Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this labor dispute, the NLRB assumed arguendo that the doctrine of judicial estoppel applied in NLRB proceedings but relied on the factors in New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001), to determine that judicial estoppel was inappropriate in this case. The DC Circuit held that the NLRB misapplied New Hampshire v. Maine and therefore remanded for the NLRB to consider whether judicial estoppel was available in NLRB proceedings and, if so, whether to invoke it. View "Temple University Hospital, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction enjoining a union's efforts to gain leverage over two commercial air carriers during negotiations over an amended collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The court held that the district court had jurisdiction to enter a status quo injunction in this major dispute, and did not abuse its discretion in enjoining this conduct.In light of the Railway Labor Act and the Norris- LaGuardia Act, the court held that Atlas presented compelling evidence in support of its assertion that this case involved a major dispute, because the existing CBA did not even arguably speak to whether the relevant conduct was permissible when done in furtherance of a particular goal. The court also held that Atlas demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, where Atlas showed that the status quo changed during a major dispute in violation of the RLA. The court held that the union encouraged strict compliance with the terms of the existing CBA in an effort to gain leverage in negotiations for a new or amended contract by encouraging pilots to block out on time, to make short notice sick calls, and to make filling open time more difficult. View "Atlas Air, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Architect with respect to plaintiff's discrimination claims, holding that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to infer that the 2014 and 2015 decision not to select plaintiff as Branch Chief was motivated by bias.The court affirmed the district court's grant of of summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's retaliation claims, holding that plaintiff failed to introduce anything beyond his weak evidence of temporal proximity to show that the Architect's decisions were motivated by a desire to retaliate against him. Furthermore, even if it were to adopt plaintiff's interpretation of the relevant dates and find that he has established a prima facie case for retaliation using evidence of temporal proximity, there would still be insufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment. View "Iyoha v. Architect of the Capitol" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit denied the petition for review of OSHA's citation to Griffin for violating workplace safety standards designed to prevent electric shock. The court held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's determination that Griffin violated two safety standards under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970; a Griffin supervisor's carelessness was foreseeable to other supervisors and he had both actual and constructive knowledge of the violations; and the ALJ reasonably rejected Griffin's unpreventable employee misconduct defense. Therefore, the Commission's order was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. View "Wayne J. Griffin Electric, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the the Acting Architect of the Capitol (AOC), in her official capacity, alleging that the selecting officials at the AOC denied him a promotion on the basis of his race and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.The DC Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment to the AOC, holding that a jury reasonably could find the panelists did not select plaintiff for promotion because of his race or national origin. Because plaintiff argued his case as a single-motive claim and at oral argument forfeited any potential mixed-motive claim he could have made, he bears the burden of showing the alleged animus was a but-for cause of the decision not to promote him. Therefore, the court remanded for trial where plaintiff will bear the typical burden in this single-motive case to establish that he would have been selected for the promotion but for the alleged improper motive. View "Mayorga v. Merdon" on Justia Law

The union petitioned for review of the Authority's decision that the union's unfair labor practice charge was untimely. The DC Circuit held that the charge was timely and therefore granted the union's petition for review in part. In this case, the Authority's finding that the Agency had openly refused to make certain changes as of 2010 was not supported by substantial evidence.However, the court denied the petition insofar as it asked the court to retain jurisdiction. The court held that retaining jurisdiction was unwarranted because it was up to the Authority to consider in the first instance the Agency's exceptions to the ALJ's holding that the Agency had committed an unfair labor practice. View "Federal Education Association v. Federal Labor Relations Authority" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was denied tenure and terminated by the University, he filed suit against the Board of Trustees, claiming that the University discriminated against him based on race and violated both the terms and spirit of its contract with him.The DC Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the University on the Title VII, D.C. Human Rights Act (DCHRA), and contract claims. As to the statutory claims under Title VII and the DCHRA, the court held that plaintiff raised a plausible inference that race was a motivating factor in the University's decision to deny him tenure. As to the contract claims, the court held that the claims were not time-barred. On the merits, the court held that there was an unresolved factual dispute regarding whether an implied-in-fact contract between plaintiff and the University existed and, if it did, what the terms and intent of that contract were. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Mawakana v. Board of Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit held that lacrosse officials working for the Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association (PIAA) are independent contractors exempt from the protections of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In this case, the union filed a petition with the Board seeking to represent 140 individuals who officiate lacrosse games. PIAA contested the union's right to hold an election. The Regional NLRB Director rejected PIAA's arguments and directed that a union election take place. The court granted PIAA's petition for review and vacated the Board's order, denying the cross-application for enforcement, because the lacrosse officials were independent contractors. View "Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Assoc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, 47 former longtime employees of the District Child and Family Services Agency who were mostly African American, filed suit alleging claims that their terminations were unlawfully discriminatory on the basis of age and race. At issue on appeal, were the race-based claims.The DC Circuit generally affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's race-based claims, but reversed as to one issue. The court held that nothing in Title VII suggests that the practices an employer uses to effectuate the adverse employment action of layoffs, whether or not dubbed a reduction in force, are exempt from disparate-impact scrutiny. Accordingly, the court reversed the "particular practice" holding and the accompanying denial of class certification, remanding for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's decisions with respect to plaintiffs' challenge to the college degree requirement the Agency added to one job category, and the applicability of estoppel to certain individual plaintiffs' claims. View "Davis v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

After the Board found that DirectSat had refused to disclose information relevant to the union's statutory duties and thus violated its duty to bargain in good faith under the National Labor Relations Act, the Board issued its decision and DirecTV filed a motion to intervene. In this case, during negotiations with a union representing its employees, DirectSat proposed that any new work that arose during the term of the agreement would not count as bargaining unit work unless it was "pursuant to its Home Service Provider agreement with DirecTV." However, DirectSat repeatedly refused to provide the union the full Home Service Provider agreement to understand the proposed scope of bargaining unit work.The DC Circuit held that the Board reasonably concluded that DirectSat's bargaining proposal rendered the entire agreement relevant; there was no basis to set aside the Board's denial of DirecTV's motion to intervene on the ground that it was filed too late; and thus the court denied the companies' petition for review and grant the Board's cross application for enforcement. View "DirectSat USA LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law