Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case concerned challenges to the 2011 Hours of Service (HOS) rule issued by the FMCSA. In Case No. 12-1092, ATA asserted that the new safety-oriented provisions in the final HOS rule were overly restrictive and costly. In Case No., 12-1113, Public Citizen claimed that the rule was insufficiently protective of public safety. The court concluded that what remains of the 2003 Final Rule after two remands and three rulemakings were highly technical points best left to the agency. Therefore, the court generally affirmed the rule and vacated only the agency's application of the 30-minute break to short-haul drivers where the agency failed to explain its decision under the requirements of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. View "American Trucking Ass'ns v. FMCSA, et al." on Justia Law

Section 207 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, 49 U.S.C. 24101, empowers Amtrak and the FRA to jointly develop performance measures to enhance enforcement of the statutory priority Amtrak's passenger rail service has over trains. AAR challenged the statutory scheme as unconstitutional. The court concluded that section 207 impermissibly delegated regulatory authority to Amtrak. The court need not reach AAR's separate argument that Amtrak's involvement in developing the metrics and standards deprived its members of due process. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Assoc. of American Railroads v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., et al." on Justia Law

The Institute challenged the final rule promulgated by the FRA to implement section 104 of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432 section 104(a)(1), 122 Stat. 4848, 4857. Section 104 required a qualifying rail carrier to submit an implementation plan to install a "positive train control" (PTC) system no later than December 31, 2015 on certain tracks used for passenger service or for transporting "poison- or toxic- by-inhalation" hazardous material (PIH or TIH). The court concluded that the Institute's challenge was not ripe because it had not established that its members now faced a present or imminent injury from the 2012 Final Rule's omission of a two-part risk assessment test. Accordingly, the court dismissed the Institute's petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Chlorine Institute, Inc. v. FRA, et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's recent authorization of a pilot program that allowed Mexico-domiciled trucking companies to operate trucks throughout the United States, so long as the trucking companies complied with certain federal safety standards. Drivers Association and Teamsters contended that the pilot program was unlawful. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that Drivers Association and Teamsters both have standing to challenge the pilot program. On the merits, the court concluded that all seven of Drivers Association's arguments and all six of Teamsters' arguments were unpersuasive. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "International Brotherhood of Teamsters, et al. v. DOT, et al." on Justia Law

Indiana Boxcar, a holding company that owns several railroads, petitioned for review of the Board's determination that Indiana Boxcar was an "employer" for purposes of the Railroad Retirement Act and the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. 231, 351. To be an employer under those two Acts, a company such as Indiana Boxcar must be "under common control" with a railroad. Before this case, the Board repeatedly held that parent corporations like Indiana Boxcar were not under common control with their railroad subsidiaries. Under Board precedent, the term "common control" did not usually apply to two companies in a parent-subsidiary relationship. Here, however, the Board did not adhere to that precedent and did not reasonably explain and justify its deviation from its precedent. Therefore, the court held that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded to the Board. View "Indiana Boxcar Corp. v. RRRB" on Justia Law

Manufacturers obtained authorization from the Board to discontinue service over its entire system but the Board did not apply its entire-system exception. Instead, the Board required Manufacturers to pay dismissal allowances to its dismissed employees. The court concluded that the Board did not reasonably explain and justify the departure from its longstanding entire-system exception. Therefore, the court found that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board's decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Manufacturers Railway Co. v. STB, et al." on Justia Law

Republic challenged an order of the DOT withdrawing two Republic "slot exemptions" at Reagan National and reallocating those exemptions to Sun Country. "Slots" were take-off and landing rights. In both an informal letter to Republic and a final order, DOT held that Republic's parent company engaged in an impermissible slot-exemption transfer with Midwest. In so holding, DOT summarily dismissed Republic's argument that, under DOT and Federal Aviation Administration precedent, the Republic-Midwest slot-exemption transfer was permissible because it was ancillary to Republic Holdings' acquisition of Midwest. The court held that because DOT had departed from its precedent without adequate explanation, its decision could not survive arbitrary and capricious review. Accordingly, the court granted Republic's petition for review and vacated DOT's order. View "Republic Airline Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

This case involved the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 152, which provided that "the majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class." For 75 years, the Board had counted non-voters as voting against union representation, thereby requiring a majority of eligible voters to affirmatively vote for representation before a union could be certified. In 2010, the Board issued a new rule that elections would be decided by a majority of votes cast, and those not voting would be understood as acquiescing to the outcome of the election. Appellants challenged the new rule, claiming that it violated the statute and was arbitrary and capricious. The district court rejected these arguments and granted summary judgment to the Board. Upon review, the court agreed with the district court and affirmed the judgment. View "Air Transport Assoc. of America v. Nat'l Mediation Bd." on Justia Law

The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and two individuals petitioned for review of a decision by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to screen airline passengers by using advanced imaging technology (AIT) instead of magnetometers. EPIC argued that the use of AIT violated various federal statutes and the Fourth Amendment and, in any event, should have been the subject of notice-and-comment rulemaking before being adopted. The court granted the petition for review with respect to claims that the TSA had not justified its failure to initiate notice-and-comment rulemaking before announcing it would use AIT scanners for primary screening at airports. None of the exceptions urged by the TSA justified its failure to give notice of and receive comment upon such a rule, which was legislative and not merely interpretive, procedural, or a general statement of policy. The court denied the petition with respect to EPIC's statutory arguments and their claim under the Fourth Amendment, except their claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq., which the court dismissed for lack of standing. Finally, due to the obvious need for the TSA to continue its airport security operations without interruption, the court remanded the rule to the TSA but did not vacate it.

Southwest Airlines Co. and 18 other airlines alleged that the TSA's determination of their year 2000 costs was arbitrary and capricious for purposes of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. At issue was whether the TSA should have relied on the Simat, Helliesen & Eichner, Inc. report (SH&E report) commissioned by the TSA or, at least, should have more fully explained why it rejected the conclusions of the Campbell Aviation Consultants report (Campbell report) submitted by the airlines. The court held that the TSA's determination was not arbitrary or capricious when the TSA chose the SH&E report with good reason where it sent a letter to each airline stating that it had thoroughly reviewed the Campbell report and concluded that the report was insufficient due to its limited data and broad, simplistic methodologies and the letter also explained SH&E's more extensive methodology. The court also discussed and disposed of the three other arguments the airlines raised. Accordingly, the court denied the airlines' petitions for review.