Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Fallbrook Hospital petitioned for review of the Board's decision ordering it to pay negotiation expenses to the Union after the Board held that petitioner had violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (5). The Board found that the totality of petitioner's conduct made it clear that there was no intent to bargain and found multiple violations of the Act based on petitioner's conduct at the bargaining table. The court concluded that the Board's decision that negotiation expenses were warranted in this case is amply supported by substantial evidence in the record and has a rational basis in the law. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and granted the Board's cross-petition for enforcement. View "Fallbrook Hosp. Corp. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. 5596(b)(1), authorizes back pay awards to employees "affected by an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action." At issue was whether Customs and Border Protection must provide a border guard, whom an arbitrator found was wrongfully denied an overtime opportunity in violation of the agency's assignment policy, with monetary compensation under the Act or whether Customs must provide the next available overtime opportunity under the agency's assignment policy. Customs argues that the Act limits the guard's remedy to the terms of the assignment policy but the Authority rejected the agency's reading of subsection (b)(4) and ruled that even if the Act limits awards to the terms of the agency's assignment policy, that policy was inapplicable in this case because it applies only in situations involving administrative error and the arbitrator had concluded that the denial of overtime was "more than a mere mistake." Customs petitioned for review. The court agreed with the Authority that it lacks jurisdiction to review the Authority's final orders. Section 7123 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7123(a)(1), vests the court with jurisdiction to review the Authority's final orders "other than an order...involving an award by an arbitrator." Because no exception applies, the court dismissed the petition. View "DHS v. FLRA" on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board dismissed a charge that the Union violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(1)(A), by failing to remove derisive and allegedly threatening comments posted on a Facebook page maintained for Union members. The comments, written by Union members without the permission of the Union, appeared while the Union was on strike against Veolia and made disparaging remarks about people who crossed the picket line. The Board held that the Union was not responsible for the Facebook comments because “the 3 individuals who posted the comments were neither alleged nor found to be agents of the [Union].” The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Union should be held responsible for the Facebook entries posted by Union members because a Union officer controlled the Facebook page. The Union’s private Facebook page was not analogous to misconduct on a picket line; it was not accessible or viewable by anyone other than active Union members and the disputed postings were made by persons who acted on their own without the permission of the Union. View "Weigand v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked in the State Department as Diplomatic Security Special Agents and volunteered to serve one-year in Iraq. They arrived in Iraq in February 2004. Initially, their permanent duty station was in Washington, D.C., so they received “locality pay” in addition to base salary intended to equalize federal employees’ compensation with that of non-federal workers in the same geographic area, 5 U.S.C. 5301, 5304. Months later, their permanent duty station changed to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and they no longer received locality pay. Plaintiffs also received compensation for a significant number of overtime hours. In 2005, they returned to the U.S. After the Office of Personnel Management’s new regulations took effect, the plaintiffs received notices of a review of premium pay earnings involving Iraq, that “the rate of the annual premium pay cap that applies to you is $128,200,” that earnings to date “have already or will shortly put you above the cap for the current pay year,” and that the Department would seek collection of any overpayments. Each later received a letter requiring repayment of from $435.94 to $10,514.98. The D.C. Circuit held that the Department permissibly construed the statute and did not act arbitrarily in denying a discretionary waiver of the obligation to repay. View "Lubow v. Dep't of State" on Justia Law

Retired officers of D.C.’s Metropolitan Police Department were subsequently re-hired by the D.C. Protective Services Division, which protects government buildings and D.C.-owned property. They received pension benefits from their service with the Police Department and salaries for their jobs with Protective Services, but Section 5- 723(e) of the D.C. Code requires reduction of plaintiffs’ salaries by the amount of their pensions to prevent so-called double-dipping. Pursuant to that provision, D.C. reduced plaintiffs’ salaries by the amount of their pensions. Following a remand for consideration under the Fair Labor Standards Act, plaintiffs raised a claim under the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, 4 U.S.C. 111(a)), which was rejected. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. The Public Salary Tax Act allows states and D.C. to impose “taxation” on compensation paid to employees of the federal government, only if the taxation does not discriminate against federal employees. The D.C. salary reduction provision at issue is not “taxation.” It does not raise revenue, but operates on the opposite side of D.C.’s financial ledger. It reduces D.C.’s total expenditures on salaries. View "Cannon v. Dist. of Columbia" on Justia Law

The Union represents employees at the Anniston Army Depot. Clark is a bargaining-unit employee, but not a dues-paying union member. The Union learned that the Depot was assigning employees duties beyond their pay grade without additional compensation and filed a grievance on behalf of all bargaining-unit employees. The parties entered a settlement agreement that provided backpay. The Union was to notify Depot employees and gather information needed for claims. Though Clark had completed work above his pay grade, the Union failed to contact him. When Clark inquired about the settlement, a Union representative asked whether he was a member and told Clark he needed to join. Clark refused. The representative told Clark how to submit a claim. Clark complied. The Depot and the Union agreed to distribute $303,825 among 218 employees the Union had listed. The Union left Clark off the list and put only one non-member on the list. Clark filed an unfair labor practice charge with the FLRA, which alleged that the Union had violated 5 U.S.C. 7114(a)(1) and 7116(b)(8) by giving preferential treatment to union member. Before a hearing, the parties agreed that the Union would pay Clark $1,970, but 55 other nonunion employees would receive $200. Clark objected. The Regional Director approved the settlement; the FLRA General Counsel affirmed. The D.C. Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Such a decision is not a “final order of the Authority” subject to review under 5 U.S.C. 7123(a). View "Clark v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth." on Justia Law

Rattigan is a black male of Jamaican descent who worked at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia as the FBI’s primary liaison to the Saudi intelligence service. In 2001, he accused supervisors in the FBI’s Office of International Operations, of discriminating against him on the basis of race and national origin and pursued charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Office. One of those supervisors later sent Special Agent Leighton on a short assignment to Riyadh, where he evidently grew suspicious about Rattigan. The FBI Security Division conducted an investigation and concluded that the alleged security risks were “unfounded.” Rattigan filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000. On remand, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the FBI because the memo on which Rattigan based his claim had been prepared not by one of the accused supervisors, but by Special Agent Donovan Leighton, who was not charged with discrimination and had no apparent reason to retaliate against him. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. View "Rattigan v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, Capitol Police, alleging violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2615, when Capitol Police interfered with her exercise of FMLA rights and retaliated against her for that exercise. Plaintiff sought leave from a system allowing an employee to obtain a pre-approval of a "bank" leave. After the grant of her leave, police superiors ordered plaintiff to submit to a "fitness for duty examination," and told her that the facts supporting her FMLA requests were the basis for the order. Plaintiff's "police powers" were revoked and she was assigned to administrative duties while she waited to take the examination. In regards to the retaliation claim, the court concluded that the district court erred in granting Capitol Police's motion to dismiss where plaintiff's allegations amply supported the inference of retaliatory purpose and are enough to defeat the motion. In regard to the interference claim, the court held that an employer action with a reasonable tendency to "interfere with, restrain, or deny" the "exercise of or attempt to exercise" an FMLA right may give rise to a valid interference claim under section 2615(a)(1) even where the action fails to actually prevent such exercise or attempt. Plaintiff's claim satisfies this element as well as the second element of prejudice. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the interference claim. View "Gordon v. United States Capitol Police" on Justia Law

After Ozark contested the union's certification as the bargaining representative of company employees, the Board ordered the company to bargain with the union. Mainly at issue on appeal was whether, during a hearing on the validity of the election, the hearing officer erred in revoking Ozark's subpoenas duces tecum, and if so, whether the error prejudiced Ozark. In this case, the hearing officer never attempted to balance the employee interests against the company's need for the documents at issue, and there is no indication that the Board did so either. Had the Board done so, it would have recognized that at least some of the document requests did not implicate an employee's confidentiality interest. Further, the error in quashing the subpoenas caused Ozark prejudice where, among other things, the documents are not part of the administrative record available for judicial review. The court granted the petition for judicial review and denied the cross-petition for enforcement. Accordingly, the court vacated the Board's order and remanded. View "Ozark Auto Distrib. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Petitioner, operator of a commercial printing facility, challenged the Board's determination that petitioner's policy prohibiting employees from wearing baseball caps except for caps bearing the company logo violates the rights of petitioner's employees. The Board's order was premised on its finding that there was no dispute concerning whether petitioner's hat policy facially prohibited employees from wearing hats bearing union insignia. The court concluding that, contrary to the Board's assertion, petitioner did dispute that the hat policy facially prohibits employees from wearing caps bearing union insignia. Because the Board's finding has no basis in the record, the court granted the petition for review and remanded to the Board for reconsideration. The court denied the Board's application for enforcement. View "World Color (USA) Corp. v. NLRB" on Justia Law