Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Michael C. Baxley served in the Army beginning in 1974. After various instances of misconduct, he was identified as a drug abuser and entered the Army’s rehabilitation program. In 1975, he was designated a rehabilitation program failure, and subsequent further misconduct led to a recommendation for discharge. During his discharge proceedings, evidence of his rehabilitation failure was introduced, and he was discharged “under other than honorable conditions.” Years later, his discharge status was upgraded to “under honorable conditions (general),” but without “honorable” status, he was unable to access certain veterans benefits. In 2018, following a VA determination of a service-connected mental health condition, Baxley requested the Army Board for Correction of Military Records to upgrade his discharge to “honorable,” arguing that exempt evidence was improperly used against him and that relevant Army guidance regarding mental health conditions was not followed.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the Board’s denial of Baxley’s request and granted summary judgment to the Board. The court found no violation of the Army’s Exemption Policy and concluded that the Board adequately considered the Army guidance for discharge upgrades related to mental health conditions (the Kurta Memorandum).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the administrative action de novo. The Court held that the Board’s decision regarding the Exemption Policy was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to meaningfully assess whether evidence of Baxley’s rehabilitation failure was developed as a direct or indirect result of protected communications during his rehabilitation program, as the policy requires. Therefore, the Court reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue, vacated the Board’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. However, the Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment regarding the Kurta Memorandum, finding the Board’s consideration sufficient and not arbitrary or capricious. View "Baxley v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

A group of current and prospective military service members challenged a new federal policy that disqualified individuals with a history of gender dysphoria or those perceived as expressing a gender identity different from their sex assigned at birth from serving in the military. This policy, known as the Hegseth Policy, was issued following an executive order by the President in 2025. The policy went further than prior military policies by not only excluding individuals with a recent diagnosis of gender dysphoria or those undergoing transition, but by broadly disqualifying anyone with any history of the condition or who had attempted social transition, regardless of current fitness or stability.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. After extensive hearings, the District Court found the Hegseth Policy to be motivated by animus against transgender individuals, characterizing it as a blanket ban that was not justified by legitimate military interests. The court applied intermediate scrutiny, concluded that the policy was not substantially related to the stated goals of military readiness or cohesion, and found that it violated the plaintiffs’ right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction, preventing enforcement of the policy against both current servicemembers and those seeking to enlist.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the government’s appeal of the preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals held that the Hegseth Policy, as applied to current servicemembers, was likely unconstitutional because it relied on arbitrary classifications and was motivated at least in part by impermissible animus. The court affirmed the preliminary injunction for current servicemembers but vacated it as to individuals seeking to join the military, reasoning that the equities and public interest differed for prospective enlistees. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court’s opinion. View "Talbott v. USA" on Justia Law

Lieutenant Ernest Mitchell, a U.S. Navy officer, was serving as the Command Duty Officer aboard the USS Howard when he left the ship without authorization to move his car prior to the ship’s relocation. He failed to inform his commanding officer or transfer his duties to another qualified person during his absence. This incident, along with prior documented deficiencies in communication and adherence to standards, led to a series of disciplinary actions. These included his detachment from the ship for cause, findings by a Board of Inquiry of violations under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, delay and eventual removal from a promotion list, and denial of his efforts to remove adverse records and secure his promotion.After exhausting administrative remedies, Mitchell filed suit against the Secretary of the Navy in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the Navy’s actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, determining that the Navy’s actions were reasonable and supported by a satisfactory explanation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo, applying a highly deferential standard to the military’s factfinding. The appellate court rejected Mitchell’s argument that he was entitled to promotion by operation of law under 10 U.S.C. § 624(d), holding that the statute does not mandate automatic appointment if the Executive decides against it. The court also found that the Board for Correction of Naval Records did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in concluding Mitchell demonstrated substandard performance over an extended period. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Navy. View "Mitchell v. Phelan" on Justia Law

A former Navy sailor, Lamar Forbes, was diagnosed with HIV in 2012 and instructed by medical personnel to disclose his status before engaging in sexual activity. Between 2013 and 2015, while stationed in Virginia, Forbes had unprotected sex with four women without informing them of his HIV-positive status. He was charged under several articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), including making a false official statement, sexual assault, and violating Article 134 by incorporating Virginia’s infected sexual battery statute through the Assimilative Crimes Act. Forbes pleaded guilty to some charges, and the military judge sentenced him to eight years’ confinement, reduction in paygrade, and a dishonorable discharge.Forbes appealed his sexual assault convictions to the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA), arguing that his conduct did not constitute sexual assault under the UCMJ and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. He did not appeal his Article 134 or Article 107 convictions. The NMCCA affirmed, relying on precedent that failure to disclose HIV status vitiates consent, making the sexual act an “offensive touching.” The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) affirmed, holding that Forbes’s conduct met the definition of sexual assault under Article 120.On supervised release, Forbes petitioned the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for habeas relief, arguing that the military courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that their interpretation of Article 120 was an unconstitutional ex post facto expansion. The district court denied his petition, finding his challenges nonjurisdictional and procedurally defaulted, and that the military courts had fully and fairly considered his preserved claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Forbes’s challenges were nonjurisdictional, subject to procedural default rules, and that the military courts had given full and fair consideration to his preserved claims. View "Forbes v. Phelan" on Justia Law

Respondents Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak bin ‘Atash, and Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi are being tried by military commission at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for their roles in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In July 2024, they entered into pretrial agreements to plead guilty in exchange for the government not seeking the death penalty. However, on August 2, 2024, then-Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III withdrew from these agreements.The military commission judge and the United States Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR) refused to recognize the Secretary’s withdrawal, ruling that the respondents had begun to perform under the agreements. The CMCR denied the government’s petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition, and the military judge scheduled the entry of the respondents’ pleas. The government then sought relief from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Secretary of Defense had the legal authority to withdraw from the pretrial agreements. The court found that the respondents had not begun performance of promises contained in the agreements, as their actions did not constitute the beginning of performance under the agreements' terms. The court concluded that the government had no adequate alternative remedy and that the equities warranted the issuance of writs of mandamus and prohibition. Consequently, the court granted the government’s petition, vacated the military judge’s order preventing the Secretary’s withdrawal, and prohibited the military judge from conducting hearings to enter guilty pleas under the withdrawn agreements. View "In re: United States of America" on Justia Law

Ammar al-Baluchi, a Pakistani national, has been detained at the U.S. naval base in Guantánamo Bay since 2006. He is accused of supporting the September 11, 2001, attacks as a senior member of al-Qaeda. In 2008, al-Baluchi filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. In 2022, he moved to compel the government to convene a Mixed Medical Commission to assess his eligibility for repatriation due to alleged torture and resulting serious health issues. The district court denied his request, ruling that detainees captured during non-international armed conflicts are not entitled to such examinations under the Third Geneva Convention or Army Regulation 190-8.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially stayed al-Baluchi’s habeas case pending the outcome of his military commission trial. After temporarily lifting the stay to consider his motion for a Mixed Medical Commission, the court denied the motion, leading al-Baluchi to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s nonfinal order. The court found that al-Baluchi did not demonstrate that the denial of his motion had the practical effect of denying injunctive relief or that it caused serious or irreparable harm requiring immediate review. The court noted that even if a Mixed Medical Commission found al-Baluchi eligible for repatriation, the government retained discretion to delay repatriation until the completion of his military commission proceedings. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Al-Baluchi v. Hegseth" on Justia Law

David J. Rudometkin was found guilty of several offenses by a military judge in 2018 and sentenced to seventeen years of confinement. His post-trial motion for a mistrial was denied by another military judge after the original judge was suspended for inappropriate conduct. Rudometkin then submitted FOIA requests to the Army and the Department of Defense for records related to the judges involved. The government either did not respond meaningfully or rejected the requests under FOIA exemptions.Rudometkin filed a pro se complaint in the District Court in 2020, challenging the government's withholding of records. He later amended his complaint to focus solely on records related to the appointment of the Chief Trial Judge. The District Court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the government had adequately searched for records and appropriately withheld information under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege. The court also denied Rudometkin’s motions to amend his complaint to include his original FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the government did not establish that it properly withheld records under Exemption 5’s deliberative-process privilege and had not shown that it released all reasonably segregable information. The court reversed and remanded on the segregability issue. However, the court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Rudometkin’s motion to amend his complaint, as his FOIA claim regarding the Army’s investigatory records of the first judge was now live in a separate action. View "Rudometkin v. USA" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the Department of Defense's (DoD) authority to impose time-in-service requirements for expedited naturalization of noncitizen servicemembers under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Historically, the DoD certified noncitizens' honorable service for naturalization without a time-in-service requirement. However, in 2017, the DoD issued a policy requiring a minimum of 180 days of active-duty service or one year for reservists before certifying honorable service. In 2020, a group of noncitizen servicemembers challenged this policy under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding the policy arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and that the DoD's role in certifying honorable service was purely ministerial. The court vacated the time-in-service requirement and enjoined the DoD from withholding certification based on the policy. The DoD appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. During the appeal, the DoD rescinded the challenged policy and did not introduce a replacement. The court determined that the case was moot due to the rescission of the policy and dismissed the appeal. The court also vacated the district court's judgment, finding no indication that the DoD rescinded the policy to evade review and emphasizing the need to clear the path for future litigation on the issue. View "Samma v. DOD" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in a case involving Clark Calloway Jr., a former U.S. Marine convicted of several firearms offenses. Calloway had acquired a fully automatic AK-47, which was inoperable, from an FBI source after expressing violent intentions on social media, advocating for ISIS, and pledging to commit violence against non-Muslims. He was arrested upon possession of the firearm and was later convicted on three counts under 18 U.S.C. § 922 and § 924.At sentencing, the district court calculated Calloway's total offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and found that he posed a serious risk to public safety, which justified an upward departure in his sentence. Calloway appealed this decision, arguing that the inoperability of the gun he received negated significant public endangerment, and that the upward departure was duplicative of a separate sentencing enhancement applied by the court.The Court of Appeals disagreed with Calloway's arguments. It held that the district court was correct in its findings of fact that Calloway was dangerous at the time of the offense, and that his possession of the firearm and his intent to use it for violent purposes posed a serious risk to public safety. The court also rejected Calloway's argument that the upward departure was duplicative of the sentencing enhancement, as the latter was applied due to Calloway's intent to use the firearm for another felony offense, while the former was due to the risk he posed to public safety. View "USA v. Calloway" on Justia Law

Appellant Watkins Law & Advocacy, PLLC, submitted requests under the Freedom of Information Act to various federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Veterans Affairs. Watkins sought records concerning the process by which the names of certain veterans and other VA beneficiaries are added to a background check system that identifies persons barred from possessing firearms for having been adjudicated as “mental defective[s].” Watkins initiated this FOIA action in the district court. The district court granted summary judgment to the agencies on almost all claims (and to Watkins on the remaining claims, none of which are at issue here). Watkins appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the FBI and DOJ on the adequacy of their searches and to the VA on its withholding of documents based on the deliberative process and attorney-client privileges.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the FBI and DOJ. But we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the VA and remand for further proceedings. The VA did not satisfy its burden to show that the withheld documents are exempt from disclosure. The court concluded that the VA failed to adequately set out its basis for asserting the deliberative process and attorney-client privileges as to the withheld documents. The court wrote that because the VA offers no arguments about specific documents other than the eight that Watkins highlighted as illustrations, a blanket remand is appropriate. View "Watkins Law & Advocacy, PLLC v. DOJ" on Justia Law