Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from a contract between the Indonesian government and the Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon), a United States corporation, and several of its wholly owned subsidiaries where Exxon operated a large natural gas extraction and processing facility in the Aceh province. Plaintiffs were fifteen Indonesian villagers. Eleven villagers filed a complaint in 2001 alleging that Exxon's security forces committed murder, torture, sexual assault, battery, and false imprisonment in violation of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. 1350, and various common law torts. Four villagers alleged that in 2007, Exxon committed various common law torts. All plaintiffs alleged that Exxon took actions both in the United States and at its facility in the Aceh province that resulted in their injuries. Plaintiffs challenged the subsequent dismissal of their claims and Exxon filed a cross-appeal, inter alia, raising corporate immunity for the first time. The court concluded that aiding and abetting liability was well established under the ATS. The court further concluded that neither the text, history, nor purpose of the ATS supported corporate immunity for torts based on heinous conduct allegedly committed by its agents in violation of the law of nations. The court affirmed the dismissal of the TVPA claims in view of recent precedent of the court. The court concluded, however, that Exxon's objections to justiciability were unpersuasive and that the district court erred in ruling that plaintiffs lacked prudential standing to bring their non-federal tort claims and in the choice of law determination. The court finally concluded that Exxon's challenge to the diversity of parties in the complaint at issue was to be resolved initially by the district court. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' TVPA claims, reversed the dismissal of the ATS claims at issue, along with plaintiffs' non-federal tort claims, and remanded the cases to the district court.

Plaintiffs, four Afghan and five Iraqi citizens captured and subsequently held in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, by the United States military sued defendants, seeking damages and declaratory relief as the result of their treatment while in U.S. custody. Each plaintiff asserted two Bivens claims, namely, defendants tortured him in violation of his due process right under the Fifth Amendment and defendants' conduct constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs also brought claims under the ATS based on defendants' alleged infliction of "prolonged arbitrary detention," "torture," and "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their constitutional claims and ATS claims. The court held that defendants were protected from plaintiffs' constitutional claims by qualified immunity. The court also held that, even if defendants were not shielded by qualified immunity and plaintiffs could claim the protections of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, the court would decline to sanction a Bivens cause of action because special factors counseled against doing so. The court further held that plaintiffs' claim under the ATS alleged a violation of the law of nations, not of the ATS, and therefore, did not violate a statute of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(2)(B). The court finally held that because plaintiffs have not alleged a cognizable cause of action, they have no basis upon which to seek declaratory relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment of dismissal.

Appellant and his wife filed an action against the Palestinian Authority ("PA") and the Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO") seeking to recover damages under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C. 1350, where appellant was arrested by PA security officers and confined and tortured for several months. At issue was whether the district court erred in dismissing the action for failure to state a claim. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court where the complaint did not raise a claim cognizable within the jurisdictional grant of the ATS and further concluded that the district court did not err in declining to exercise pendant jurisdiction under the alleged negligence claim under Israeli law.

The families of two American contractors beheaded by terrorists in Iraq sued the Syrian Arab Republic ("Syria") in federal court and when Syria did not respond, the district court eventually entered a default judgment in favor of the families. At issue was whether the district court's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) order was in error and its default judgment void. Also at issue was whether remand was appropriate to give the district court opportunity to grant further relief of Syria. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the families adequately effected service of process against Syria when they first filed suit under former section 1605(a)(7) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. 1602, et seq., where, before the district court entered judgment, the families removed to convert their action and proceeded under the new section 1605A in accordance with section 1083 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ("NDAA"), Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3. The court also held that under section 1083 of the NDAA, the families did not have to serve Syria anew because the statutory text did not treat converted claims as new claims for relief. The court further held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a)(2) did not apply in this case given the FSIA's specific statutory service of process provision. Accordingly, there was no need to remand the case to grant Syria other relief.

Appellee filed an action against appellants, sisters who were traveling together aboard Pan Am Airways Flight 73 when Libyan terrorists hijacked the plane and held it for sixteen hours on the tarmac in Pakistan, seeking to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitrarion Act ("Arbitration Act"), 9 U.S.C. 4. While the suit was pending, the United States and Libya reached a diplomatic settlement where Libya agreed to deposit $1.5 billion into a settlement fund and Congress provided for the implementation of the settlement fund for all terrorism-related litigation against Libya in American courts. At issue was whether the district court properly granted a motion to compel arbitration under section 4 of the Arbitration Act. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the motion to compel and held that the Libyan Claims Resolution Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605A, did not prevent the district court from ordering arbitration of the underlying dispute.

Argentina appealed the district court's dismissal of its motion to extend where Argentina had violated a Bilateral Investment Treaty when it implemented several emergency measures in response to the nation's financial crisis. An arbitration panel determined that Argentina was liable to National Grid PLC, ("National Grid") which had been operating in Argentina under the auspices of the treaty. At issue was whether National Grid forfeited its timeliness defense, whether the district court erred in treating Argentina's motion to extend as moot, and whether the district court erred in ultimately finding service to be untimely. Also at issue was whether the district court erred in granting a confirmation motion without first giving Argentina the opportunity to raise defenses available under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. 201-208. The court rejected Argentina's argument that National Grid had forfeited its timeliness defense where it had expressly preserved this defense in the joint stipulation and then raised it in its first responsive pleading. The court also held that the district court had no authority to grant Argentina's motion to extend time to serve notice and therefore acted within its discretion in treating the motion as moot. Absent any evidence of timely service of notice, the court affirmed the dismissal of Argentina's motion to vacate the arbitral awards. The court further affirmed National Grid's cross-motion for recognition of the arbitral award where Argentina had ample time to raise defenses but made no attempt to raise such defects in the district court.

Plaintiffs, the son and widow of an individual who was allegedly tortured and killed by the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization ("defendants"), sued defendants for violation of the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"), 28 U.S.C. 1350, and federal common law. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in vacating the entry of default and if not, whether plaintiffs had a cause of action under the TVPA or federal common law. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court and held that the TVPA did not permit a suit against defendants where the term "individual" comprised only natural persons and also held that plaintiffs did not have a cause of action under 28 U.S.C. 1331 for an alleged violation of federal common law.

FG Hemisphere Associates, LLC ("FG Hemisphere") brought a suit against the Democratic Republic of Congo ("DRC") under the provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. 1604, permitting a plaintiff to confirm an arbitration award secured against a foreign sovereign. At issue was whether the district court could sanction DRC for failing to respond to a court-ordered discovery under the FSIA. The court held that the FSIA did not abrogate a court's inherit power to impose contempt sanctions on a foreign sovereign and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it sanctioned the DRC.

Plaintiff, a Cuban corporation, sued the United States Department of Treasury when plaintiff's renewal of its trademark, which had previously been permitted as an exception under the Trading with the Enemy Act ("Act"), was barred by the 1998 law that modified the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and subsequently barred renewals of certain trademarks. At issue was whether plaintiffs had invoked the presumption against retroactivity and the 1998 law should be interpreted to bar only new trademark registrations, not renewals of previously registered trademarks, and if the 1998 law did bar the renewal of previously registered trademarks, then would it violate the substantive due process doctrine. The court held that the presumption against retroactivity did not apply to plaintiff where plaintiff did not possess a vested right to renewal of its trademark. The court also held that the 1998 law did not violate the substantive due process doctrine where it was rationally related to the legitimate government goals of isolating Cuba's Communist government and hastening a transition to democracy in Cuba.