Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The issue in this case revolves around which union—the International Association of Machinists (“IAM”) or the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (“ILWU”)—is entitled to represent the mechanic workforce at the Ben Nutter Terminal in Oakland, California.For many years, the Terminal’s mechanics were represented by the IAM. In 2015, Everport Terminal Services, Inc., took over the Terminal’s operation and decided to hire a new workforce. As a member of the multi-employer Pacific Maritime Association (“PMA”), Everport was party to a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the PMA and the ILWU. As Everport read that agreement, it required Everport to prioritize ILWU applicants in hiring its new mechanics and to recognize the ILWU as their representative. Everport therefore gave qualified ILWU applicants first choice of the available mechanic positions, filling the remaining vacancies with applicants from the Terminal’s existing, IAM-represented workforce.The NLRB found that Everport had unlawfully discriminated against the Terminal’s incumbent mechanics on the basis of their IAM affiliation; that it had violated its statutory obligation to recognize and bargain with the incumbent mechanics’ chosen union, the IAM; and that it had prematurely recognized the ILWU as the representative of the Terminal’s mechanics. The NLRB also found the ILWU had unlawfully demanded and accepted recognition from Everport. In its order, the Board did not dispute—or even engage with— Everport’s reading of the PMA-ILWU agreement, instead dismissing it as a “red herring.”The D.C. Circuit held that the NLRB's action was arbitrary, granted Everport's petition for review, and vacated the NLRB's order. View "Everport Terminal Services Inc v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA) governs collective bargaining by employees of the District of Columbia government. It allows officers of the Metropolitan Police Department, like other D.C. government employees, to unionize and engage in collective bargaining. They have done so and are represented by the plaintiff in this case, the Fraternal Order of Police, Metropolitan Police Department Labor Committee, D.C. Police Union (FOP). The police union contends that the statute violates equal protection principles, the Bill of Attainder Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.   The DC Circuit rejected all the challenges concluding that the district court correctly concluded that the FOP’s constitutional claims lack merit. The FOP disputes that police accountability motivated the Council. The court explained that the legislature’s actual motive is “entirely irrelevant”; all that matters is whether there are “plausible reasons” to conclude that the statutory classification furthers a legitimate government interest.   The FOP next contends that section 116 violates the Bill of Attainder Clause. However, the court found that the union makes no serious effort to show that the Council acted beyond its discretion. And the court could discern no express or hidden intent to punish. Further, FOP contends that section 116 violates the Contract Clause. The court explained that retrospective laws violate the Contract Clause only if they “substantially” impair existing contract rights. Here, the union could not have reasonably expected to insulate itself from legal changes after the 2017 Agreement had expired by its terms. View "Fraternal Order of Police, Metropolitan Police Department Labor Committee, D.C. Police Union v. DC" on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) decided that Constellium Rolled Products had violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. Section 158(a)(1), (3), by suspending and terminating an employee for offensive conduct done in the course of protected Section 7 activity, 29 U.S.C. Section 157. On review, this DC Circuit court held that the Board had based its decision “upon substantial evidence” without “impermissibly depart[ing] from precedent without explanation,” but had failed to address the potential conflict between its interpretation of the NLRA and Constellium’s obligations under state and federal equal employment opportunity laws. On remand, the Board affirmed its earlier decision but used a different analytical framework to do so. Constellium argued that the Board has failed to reconcile the conflict upon which we remanded the case and challenges the Board’s most recent analysis.   The DC Circuit concluded that the Board sufficiently addressed the conflict between the NLRA and Constellium’s antidiscrimination obligations and reasonably found that Constellium terminated the employee in violation of Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. Section158(a)(1), (3). Accordingly, the court denied Constellium’s petition and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement of its order. The court explained that an employer may defend against allegations that its act of discipline against an employee engaged in protected activity violated the NLRA by demonstrating that its motive was adherence to anti-discrimination laws. This approach addresses the potential conflict between the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA and Constellium’s obligations under state and federal equal employment opportunity laws. View "Constellium Rolled Products Ravenswood, LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The Department of Agriculture asked the FLRA for guidance on whether an agency head may review a collective bargaining agreement when it is extended under a continuance clause. The Authority concluded that agency heads may do so. It further concluded that, when an agreement is so extended, the employing agency may begin to enforce regulations that conflict with the agreement and that became effective after the agreement’s original effective date. Member DuBester dissented. In his view, the Authority should not have given general guidance divorced from the precise language of specific continuance clauses. Further, he concluded that the guidance conflicts with the Statute and with FLRA precedent.   Three unions petitioned for review of the FLRA’s order. The USDA, along with the Office of Personnel Management, intervened to defend the guidance. The DC Circuit granted the petitions for review. The court held that because invoking a continuance clause does not execute a new agreement, there is no statutory basis for a second round of agency-head review. Further, because the invocation of a continuance clause extends a collective bargaining agreement pending negotiations over its successor, the existing agreement remains “in effect” until a new agreement is in place. Thus, the employing agency may not enforce regulations that conflict with the agreement and that became effective after it did. View "National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA" on Justia Law

Intervenor Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc. (“Browning-Ferris”) operates a recycling plant in Milpitas, California, where it employs about 60 workers. Browning-Ferris contracts with Leadpoint Business Services (“Leadpoint”), which provides BrowningFerris with approximately 240 additional recyclery workers. Petitioner Sanitary Truck Drivers and Helpers Local 350, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (the “Union”) filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) to represent Leadpoint’s recyclery workers, asserting that Browning-Ferris and Leadpoint are joint employers of Leadpoint’s workers.   The Union petitioned the DC Circuit to vacate two of the NLRB’s recent orders, in which the Board declined to hold Browning-Ferris to be a joint employer under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA” or “Act”). The DC Circuit granted the Union’s petition. The court explained that the Board failed to establish that Browning-Ferris represented the kind of clear departure from longstanding and settled law that the agency said justified its retroactivity conclusion. Further, the court wrote that the Board erred in holding that there was “no variation or explanation” of the joint-employer test in Browning-Ferris I that would not result in manifest injustice. The Board failed to explain how it would be a manifest injustice for the Board to consider all of those factors here in light of the agency’s assertion in its 2020 rulemaking that it had previously considered reserved and indirect control in assessing joint-employer status. View "Sanitary Truck Drivers v. NLRB" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) modified its regulations governing the maximum hours that commercial motor vehicle operators may drive or operate within a certain timeframe. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, a labor union representing commercial truck drivers, and three national nonprofit organizations petitioned for review. They argued that the Final Rule was arbitrary and capricious for failing to grapple with the safety and driver health consequences of changes to record-keeping rules for short-haul commercial vehicle drivers and break requirements for long-haul drivers.   The DC Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that the modifications to the hours-of-service rules were sufficiently explained and grounded in the administrative record. The court explained that the Administration not only directly tackled the issue of driver health but also reasonably explained why the health benefits estimated in the 2011 Rule would continue under the modified 30-minute break rule. That met the APA’s requirements. View "Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety v. FMCSA" on Justia Law

The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (“MPPAA”) requires an employer to pay “withdrawal liability” if it decides to leave a multiemployer pension plan. Calculating the amount of money the employer owes the plan requires an actuary to project the plan’s future payments to pensioners. The MPPAA requires the actuary to use “assumptions and methods which, in the aggregate, are reasonable (taking into account the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations) and which, in combination, offer the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan.” 29 U.S.C. Section 1393(a)(1).   The Energy West Mining Company (“Energy West”) withdrew from the United Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Plan (“Pension Plan”). In calculating Energy West’s withdrawal liability, the actuary did not rely on the Pension Plan’s performance to determine what discount rate to use but instead adopted a risk-free discount rate. An arbitrator upheld the risk-free discount rate and the district court granted summary judgment to the Pension Plan, enforcing the arbitral award.   The Second Circuit reversed because the actuary’s choice of a risk-free rate violates the MPPAA’s command. The court explained that to calculate Energy West’s withdrawal liability from the Pension Plan, the actuary was required to base his assumptions on the Plan’s actual characteristics. Because the actuary failed to do so, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for vacatur of the arbitration award. When the actuary calculates Energy West’s withdrawal liability, the discount rate assumption must be similar, but need not be identical, to the discount rate assumption used to calculate minimum funding. View "United Mine Workers of America v. Energy West Mining Company" on Justia Law

In 2015 the labor union representing employees of Temple University Hospital (“Hospital”)  petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) to exercise jurisdiction over its relationship with the Hospital. Over the Hospital’s objections, the NLRB granted the petition, asserted jurisdiction, and certified the union as the representative of an expanded unit of employees. the Hospital refused to bargain with the union and eventually filed a petition for review.   On remand, the NLRB again asserted jurisdiction over the Hospital after determining that principles of judicial estoppel are inapplicable. The Hospital continued to resist that result, and it renewed the additional arguments the DC Circuit had no occasion to address in 2019.   The DC Circuit denied the petition or review and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement. The court held that the Hospital did not identify any error in NLRB’s decision.The court explained that the Hospital points out that the Board’s jurisdiction is discretionary and not mandatory. The Board, though, recognized as much, acknowledging that it “does not always exercise the power Congress granted it in Section 10(a).”  The fact that the Board may at times decline to exercise its jurisdiction is by no means inconsistent with its choice to avoid a regime in which the petition-filing practices of private parties—rather than the Board’s own discretionary decisions—could prevent it from hearing a dispute it would otherwise entertain. Moreover, the Board reasonably determined that the Hospital does not qualify as a political subdivision of Pennsylvania. View "Temple University Hospital v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought numerous transfers to different units in the Office. After these requests were denied, she filed a charge of sex discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, contending that similarly situated male employees had been granted the transfers they requested. She filed a Title VII suit against the District in 2014 alleging unlawful sex discrimination and retaliation.   The district court, applying Brown, granted summary judgment to the District. On rehearing, Plaintiff contends that Brown is facially inconsistent with Title VII. The DC Circuit explained that without any footing in the text of Title VII or Supreme Court precedent, there is no sound basis for maintaining Brown as circuit law. The court held that an employer that transfers an employee or denies an employee’s transfer request because of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin violates Title VII by discriminating against the employee with respect to the terms, and conditions, or privileges of employment. The court reasoned that Brown is fundamentally flawed because it “elevated policy concerns . . . over the plain statutory text.” The plain text of section 703(a)(1) contains no requirement that an employee alleging discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment make a separate showing of “objectively tangible harm.” View "Mary Chambers v. DC" on Justia Law

Petitioner is an experienced airline pilot. When he was interviewing for a new position, he was asked to take a urine test. Unable to provide an adequate sample, Petitioner left the site. Under FAA guidelines, walking out before providing a drug test sample is considered a refusal. The potential employer reported Petitioner's refusal to the FAA. The FAA sought to revoke Petitioner's pilot and medical certifications. However, at a hearing in front of the National Safety Transportation Board, the Board agreed with the FAA in sustaining the refusal, but reduced Petitioner's sanction to a 180-suspension.The D.C. Circuit denied Petitioner's petition for review, finding that by walking out before providing a sufficient urine sample, Petitioner's conduct was properly considered a refusal. In so holding, the court noted that the trial court credited the FAA witnesses while questioning the veracity of Petitioner's testimony.The D.C. Circuit also granted the FAA's cross-petition, finding that the Board was required to defer to the FAA under these circumstances. View "Ydil Pham v. NTSB" on Justia Law