Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a civil suit alleging that his employer fired him because he was male. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) barred plaintiff's suit because he brought it too late. On EEOC Form 5, plaintiff swore that his statements were true and listed his address as “3032 Rodman Street, NW, Apt. 35, Washington, DC 20008.” At the time he was not living at that address. A month earlier he had moved to South Carolina. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that when a complainant, such as plaintiff in this instance, fails to receive a right-to-sue notice because he gave the EEOC an incorrect address or because he neglected to inform the EEOC when he moved, the complainant is at fault and he is not entitled to equitable tolling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Maggio v. Wisconsin Ave. Psychiatric Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a civil suit alleging that his employer fired him because he was male. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) barred plaintiff's suit because he brought it too late. On EEOC Form 5, plaintiff swore that his statements were true and listed his address as “3032 Rodman Street, NW, Apt. 35, Washington, DC 20008.” At the time he was not living at that address. A month earlier he had moved to South Carolina. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that when a complainant, such as plaintiff in this instance, fails to receive a right-to-sue notice because he gave the EEOC an incorrect address or because he neglected to inform the EEOC when he moved, the complainant is at fault and he is not entitled to equitable tolling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Maggio v. Wisconsin Ave. Psychiatric Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Department, alleging that her new supervisor retaliated against her for earlier discrimination complaints. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. The supervisor justified plaintiff's low performance ratings on the ground that plaintiff, a managerial employee, failed adequately to supervise satellite offices and external contractors. Further, the supervisor attested that plaintiff was never excluded from meetings and that plaintiff could have attended meetings, but never did. The court concluded that the proffered facts could not, if presented a trial, support a jury verdict that retaliation was the supervisor's real motive for the actions of which plaintiff complains. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Allen v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Department, alleging that her new supervisor retaliated against her for earlier discrimination complaints. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. The supervisor justified plaintiff's low performance ratings on the ground that plaintiff, a managerial employee, failed adequately to supervise satellite offices and external contractors. Further, the supervisor attested that plaintiff was never excluded from meetings and that plaintiff could have attended meetings, but never did. The court concluded that the proffered facts could not, if presented a trial, support a jury verdict that retaliation was the supervisor's real motive for the actions of which plaintiff complains. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Allen v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Bruce Packing petitioned for review of the Board's decision that Bruce Packing committed unfair labor practices in an effort to beat back a union-organizing drive at one of its plants. The court agreed with the Board that substantial evidence supports its conclusion that the termination of a worker violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3), where the evidence demonstrated that Bruce Packing would not have terminated the worker absent his union activity. However, the court disagreed with the Board’s decision to allow the late amendment of the General Counsel’s complaint, which left Bruce Packing without notice of a new charge that it lacked the opportunity to fairly contest. Accordingly, the Board’s order will be enforced with respect to all issues, except its conclusion that Bruce Packing illegally promised benefits to employees who stopped supporting the union. View "Bruce Packing Co. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

After a federal court of appeals entered judgment enforcing petitioner’s right to reinstatement and backpay with interest for his unlawful termination, the Board entered into a settlement agreement with petitioner's former employer under which petitioner's backpay would be paid by monthly installments over eleven years with no interest accruing. The Board also ruled that reinstatement to a position with reduced pay, benefits, and job security satisfied the court’s judgment because it paralleled what current employees received. The court concluded that the Board's decision departs without any reasoned explanation from longstanding Board precedent constraining the Board’s ability to alter the terms of a judicially enforced Order, and it relies on a finding of substantial equivalence between petitioner’s old job and his reinstatement offer that is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court granted the petition in part, vacated the Board's ruling, and remanded. View "Dupuy v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against the Department, alleging a claim under the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act, D.C. Code 1–615.51 et seq., after she was discharged as a result of the Department's disciplinary proceedings stemming from a major fire of a high-rise building. The district court grouped appellant’s numerous communications with her supervisors into broad categories, and then granted summary judgment to the Department on the ground that most of those categories were not statutorily protected types of communications, and for the one group that was protected, the Department had articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions. The court concluded, however, that Whistleblower protection is not disbursed or denied en masse. When appellant's complaints are considered individually rather than categorically, a reasonable jury could conclude that one or more of them qualifies as a protected complaint under the Whistleblower Act. Appellant also came forward with sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find a prima facie case of retaliation as to those complaints. The Department failed to meet its burden of establishing that any reasonable juror would have to find by clear and convincing evidence that it had legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its actions. Accordingly, the court reversed as to the Whistleblower claims. The court affirmed, with one exception, the grant of summary judgment as to appellant's other claims. View "Coleman v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who suffers from Multiple Sclerosis (MS), filed suit against her former employer, TEFCU, for wrongful termination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), D.C. CODE 2-1401.01 et seq.; and Section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1140. Plaintiff alleged that the cost of treating her MS was causing the monthly healthcare insurance premium to rise and that TEFCU dismissed her to reduce its health care costs. TEFCU claimed that plaintiff's termination was due to her poor performance as an employee. The district court granted TEFCU's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could infer that TEFCU dismissed plaintiff because of the costs associated with insuring her. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for sanctions where plaintiff provides no citation to authority or to the record demonstrating that the district court's denial was premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law, an erroneous factual finding, or that it was otherwise unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Giles v. Transit Emp. Fed. Credit Union" on Justia Law

The NLRB determined that the Venetian committed an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 157, when it requested that police officers at the scene of a union demonstration issue criminal citations to the demonstrators and block them from the walkway because they were allegedly trespassing. The Venetian argues that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunizes it from liability under the Act. Under that doctrine, conduct that constitutes a direct petition to government, but would otherwise violate the Act, is shielded from liability by the First Amendment. The court granted the Venetian's petition for review because the act of summoning the police to enforce state trespass law is a direct petition to government subject to protection under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine; denied the Board's cross-application for enforcement; and vacated the Board's order. Because the Board did not address whether the Venetian’s petition was a sham, the court remanded so that the Board may consider that question in the first instance. View "Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The NLRB ruled that AT&T committed an unfair labor practice by barring its employees from wearing union shirts that say "Inmate" and "Prisoner" while interacting with customers or working in public. The court concluded that, while Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 157, protects the right of employees to wear union apparel at work, there is a special circumstances exception to that general rule. The court held that a company may lawfully prohibit its employees from displaying messages on the job that the company reasonably believes may harm its relationship with its customers or its public image. In this case, it was reasonable for AT&T to believe that the “Inmate/Prisoner” shirts may harm AT&T’s relationship with its customers or its public image. Thus, AT&T lawfully prohibited its employees from wearing the shirt. The court granted AT&T's petition for review, vacated the Board's decision and order with respect to these shirts, and denied the cross-application for enforcement. View "Southern New England Telephone v. NLRB" on Justia Law