Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Board declared a rule that employers subject to its jurisdiction would be guilty of an unfair labor practice if they did not post on their properties and on their websites a "Notification of Employee Rights under the National Labor Relations Act." Trade associations and other organizations representing employers filed complaints in the district court, claiming that the Board's rule violated the National Labor Relations Act 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., and the First Amendment to the Constitution. As a preliminary matter, the court held that the time of filing with the Office of the Federal Register was the appropriate time for determining whether the Board had a valid quorum. That the Board may have lost a quorum before its rule was published did not render its rule invalid. On the merits, the court concluded that the Board's rule violated section 8(c) because it made an employer's failure to post the Board's notice an unfair labor practice, and because it treated such a failure as evidence of an unfair labor practice. Further, the Board's tolling rule was contrary to section 10(b). Accordingly, the court vacated the Board's posting rule. View "Nat'l Assoc. of Manufacturers, et al v. NLRB, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment against her claims of age and sex discrimination in the workplace. The district court credited the defense of plaintiff's employer that she was let go during a restructuring of the firm only because her expertise was not a good fit with the firm's new business focus. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff - including a productivity spreadsheet that included the age of each employee - the court concluded that a reasonable jury could find the employer's defense to be a pretext for discrimination. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barnett v. PA Consulting Group, Inc." on Justia Law

The union charged Flagstaff with dozens of unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (3). The ALJ dismissed most of the allegations and a divided Board affirmed eight violations, reinstated four charges the ALJ had missed, and affirmed the dismissal of everything else. Rejecting the ALJ's findings, the Board concluded that Flagstaff violated section 8(a)(1) when its president threatened employees that unionization would be futile; and that Flagstaff violated section 8(a)(1) and (3) by modifying an employee's schedule in retaliation for her union activity and by firing another employee because of his union activity. The court agreed that the Board failed to muster substantial evidence for its conclusions about the president and one of the employees and, therefore, granted Flagstaff's petition in part. The court denied the petition in all other respects. View "Flagstaff Medical Center, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's recent authorization of a pilot program that allowed Mexico-domiciled trucking companies to operate trucks throughout the United States, so long as the trucking companies complied with certain federal safety standards. Drivers Association and Teamsters contended that the pilot program was unlawful. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that Drivers Association and Teamsters both have standing to challenge the pilot program. On the merits, the court concluded that all seven of Drivers Association's arguments and all six of Teamsters' arguments were unpersuasive. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "International Brotherhood of Teamsters, et al. v. DOT, et al." on Justia Law

Indiana Boxcar, a holding company that owns several railroads, petitioned for review of the Board's determination that Indiana Boxcar was an "employer" for purposes of the Railroad Retirement Act and the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. 231, 351. To be an employer under those two Acts, a company such as Indiana Boxcar must be "under common control" with a railroad. Before this case, the Board repeatedly held that parent corporations like Indiana Boxcar were not under common control with their railroad subsidiaries. Under Board precedent, the term "common control" did not usually apply to two companies in a parent-subsidiary relationship. Here, however, the Board did not adhere to that precedent and did not reasonably explain and justify its deviation from its precedent. Therefore, the court held that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded to the Board. View "Indiana Boxcar Corp. v. RRRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued his employer, Fannie Mae, alleging violations of federal anti-discrimination laws by denying him a salary increase for discriminatory reasons; maintaining a racially hostile work environment; and retaliating against him for filing a discrimination complaint. The district court granted Fannie Mae summary judgment. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Fannie Mae unlawfully discriminated against, harassed, and retaliated against plaintiff. Therefore, plaintiff was entitled to a trial on those claims. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on all of plaintiff's anti-discrimination claims. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's D.C. law defamation claim because the statements at issue were not false. View "Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three applicants for attorney positions under the Honors Program in 2006, alleged that they were not selected for interviews because of their political affiliations. Plaintiffs claimed that senior officials at the DOJ created records describing how an individual exercised First Amendment rights, in violation of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, in the form of annotations to plaintiffs' applications and internet printouts concerning their political affiliations. The court held that summary judgment was inappropriately granted on plaintiffs' Privacy Act claims under 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(5) and (e)(7). In light of the destruction of plaintiffs' records, a permissive spoliation inference was warranted because the senior DOJ officials had a duty to preserve the annotated applications and internet printouts given that DOJ investigation and future litigation were reasonably foreseeable. On remand, the district court shall construe the evidence in light of this negative spoliation inference, which would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that two of the plaintiffs were harmed by creation and use of the destroyed records. View "Gerlich, et al v. DOJ, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the BBG pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., after she did not receive a promotion. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the BBG. The court agreed with the district court's finding that no reasonable employee could believe that the objected-to conduct was unlawful under Title VII and therefore, summary judgment was appropriately granted on plaintiff's retaliation claims. Although the court had not held that bad faith was required for a party to be entitled to a spoliation inference where, as here, there was a duty of preservation, the error was harmless. Plaintiff's objections to the selection process, even applying a spoliation inference, failed to demonstrate that summary judgment was inappropriately granted on her discrimination claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Grosdidier v. Broadcasting Board of Governors" on Justia Law

The Union asserted unfair labor practice charges (ULPs) against the VA on behalf of two nurses at a VA medical center. The VA determined that the charges were covered by the nurses' statutory right of collective bargaining but that they arose out of professional conduct or competence within the meaning of 38 U.S.C. 7422(a)-(b). Therefore, the VA decided that the charges were excluded from review by the FLRA. Given the clear definition of collective bargaining, the court held that the district court correctly held that the VA Under Secretary lacked authority under section 7422(d) to exclude these ULPs from the FLRA's jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Amer. Fed. of Govt. Employees v. Shinseki, et al" on Justia Law

Appellees sued the District, their employer, for retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The District argued on appeal, inter alia, that it was entitled to a new trial because of improper closing arguments. Appellees' counsel made four inappropriate arguments: three after the district court had sustained objections. The first three arguments were "golden rule" arguments and the fourth argument was a "send a message" argument. As the district court's efforts to cure the resulting prejudice were insufficient, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Caudle, et al v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law