Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Agreeing with the Board, the district court ruled that Quantum's 1996 Management Agreement with the Pueblo was null and void for lack of approval by the Secretary as required by 25 U.S.C. 81, and that it was incapable of being validated by the 2000 amendment to section 81, the application of which would be impermissibly retroactive. Applying Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the court concluded that Congress made no clear statement that it intended the 2000 amendment to apply retroactively. The court also concluded that, because the 1996 Agreement required Secretarial approval that was never obtained and the parties agreed that the Agreement would be valid without Secretarial approval under section 81 as amended, the application of the new law would give life to a null and void agreement, thereby attaching new legal consequences to it. Although the Pueblo may have voluntarily undertaken the stated duties and liabilities under the Agreement, such an agreement was null and void without Secretarial approval before 2000. Since the Secretary never approved the Agreement, any legislative validation of the duties or liabilities attached to it was impermissibly retroactive. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "Quantum Entertainment Ltd. v. Dept. of the Interior" on Justia Law

The Muwekma petitioned the court to order Interior to recognize it as an Indian tribe. The court agreed with the district court that Interior's Supplemental Explanation adequately explained why Muwekma was not similarly situated to the Ione Band of Miwok or the Lower Lake Rancheria of California and, accordingly, Muwekma's equal protection claim failed; Muwekma's termination claim, although not barred by the statute of limitations, failed on the merits because Interior did not terminate Muwekma's recognition; because Muwekma had no cognizable property interest, its claim under 5 U.S.C. 554(d) failed; and Interior's Final Determination was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Interior. View "Muwekma Ohlone Tribe v. Salazar, et al" on Justia Law

A group of Freedmen, former Cherokee slaves and their descendants, sued in district court claiming that the Cherokee Nation had violated the 1866 Treaty that guaranteed the Freedmen all the rights of native Cherokees. To avoid the sovereign immunity bar, the Freedmen sued not only the Cherokee Nation itself but also the relevant executive official, the Principal Chief, in his official capacity. Applying the precedents that permitted suits against government officials in their official capacities, the court concluded that this suit could proceed against the Principal Chief in his official capacity, without the Cherokee Nation itself as a party. The Cherokee Nation and the Principal Chief in his official capacity were one and the same in the Ex Parte Young suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. As a result, the Principal Chief could adequately represent the Cherokee Nation in this suit, meaning that the Cherokee Nation itself was not a required party for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vann, et al v. DOI, et al" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from the approval of a class action settlement agreement related to the Secretary of the Interior's breach of duty to account for funds held in trust for individual Native Americans. The court concluded that the record failed to confirm either the existence of a purported intra-class conflict or a violation of due process. Rather, the record confirmed that the two plaintiff classes possess the necessary commonality and adequate representation to warrant certification, and that the district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in certifying the two plaintiff classes in the settlement or in approving the terms of the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate pursuant to Rule 23(e). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment approving the class settlement agreement. View "Cobell, et al. v. Salazar, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individuals claiming to be the Tribal Council of the Timbisha Shoshone, argued that the Western Shoshone Claims Distribution Act, Pub. L. No. 108-270, section 3, 118 Stat. 805, 806, was an unconstitutional taking of tribal property. The district court granted the Government's motion to dismiss, holding that the Distribution Act was constitutional. Plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing where the court had a letter from the Executive Branch recognizing the Gholson faction, not Kennedy faction, and therefore, the court did not reach the merits. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Timbisha Shoshone Tribe, et al. v. Salazar, et al." on Justia Law

The Buena Vista Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians ("Buena Vista") entered into a compact with California to engage in gaming on its tribal land and then petitioned the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") for approval of the compact. Amador County, in which Buena Vista's land was located, challenged the Secretary's "no-action" approval claiming that the land at issue failed to qualify as "Indian land." At issue was whether Amador County lacked constitutional standing to maintain the suit and whether a compact, that was deemed approved where he failed to act within the 45 day limit, was reviewable. The court held that Amador County had standing where its allegations were more than sufficient to establish concrete and particularized harm and where Amador County could easily satisfy the requirements of causation and redressability. The court also held that where, as here, a plaintiff alleged that a compact violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(8)(C), and required the Secretary to disapprove the compact, nothing in the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), precluded judicial review of a subsection (d)(8)(C) no-action approval. Accordingly, the court remanded to give the district court the opportunity to assess the merits of the suit.