Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his request for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court concluded that the sentencing court relied on defendant's "flawed" guideline range in this case, opening the door to "reexamination" of his sentence under a section 3582(c)(2) proceeding; because of the government's substantial assistance motion, no mandatory minimum was at work when the district court sentenced defendant; without the mandatory minimum bar, no provision kept Amendment 750 from having "the effect of lowering" defendant's applicable guideline range, leaving defendant eligible under the policy statement to pursue a sentence reduction; and the policy statement did not foreclose 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) defendants from receiving reductions on that basis. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re: Sealed Case" on Justia Law

In 2006, DOL issued an opinion letter concluding that mortgage loan officers with archetypal job duties fell within the administrative exemption. In 2010, DOL issued an "Administrator's Interpretation" declaring that "employees who perform the typical job duties" of the hypothetical mortgage loan officer "do not qualify as bona fide administrative employees." Petitioner challenged DOL's decision to change their "definitive interpretation" without first undergoing notice-and-comment rulemaking as a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. Having conceded the existence of two definitive - and conflicting - agency interpretations, the government acknowledged that petitioner prevailed if the only reason courts look to reliance was to find out if there was a definitive interpretation. The court held that there was no discrete reliance element and that reliance was just one part of the definitiveness calculus. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order denying petitioner's motion for summary judgment and remanded with instructions to vacate DOL's 2010 Administrative Interpretation. View "Mortgage Bankers Assoc. v. Solis, et al." on Justia Law

The Conference Group challenged the Commission's decision that the audio bridging services provided by InterCall were properly classified as "telecommunications" under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and thereby obligated it and "similarly situated" providers to contribute directly to the Universal Service Fund (USF), 47 U.S.C. 254(d). The court concluded that the Conference Group had standing to challenge the Commission's decision as procedurally unlawful rulemaking; on the merits, the Commission's decision involved a statutory interpretation that could be rendered in the form of an adjudication, not only in a rulemaking; because the decision was an adjudication and The Conference Group was not a party, it lacked standing to challenge the merits of the adjudication; and, therefore, the court dismissed in part and denied in part The Conference Group's petition for review. View "The Conference Group, LLC v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a police officer with the Parks Service, filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging workplace discrimination. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment against him on his claim that workplace supervisors unlawfully denied him time-off awards in retaliation for his pursuit of a protected activity. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate the entitlement to an award and, as such, he could not demonstrate that the failure of his employer to nominate him for time-off awards materially affected the terms of his employment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Bridgeforth v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, the Chief Administrative Officer (OCAO), of the United States House of Representatives, for alleged racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Congressional Accountability Act (CAA), 2 U.S.C. 1301-1438. The court concluded that the Speech or Debate Clause did not require the dismissal of this action; plaintiff could proceed with all of her claims under the CAA, subject to the applicable strictures of the Speech or Debate Clause; and, accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Howard v. Chief Admin. Officer of the U.S." on Justia Law

Appellee sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of provisions of the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act (PACT Act), 15 U.S.C. 375, that required him to pay state and local taxes and banned him from sending his products through the U.S. mail. The district court enjoined the enforcement of the tax provision on due process grounds, but otherwise dismissed appellee's claims. Both parties appealed. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by entering a preliminary injunction where appellee was likely to succeed on the merits on his due process challenge; the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining where the public interest lies; and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that appellee was likely to suffer irreparable harm and that the balance of the equities tipped in his favor. Further, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of appellee's remaining claims. View "Gordon v. Holder, Jr., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an ALJ, brought this action alleging that HUD had interfered with his decisional independence and thereby violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court concluded that it need not decide whether the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's claims for lack of standing where the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint. View "Mahoney v. Donovan, et al." on Justia Law

FTM applied to the IRS for a charitable tax exemption under I.R.C. 501(a) and (c)(3) based on its trustee services. FTM subsequently filed this action seeking a declaration that it was a tax exempt charitable organization after the IRS preliminarily denied it's application. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the government, agreeing with the district court that FTM was not operated exclusively for charitable purposes. View "Family Trust of MA, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this action against the Commission seeking a declaratory judgment that recently adopted regulations of the Commission regarding derivatives trading were unlawfully adopted and invalid, and seeking to vacate and set aside those regulations and to enjoin their enforcement. Plaintiffs contended that the Commission violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., in its rulemaking by: (1) failing to address rationales for broadening Commodity Pool Operators (CPOs) exemptions; (2) failing to comply with the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. 2(a), and offering an inadequate evaluation of the rule's costs and benefits; (3) including swaps in the trading threshold, restricting its definition of bona fide hedging, and failing to justify the five percent threshold; and (4) failing to provide an adequate opportunity for notice and comment. The court concluded, however, that the Commission did not act unlawfully in promulgating the regulations at issue. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commission. View "Investment Company Inst., et al. v. CFTC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the district court's holding affirming the USCIS's denial of several of plaintiff's petitions for Q-1 visas for foreign applicants to its cultural exchange program. USCIS denied the petitions because it interpreted its regulation to require sponsors of a cultural exchange program to pay wages to the participating aliens and plaintiff admittedly did not pay its participants any wages. Given 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(Q)'s specific references to "employed," "wages," and "workers," the court agreed with USCIS that the statute was best read to require that the foreign citizens receive wages and that those wages be equivalent to the wages of domestic workers. Given 8 C.F.R. 214.2(q)(4)(i)(D)'s references to "employer," "wages," "workers," and "remunerate," the court agreed with USCIS that the regulation was best read to require that foreign citizens receive wages and that those wages be comparable to those of local workers. Finally, when USCIS denied plaintiff's petitions in 2010, the agency did not trigger the notice-and-comment procedures in the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 603(a), 604, 605(b), or the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 533(b)-(c), because the denials were not rules under either act; rather, they were informal adjudications. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Int'l Internship Program v. Napolitano, et al." on Justia Law