Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

AdvancePierre petitioned for review of the Board's finding that it committed unfair labor practices (ULPs) over a five month span as the union conducted an organizing campaign. At issue is whether AdvancePierre unlawfully encouraged its employees to withdraw their union authorization cards, and the "read-aloud" remedy ordered by the Board.The DC Circuit denied AdvancePierre's petition for review, holding that Section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act limits the court's jurisdiction to matters first presented to the Board unless extraordinary circumstances excuse such failure. In this case, AdvancePierre's petition squarely collides with Section 10(e)'s jurisdictional barrier and the court is without authority to consider all but a small portion of the company's argument. Therefore, the court cannot consider AdvancePierre's argument regarding the company's unlawful solicitation of its employees to withdraw their union authorization cards because it was not preserved under Section 10(e). Furthermore, the court held that the Board's application of In re Mohawk Industries, 334 N.L.R.B. 1170 (2001), was not arbitrary or capricious and the Board's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. In regard to the notice-reading remedy, the court held that the Board did not abuse its extremely broad discretion when it determined that the company's 17 ULPs were sufficiently serious and widespread to warrant a notice-reading. View "AdvancePierre Foods, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims of employment discrimination against Cushman & Wakefield's Chief Executive Officer of the Americas for lack of personal jurisdiction based on the fiduciary shield doctrine.The court held that the fiduciary shield doctrine lacks any basis in either the Due Process Clause or the transacting-business prong of the District of Columbia's long-arm statute, D.C.CODE 13-423(a)(1). The court also held that the district court's dismissal erroneously denied plaintiff's request in the alternative for limited jurisdictional discovery. Accordingly, on remand, the district court may either (i) determine on the current record that defendant's suit-related contacts (made in his capacity as CEO of the Americas and otherwise) satisfy the minimum-contacts standard, or (ii) grant jurisdictional discovery to permit development of the record on defendant's contacts with the District of Columbia. View "Urquhart-Bradley v. Mobley" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit denied a petition for review of the Authority's order finding that the Union committed unfair labor practices by attempting to dismantle the pool of arbitrators selected by a predecessor union and thereby impeding access to the grievance process.The court held that the Authority's conclusion that the Union committed unfair labor practices was not arbitrary and capricious. Rather, the Authority followed its own precedent when it determined that the Union's outreach to the two arbitrators amounted to unfair labor practices. The court also held that the Authority did not act contrary to law when it determined that the Union acted outside of the statutory protection for the expression of personal views; the Union has not demonstrated that its First Amendment rights were violated, seeing as it failed to identify a public concern implicated by its speech; the Authority's nontraditional remedy did not exceed its statutory authority because it was an appropriate exercise of its power to carry out the purposes of the Civil Service Reform Act by restoring the status quo ante; and the Union's application for leave to adduce additional evidence is denied because the Union has not established that the evidence is material or that there were reasonable grounds for the Union's failure to adduce it earlier. View "Independent Union of Pension Employees for Democracy and Justice v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit granted a petition for review of the NLRB's determination that Circus committed three unfair labor practices related to a temporary employee. The court held that the Board engaged in unreasoned decisionmaking by finding unfair labor practices without substantial evidence on the record as a whole and by departing from announced standards in an arbitrary and capricious manner.   The court held that NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975), requires an employee to affirmatively request union representation in a manner reasonably calculated to put the employer on notice. In this case, the employee's statement of fact standing alone was insufficient to trigger the protections of the National Labor Relations Act. The court also held that the Board misapplied the Wright Line mixed-motive test by failing to consider the employer's rebuttal case. Consequently, this error is fatal to the Board's finding that Circus violated section Section 8(a)(1) by suspending and terminating the employee because of a protected activity. Finally, the court held that the ALJ witness credibility determinations supporting the conclusion that the employee was threatened is patently insupportable. In regard to the unlawful termination finding, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Circus Circus Casinos, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

After the CBP distributed a memorandum to its agents changing vehicle inspection procedures at the El Paso border checkpoint, the Union filed a grievance on behalf of CBP agents claiming that the CBP failed to notify and negotiate with it before issuing the Memo. The arbitrator found in favor of the Union and then the Authority set aside the arbitrator's award.The DC Circuit granted the Union's petition for review, holding that the Memo was arbitrary and capricious. In this case, the Authority failed to reasonably explain its departure from precedent and its conclusion that the Memo was not subject to bargaining under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. Accordingly, the court remanded to the Authority for further proceedings. View "American Federation of Government Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Attorney General of the United States in his official capacity as head of the Department of Justice (DOJ), alleging that the DOJ had denied her a promotion to a Division Director position because of her gender, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16, and her age, in violation of 29 U.S.C. 633a. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the DOJ.The DC Circuit held that a reasonable jury could find that the DOJ's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for denying plaintiff the promotion that she sought was pretextual and that discrimination was the real reason. In this case, a reasonable jury could find in plaintiff's favor based on her superior qualifications, the accumulated evidence of gender discrimination, and pretext. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stoe v. Barr" on Justia Law

Kiewit contested its OSHA citation, arguing that the quick-drenching provision in 41 C.F.R. 50-204.6(c), which requires quick-drenching eyewash facilities for workers exposed to corrosive materials, was invalidly applied to the construction industry without notice-and-comment rulemaking. The ALJ and Commission agreed with Kiewit.After determining that it had jurisdiction over the petition for review, the DC Circuit denied Kiewit's motion for leave to add rebuttal arguments. On the merits, the court held that the Occupational Health and Safety Act is ambiguous regarding the Secretary's authority to apply established Federal standards to new industries under section 6(a). The court also held that the Secretary's interpretation of his section 6(a) authority is permissible and therefore owed deference by the Commission. Considering, among other factors, the OSH Act's stated purpose of expanding workplace protections and section 6(a)'s instruction that, in the event of conflict among any such standards, the Secretary shall promulgate the standard which assures the greatest protection of the safety or health of the affected employees, the court found that the Secretary's interpretation is consistent with the OSH Act and is therefore entitled to Chevron deference. View "Kiewit Power Constructors Co. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against George Washington University, alleging that it violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation and discriminating against her because of her illness. Plaintiff also alleged retaliation and interference claims under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Less than a year after plaintiff underwent treatment for cancer while working as a psychiatry resident at the George Washington University Hospital, she was terminated based on documented instances of unprofessionalism and deficient performance.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the University on all claims. The court held that plaintiff failed to request an accommodation under the ADA, choosing to seek leave under the FMLA. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to identify evidence allowing a reasonable jury to conclude that her employer discriminated against her because of her disability. The court also held that plaintiff failed to rebut the University's legitimate justifications for its actions. Therefore, plaintiff's interference and retaliation claims under the FMLA likewise failed. View "Waggel v. George Washington University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former employee of the FAA, filed suit against the Secretary of Transportation for unlawful retaliation and discrimination, and the Secretary of Transportation and the Department of Labor for violation of her First Amendment right to run for office without penalty. In this case, after she ran for elective office, her full disability benefits were reduced.The DC Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, holding that plaintiff alleged her FAA retaliation claim almost fifteen years after her protected activity and thus the lack of temporal proximity did not support an inference of causation. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act or Title VII, because she is neither an employee nor an applicant. Finally, OWCP's determination that plaintiff had demonstrated an ability to run for elective office, and thus disproving her doctor's contention that she was permanently disabled and would be unable to work again in any capacity, did not violate the First Amendment. View "Pueschel v. Chao" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, claiming that Mastro's deprived him and other servers of a minimum wage in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the District of Columbia's Minimum Wage Revision Act.The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Mastro's motion to compel arbitration, holding that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that plaintiff was unaware of the arbitration agreement during the course of his work at Mastro's, and that he therefore had no reason to believe his continued employment could be seen as an intent to be bound by the agreement. The court held that the district judge, in a comprehensive opinion, correctly treated Mastro's motion as if it sought summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) with respect to the question whether plaintiff had agreed to arbitrate. In this case, Mastro's was unable to produce a copy of an arbitration agreement bearing plaintiff's signature, or any other direct evidence of his assent to be bound by the policy. Furthermore, nothing in the record negates plaintiff's sworn declaration that he was unaware of the agreement's existence and had no reason to believe he had relinquished his right to a trial. View "Camara v. Mastro's Restaurants LLC" on Justia Law