Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case concerns an IRS regulation that imposes a “penalty” on U.S. banks that fail to report interest paid to certain foreign account-holders. Two Bankers Associations challenged the legality of the regulation. At issue was whether a challenge to a tax-related statutory or regulatory requirement that is enforced by a “penalty” – as opposed to a challenge to a statute or regulation that imposes a tax – is covered by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. 7421. The court concluded that the Tax Code defines some penalties as taxes for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. In those cases, such as the one here, the Anti-Injunction Act ordinarily applies because the suit, if successful, would invalidate the regulation and thereby directly prevent collection of the tax. The penalty at issue here is located in Chapter 68, Subchapter B of the Tax Code. The Tax Code provides that penalties in Chapter 68, Subchapter B are treated as taxes under the Anti-Injunction Act. Accordingly, the Anti-Injunction Act bars this suit as premature. The court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with directions to dismiss the case. View "Florida Bankers Ass'n v. US Dep't of the Treasury" on Justia Law

The IRS Appeals Office denied appellant a Collection Due Process hearing based on its unexplained determination that all the reasons he gave for requesting a hearing were frivolous. Further, the Appeals office contends that its frivolousness determination is not subject to judicial review. However, the tax court held that it has jurisdiction to conduct a review limited to whether the IRS correctly treated appellant’s arguments as frivolous. The court affirmed the tax court’s conclusion regarding jurisdiction; the court also affirmed the tax court’s assessment that the IRS’s boilerplate letter rejecting appellant’s arguments as frivolous was inadequate; and, after remand, the Appeals Office held a Collection Due Process hearing, and the tax court correctly decided that the Office did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the IRS could proceed with collection actions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the tax court’s decision in its entirety. View "Ryskamp v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a mutual fund, challenged the Commission's denial of an exemption from rules governing the calculation and reporting of petitioner's deferred tax liability. The court concluded that petitioner’s attacks on the Commission’s “hypothetical speculation” affords no basis for setting aside the Commission’s reasonable conclusion that petitioner’s proposal to provide for only a small fraction of its full potential tax liability may result in inequitable treatment of redeeming and non-redeeming shareholders, contradicting a primary purpose of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-22(a). The court rejected petitioner's remaining claims. Accordingly, petitioner's arguments fail to carry the high burden required to overturn the Commission’s denial of an exemption and, therefore, the court denied the petition for review. View "Copley Fund, Inc. v. SEC" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the Tax Court’s determination that Petaluma was a sham entity and so would be disregarded for tax purposes, resulting in the potential imposition of penalties against individual partners for underreporting their taxable income. At issue in this third appeal was whether the Tax Court had jurisdiction at the current, partnership-level stage to determine the applicability of the penalties to the individual partners, or whether that determination instead must await the commencement of separate, partner-level proceedings against each partner. Assuming that a regulation in fact is necessary to create jurisdiction in the Tax Court, the court concluded that a different (and permanent) regulation is the operative one for purposes of conferring jurisdiction. Therefore, the court concluded that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to decide the applicability of penalties to Petaluma's partners. View "Petaluma FX Partners v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

This appeal involves a Son of BOSS tax shelter, which abuses the partnership form of doing business by “employ[ing] a series of transactions to create artificial financial losses that are used to offset real financial gains, thereby reducing tax liability.” At issue was whether and when the Tax Court may apply a penalty to a taxpayer who underpays his taxes by participating in a partnership that was nothing more than an intricate tax shelter. In this case, the parties recognize that United States v. Woods answered the questions about the Tax Court’s jurisdiction over penalties and outside basis. Taxpayer concedes rightly that the Tax Court properly applied his penalty when that court conducted its review of the partnership and its items, and the court affirmed the Tax Court on this point. In turn, the IRS acknowledges correctly that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to determine that the Tigers Eye partners had no basis in the partnership, and the court reversed the portion of the Tax Court’s decision that did so. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Logan Trust v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

Z Street filed suit against the Commissioner, alleging that the “Israel Special Policy” violates the First Amendment. Z Street alleges that the agency has an “Israel Special Policy” under which applications from organizations holding “political views inconsistent with those espoused by the Obama administration” receive increased “scrutin[y]” that results in such applications “tak[ing] longer to process than those made by organizations without that characteristic.” The court agreed with the district court that Z Street seeks not to restrain “the assessment or collection” of a tax, but rather to obtain relief from unconstitutional delay, the effects of which it is now suffering. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the Commissioner's motion to dismiss. View "Z Street v. Koskinen" on Justia Law

In this appeal, both parties agree that the tax court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition filed by taxpayers challenging the seizure of their funds by the IRS. At issue was why, and the reason the tax court lacked jurisdiction. The court concluded that the tax court’s December 2013 denial of both parties’ motions and its terse order undercut any contention that it resolved precisely why jurisdiction was lacking in this case. Therefore, the court vacated the December order and remanded to the tax court to give that court an opportunity to state its reasons for dismissing the petition. Because the costs claim will be affected by the grounds of the tax court’s jurisdictional ruling, the court vacated the tax court’s denial of taxpayers’ motion for costs and leave it to the tax court to decide taxpayers’ motion anew, in light of the jurisdictional rationale it adopts; because the tax court’s December order did not address taxpayers’ alternative ground for jurisdiction, the tax court must first determine, on remand, whether the parties have preserved their arguments concerning this issue; and the court lacked jurisdiction to consider a new argument taxpayers attempt to raise for the first time on appeal regarding a collection due process hearing. View "Edwards v. Commissioner" on Justia Law

Validus, a foreign corporation, filed suit seeking a refund of excise taxes imposed under 26 U.S.C. 4371, which taxes certain types of "reinsurance." The government contends that “the best reading of the statute” establishes its applicability to reinsurance purchased by a reinsurer because such policies (known as “retrocessions”) are “a type of reinsurance,” and also that interpretation carries out Congress’s intent “to level the playing field” between domestic (U.S.) insurance companies subject to U.S. income taxes and foreign insurance companies that are not so burdened. Validus responds, however, that the plain text, considered in the context of reinsurance, and the statutory structure make clear that the excise tax does not apply to retrocessions, and further, the presumption against extraterritoriality resolves any doubt that the tax is inapplicable to Validus’s purchases of reinsurance from a foreign reinsurer. The court concluded that the text of the statute is ambiguous with respect to its application to wholly foreign retrocessions, and the ambiguity is resolved upon applying the presumption against extraterritoriality because there is no clear indication by Congress that it intended the excise tax to apply to premiums on wholly foreign retrocessions. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Validus's refund claims. View "Validus Reinsurance v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2007 Rogers, a U.S. citizen, lived in Hong Kong and worked as a flight attendant for United Airlines. She flew and worked in and over foreign countries and also in and over the United States and over international waters. She and her husband filed a tax return reporting all of her flight attendant earnings as “foreign earned income.” The IRS determined a tax deficiency of $3,428.30 on the portion of Rogers’s earnings attributable to her work outside foreign countries, as well as a 20% penalty. Rogers argued that 26 U.S.C. 911(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) authorized exclusion of Rogers’s flight attendant earnings as “foreign earned income,” because it was received “from sources within a foreign country or countries,” Rogers’s Hong Kong-based job. and that they should not be charged the negligence penalty. The Tax Court disagreed, finding that they could only exclude the portion of Rogers’s earnings that were related to her time spent working in or over foreign countries. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. View "Rogers v. Comm'r, Internal Revenue Serv." on Justia Law

Retired officers of D.C.’s Metropolitan Police Department were subsequently re-hired by the D.C. Protective Services Division, which protects government buildings and D.C.-owned property. They received pension benefits from their service with the Police Department and salaries for their jobs with Protective Services, but Section 5- 723(e) of the D.C. Code requires reduction of plaintiffs’ salaries by the amount of their pensions to prevent so-called double-dipping. Pursuant to that provision, D.C. reduced plaintiffs’ salaries by the amount of their pensions. Following a remand for consideration under the Fair Labor Standards Act, plaintiffs raised a claim under the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, 4 U.S.C. 111(a)), which was rejected. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. The Public Salary Tax Act allows states and D.C. to impose “taxation” on compensation paid to employees of the federal government, only if the taxation does not discriminate against federal employees. The D.C. salary reduction provision at issue is not “taxation.” It does not raise revenue, but operates on the opposite side of D.C.’s financial ledger. It reduces D.C.’s total expenditures on salaries. View "Cannon v. Dist. of Columbia" on Justia Law