Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants appealed the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss under the District of Columbia's Anti-SLAPP Act (anti-strategic lawsuits against public participation act) of 2010, D.C. Code 16-5501 et seq. The court assumed that it had appellate jurisdiction and concluded that the district court properly denied as untimely defendants' motion to dismiss under the statute because the district court's granting of the "Consent Motion" to extend time pursuant to Rule 6(b) could not have extended the statute's 45-day limit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Sherrod v. Breitbart, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction, after a retrial, of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute phencyclidine (PCP). On appeal, defendant argued that the district court violated Federal Rule of Evidence 701 when it permitted the FBI's administrative case agent to testify about his understanding of recorded conversations played for the jury. The court concluded that the district court's failure to enforce Rule 701's boundaries on lay-opinion testimony denied the jury the information it needed to assess the FBI agent's interpretations of recorded statements and the errors were not harmless. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Hampton" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felony and was sentenced to 37 months imprisonment and 3 years supervised release. On appeal, defendant challenged his sentence of 24 months imprisonment imposed after the second revocation of his supervised release, arguing that his revocation sentences should be aggregated under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3). The court concluded that the 2003 amendment to section 3583(e)(3), adding the phrase "on any such revocation," resulted in the felony class imprisonment terms at the end of section 3583(e)(3) being per-revocation limits, and not aggregate limits. The court further held that upon each revocation of supervised release, a defendant could be sentenced to the felony class imprisonment limits at the end of section 3583(e)(3), without regard to prison time previously served for revocation of supervised release. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in Adams v. United States challenged the nonretroactivity and protection-for-compliance provisions of the Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act of 2007 (FTEPA), Pub. L. No. 110-135, 121 Stat. 1450, as well as the FAA's implementation of these provisions. These provisions repealed the "Age 60 Rule" and extended the maximum age for piloting commercial flights by five years. Plaintiffs in Emory v. United Air Lines, Inc., supplemented their constitutional objections with state and federal claims against their employer, United, and their union, ALPA, for advancing allegedly discriminatory interpretations of the nonretroactivity provision they knew to be incorrect. The court concluded that the FTEPA passed constitutional muster and should be interpreted as the Emory defendants have done. Therefore, the court affirmed the district courts' judgments as to all claims not dismissed as moot. View "Emory v. United Airlines, Inc. " on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an African-American woman, sued the District and the Chief of Police, alleging race and sex discrimination. When plaintiff opted to retire instead of accepting a demotion, the Chief hired a white man to serve in her position at one rank higher than the rank the Chief had offered plaintiff. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that plaintiff produced sufficient evidence of race and sex discrimination to get to a jury and that the district court failed to state its reasons for keeping certain records designated "confidential" sealed. View "Primas v. District of Columbia, et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from appellant's request from the CIA of records related to a certain CIA officer. On appeal, appellant challenged the district court's determination that appellant should not receive attorney's fees as a result of his suit filed under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq. The court vacated and remanded to the district court so that it could apply the four-factor standard, which this circuit had set forth for considering a substantially prevailing party's entitlement to attorney's fees in FOIA cases, in a manner consistent with Davy v. CIA because the district court did not consider the Davy Court's analysis of the public-benefit factor. View "Morley v. CIA" on Justia Law

Appellants, hunters and hunting organizations, challenged the Service's bar against the importation of polar bear trophies under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 16 U.S.C. 1361 et seq., and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq. In regard to statutory challenges, the court concluded that Congress intended to extend the protections of sections 101(a)(3)(B) and 102(b)(3) of the MMPA to all depleted species, regardless of their depleted status; although section 104(c)(5) did authorize trophy importation, that provision remained subject to the MMPA's more stringent protections for depleted species; section 102(b)(3) referred not only to mammals taken from species the Secretary had designated as depleted but instead mammals taken from species the Secretary has so designated; and section 101(a)(3)(B) could not permit what section 102(b)(3) expressly prohibited. In regards to procedural challenges, the court concluded that section 115(a) was inapplicable because an ESA listing resulted in a depleted designation under the MMPA but entailed no "determination" to that effect. Finally, the Listing Rule provided adequate notice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re: Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing" on Justia Law

Delta filed suit against the Bank, under the Export-Import Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. 635(b)(1)(B), arguing that the Bank failed to consider the effects of loan guarantees given to Air India so that Air India could purchase Boeing airplanes. The district court entered judgment in favor of the Bank and Delta appealed. The court reversed, concluding that the Bank failed to reasonably explain its application of the Act in this case, as required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court directed the district court to remand the case to the Bank for further proceedings, but the district court should not vacate any of the Bank's actions in this matter to date. View "Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Export-Import Bank of the U.S., et al." on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court concluded that appellant was part of al Qaeda or the Taliban at the time of his capture, based on evidence of what he did and with whom he stayed in Pakistan and Afghanistan as well as his efforts to explain away that evidence, which the district court found implausible. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and those facts supported the conclusion that appellant was more likely than not a part of enemy forces at the time of his capture. View "Hussain v. Obama, et al" on Justia Law

NRG petitioned for review of FERC's order approving a settlement between PJM, NYISO, ConEd, PSE&G, and others regarding transmission service agreements. NRG objected to the settlement, which gave ConEd transmission rights not available to other market participants. The court concluded that FERC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in approving an agreement that did not conform to PJM's open-access transmission tariff and that FERC's justifications for approving the agreement were reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "NRG Power Marketing, LLC, et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law