Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ammar al-Baluchi, a Pakistani national, has been detained at the U.S. naval base in Guantánamo Bay since 2006. He is accused of supporting the September 11, 2001, attacks as a senior member of al-Qaeda. In 2008, al-Baluchi filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. In 2022, he moved to compel the government to convene a Mixed Medical Commission to assess his eligibility for repatriation due to alleged torture and resulting serious health issues. The district court denied his request, ruling that detainees captured during non-international armed conflicts are not entitled to such examinations under the Third Geneva Convention or Army Regulation 190-8.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially stayed al-Baluchi’s habeas case pending the outcome of his military commission trial. After temporarily lifting the stay to consider his motion for a Mixed Medical Commission, the court denied the motion, leading al-Baluchi to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s nonfinal order. The court found that al-Baluchi did not demonstrate that the denial of his motion had the practical effect of denying injunctive relief or that it caused serious or irreparable harm requiring immediate review. The court noted that even if a Mixed Medical Commission found al-Baluchi eligible for repatriation, the government retained discretion to delay repatriation until the completion of his military commission proceedings. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Al-Baluchi v. Hegseth" on Justia Law

David J. Rudometkin was found guilty of several offenses by a military judge in 2018 and sentenced to seventeen years of confinement. His post-trial motion for a mistrial was denied by another military judge after the original judge was suspended for inappropriate conduct. Rudometkin then submitted FOIA requests to the Army and the Department of Defense for records related to the judges involved. The government either did not respond meaningfully or rejected the requests under FOIA exemptions.Rudometkin filed a pro se complaint in the District Court in 2020, challenging the government's withholding of records. He later amended his complaint to focus solely on records related to the appointment of the Chief Trial Judge. The District Court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the government had adequately searched for records and appropriately withheld information under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege. The court also denied Rudometkin’s motions to amend his complaint to include his original FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the government did not establish that it properly withheld records under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege and had not shown that it released all reasonably segregable information. The court reversed and remanded on the segregability issue. However, the court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Rudometkin’s motion to amend his complaint, as his FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge was now live in a separate action. View "Rudometkin v. USA" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the Department of Defense's (DoD) authority to impose time-in-service requirements for expedited naturalization of noncitizen servicemembers under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Historically, the DoD certified noncitizens' honorable service for naturalization without a time-in-service requirement. However, in 2017, the DoD issued a policy requiring a minimum of 180 days of active-duty service or one year for reservists before certifying honorable service. In 2020, a group of noncitizen servicemembers challenged this policy under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding the policy arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and that the DoD's role in certifying honorable service was purely ministerial. The court vacated the time-in-service requirement and enjoined the DoD from withholding certification based on the policy. The DoD appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. During the appeal, the DoD rescinded the challenged policy and did not introduce a replacement. The court determined that the case was moot due to the rescission of the policy and dismissed the appeal. The court also vacated the district court's judgment, finding no indication that the DoD rescinded the policy to evade review and emphasizing the need to clear the path for future litigation on the issue. View "Samma v. DOD" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in a case involving Clark Calloway Jr., a former U.S. Marine convicted of several firearms offenses. Calloway had acquired a fully automatic AK-47, which was inoperable, from an FBI source after expressing violent intentions on social media, advocating for ISIS, and pledging to commit violence against non-Muslims. He was arrested upon possession of the firearm and was later convicted on three counts under 18 U.S.C. § 922 and § 924.At sentencing, the district court calculated Calloway's total offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and found that he posed a serious risk to public safety, which justified an upward departure in his sentence. Calloway appealed this decision, arguing that the inoperability of the gun he received negated significant public endangerment, and that the upward departure was duplicative of a separate sentencing enhancement applied by the court.The Court of Appeals disagreed with Calloway's arguments. It held that the district court was correct in its findings of fact that Calloway was dangerous at the time of the offense, and that his possession of the firearm and his intent to use it for violent purposes posed a serious risk to public safety. The court also rejected Calloway's argument that the upward departure was duplicative of the sentencing enhancement, as the latter was applied due to Calloway's intent to use the firearm for another felony offense, while the former was due to the risk he posed to public safety. View "USA v. Calloway" on Justia Law

Appellant Watkins Law & Advocacy, PLLC, submitted requests under the Freedom of Information Act to various federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Veterans Affairs. Watkins sought records concerning the process by which the names of certain veterans and other VA beneficiaries are added to a background check system that identifies persons barred from possessing firearms for having been adjudicated as “mental defective[s].” Watkins initiated this FOIA action in the district court. The district court granted summary judgment to the agencies on almost all claims (and to Watkins on the remaining claims, none of which are at issue here). Watkins appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the FBI and DOJ on the adequacy of their searches and to the VA on its withholding of documents based on the deliberative process and attorney-client privileges.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the FBI and DOJ. But we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the VA and remand for further proceedings. The VA did not satisfy its burden to show that the withheld documents are exempt from disclosure. The court concluded that the VA failed to adequately set out its basis for asserting the deliberative process and attorney-client privileges as to the withheld documents. The court wrote that because the VA offers no arguments about specific documents other than the eight that Watkins highlighted as illustrations, a blanket remand is appropriate. View "Watkins Law & Advocacy, PLLC v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Appellant brought an action against the Army in district court, challenging the Secretary’s assignment of a 20% disability rating. According to Appellant the Secretary should have given him a 30% rating, consistent with the rating he had received from the Department of Veterans Affairs in a separate assessment conducted by the VA to determine his eligibility for veterans’ disability benefits. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Army.   The DC Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment to the Army and remanded. The court concluded that the Secretary’s approach when determining Appellant’s disability rating was inconsistent with the applicable statute and regulations. The court explained that to the extent the Physical Disability Board of Review (PDBR) concluded that Appellant’s leg condition rendered him collectively unfit when considered together with his back condition, it was obligated to assign a rating to the leg condition. By extension, the Secretary, in accepting the PDBR’s recommendation to give no rating to Appellant’s leg condition, acted contrary to law insofar as the PDBR concluded that his leg condition was collectively unfitting together with his back condition. The court further explained that the fact that a condition contributes to a soldier’s unfitness is enough, and the Secretary’s apparent addition of a “significantly” criterion naturally raises questions about what degree and manner of contribution is thought to suffice, questions that the terms of the statute and regulations do not make salient. Any assumption that a medical condition, to receive a rating, must contribute “significantly” to unfitness thus is contrary to law. View "Jason Sissel v. Christine Wormuth" on Justia Law

Petitioner served as the personal assistant and public-relations secretary to Usama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda and mastermind of the 9/11 terrorist attack against the United States. Members of a military commission convicted Petitioner of conspiracy to commit war crimes, providing material support for terrorism, and solicitation of others to commit war crimes. The members sentenced Petitioner to imprisonment for life, and the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review (“CMCR”) affirmed. On Petitioner’s first appeal to the DC Circuit, the court upheld the conspiracy charge but vacated the other convictions as unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause. The CMCR subsequently reaffirmed Petitioner’s remaining conspiracy conviction and life sentence twice. Petitioner asked the court to vacate his conspiracy conviction or, alternatively, to remand his case for resentencing by military commission members.   The DC Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that Petitioner could have raised the change in law, or other similar objections, in his initial appeal to the CMCR or during the extensive proceedings since then. He did not. On the most recent remand to the CMCR, he questioned the admissibility of the statements in his opening brief but did not argue that Section 948r barred their admission until his reply. Accordingly, the court wrote that it declined to revisit its prior ruling that the convening authority is an inferior officer because the intervening Supreme Court case cited by Petitioner does not clearly dictate a departure from the circuit’s precedent. The court also upheld his sentence of life imprisonment. View "Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. USA" on Justia Law

The Department of Defense has detained Petitioner at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for over two decades. In 2008, a military commission convicted Petitioner of conspiracy to commit various war crimes. He now seeks judicial review of his ensuing life sentence. Petitioner moved to disqualify Judge Katsas based on my involvement in other Guantanamo Bay detainee litigation while serving in the Department of Justice between 2001 and 2009.   Judge Katsas denied the motion to disqualify. The court explained that Section 455 of Title 28 establishes disqualification standards for federal judges. Section 455(b) lists five specific circumstances requiring disqualification. Petitioner cites these provisions and a handful of cases applying them for the general proposition that a judge “may not hear a case in which he previously played any role.” The court wrote that Section 455(a) is a more general “catch-all” provision, and the court should not lightly use it to shift the lines specifically drawn in section 455(b). At most, that should occur only in “rare and extraordinary circumstances,” which are not present here. Judge Katsas wrote that in short, his work at DOJ does not disqualify him under the specific rules set forth in section 455(b), and no other consideration tips the balance in favor of disqualification under section 455(a). View "Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. USA" on Justia Law

Appellants, three Sikh men, intended to join the Marines. However, existing Marines pre-enlistment requirements pertaining to hair length, beards, and a prohibition on wearing certain non-uniform items, conflicted with their faith. The Marines allowed an accommodation, but only after the men completed basic training.Appellants sought a preliminary injunction, and the district court refused. After considering the competing interests in the case, the D.C. Circuit reversed the decision as it related to two men, finding that they showed a likelihood for success on the merits and proved irreparable harm. The court remanded the third man's case for further proceedings. View "Jaskirat Singh v. David Berger" on Justia Law

Appellee, a member of the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, pleaded guilty at a court-martial to the sexual assault of a civilian. In this collateral challenge to his sentence, Appellee argued that the statutory grant of military jurisdiction over Fleet Marine Reservists exceeds Congress’ authority under the “Make Rules Clause.” The district court held for Appellee and the DC Circuit reversed.   The court explained that whether a person may be subjected to court-martial jurisdiction turns “on one factor: the military status of the accused.” Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). Here, based on the Supreme Court’s precedents interpreting the Make Rules Clause as well as the original meaning of that Clause, the court held that a person has “military status” if he has a formal relationship with the military that includes a duty to obey military orders. As a Fleet Marine Reservist, Appellee was “actually a member or part of the armed forces,” and therefore amenable to military jurisdiction under the Make Rules Clause. The court further held that the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause did not separately bar Appellee’s court-martial. View "Steven Larrabee v. Carlos Del Toro" on Justia Law