a contract between the Indonesian government and the Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon), a United States corporation, and several of its wholly owned subsidiaries where Exxon operated a large natural gas extraction and processing facility in the Aceh province. Plaintiffs were fifteen Indonesian villagers. Eleven villagers filed a complaint in 2001 alleging that Exxon's security forces committed murder, torture, sexual assault, battery, and false imprisonment in violation of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. 1350, and various common law torts. Four villagers alleged that in 2007, Exxon committed various common law torts. All plaintiffs alleged that Exxon took actions both in the United States and at its facility in the Aceh province that resulted in their injuries. Plaintiffs challenged the subsequent dismissal of their claims and Exxon filed a cross-appeal, inter alia, raising corporate immunity for the first time. The court concluded that aiding and abetting liability was well established under the ATS. The court further concluded that neither the text, history, nor purpose of the ATS supported corporate immunity for torts based on heinous conduct allegedly committed by its agents in violation of the law of nations. The court affirmed the dismissal of the TVPA claims in view of recent precedent of the court. The court concluded, however, that Exxon's objections to justiciability were unpersuasive and that the district court erred in ruling that plaintiffs lacked prudential standing to bring their non-federal tort claims and in the choice of law determination. The court finally concluded that Exxon's challenge to the diversity of parties in the complaint at issue was to be resolved initially by the district court. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' TVPA claims, reversed the dismissal of the ATS claims at issue, along with plaintiffs' non-federal tort claims, and remanded the cases to the district court.

A jury found for the District of Columbia government and a detective of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)(collectively, the government), in this case alleging a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for the use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and common law claims for assault and battery. Appellant, as personal representative of her brother's estate, sued to recover damages for the shooting death of her brother by the detective, and she contended on appeal that she did not receive a fair trial. The principle issue concerned the district court's rulings on the inadmissibility of portions of an internal MPD report regarding an altercation between the detective and appellant's brother. A related issue involved a violation of the pretrial disclosure requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. The court found no abuse of discretion by the district court where the record revealed that it properly excluded those parts of the report likely to confuse the jury and unfairly prejudiced the government. The court also held that the government failed to comply with Rule 26(a)(2)(E) by not supplementing the medical expert's disclosure to reflect an interview with the detective on which the expert intended to rely at trial, but in view of appellant's cross-examination of the expert, after receiving the expert's interview notes, that the violation was harmless and so the district court's refusal to strike the expert's testimony was not reversible error. Accordingly, because appellant's other claims of error and her bias claim were unpersuasive, the court affirmed the judgment.

Appellant and his wife filed an action against the Palestinian Authority ("PA") and the Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO") seeking to recover damages under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C. 1350, where appellant was arrested by PA security officers and confined and tortured for several months. At issue was whether the district court erred in dismissing the action for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court where the complaint did not raise a claim cognizable within the jurisdictional grant of the ATS and further concluded that the district court did not err in declining to exercise pendant jurisdiction under the alleged negligence claim under Israeli law.

The families of two American contractors beheaded by terrorists in Iraq sued the Syrian Arab Republic ("Syria") in federal court and when Syria did not respond, the district court eventually entered a default judgment in favor of the families. At issue was whether the district court's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) order was in error and its default judgment void. Also at issue was whether remand was appropriate to give the district court opportunity to grant further relief of Syria. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the families adequately effected service of process against Syria when they first filed suit under former section 1605(a)(7) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. 1602, et seq., where, before the district court entered judgment, the families removed to convert their action and proceeded under the new section 1605A in accordance with section 1083 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ("NDAA"), Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3. The court also held that under section 1083 of the NDAA, the families did not have to serve Syria anew because the statutory text did not treat converted claims as new claims for relief. The court further held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a)(2) did not apply in this case given the FSIA's specific statutory service of process provision. Accordingly, there was no need to remand the case to grant Syria other relief.

Appellant was convicted and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment and ordered to pay $160,000 in restitution to the Naval Research Laboratory ("Research Laboratory") when he stole computer equipment over the course of ten years as an employee of the Research Laboratory. At issue was whether the costs of the Research Laboratory's internal investigation constituted necessary expenses that were incurred during participation in the investigation and prosecution of the offense under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act ("Act"), 18 U.S.C. 3663A(b)(4). The court reversed the district court's judgment ordering restitution and held that the text of the Act did not authorize restitution for the costs of an organization's internal investigation at least when the internal investigation was neither required nor requested by the criminal investigators or prosecutors.

Appellee filed an action against appellants, sisters who were traveling together aboard Pan Am Airways Flight 73 when Libyan terrorists hijacked the plane and held it for sixteen hours on the tarmac in Pakistan, seeking to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitrarion Act ("Arbitration Act"), 9 U.S.C. 4. While the suit was pending, the United States and Libya reached a diplomatic settlement where Libya agreed to deposit $1.5 billion into a settlement fund and Congress provided for the implementation of the settlement fund for all terrorism-related litigation against Libya in American courts. At issue was whether the district court properly granted a motion to compel arbitration under section 4 of the Arbitration Act. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the motion to compel and held that the Libyan Claims Resolution Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605A, did not prevent the district court from ordering arbitration of the underlying dispute.

Plaintiffs, the son and widow of an individual who was allegedly tortured and killed by the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization ("defendants"), sued defendants for violation of the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"), 28 U.S.C. 1350, and federal common law. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in vacating the entry of default and if not, whether plaintiffs had a cause of action under the TVPA or federal common law. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court and held that the TVPA did not permit a suit against defendants where the term "individual" comprised only natural persons and also held that plaintiffs did not have a cause of action under 28 U.S.C. 1331 for an alleged violation of federal common law.