Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence on one count of possession of powder cocaine with intent to distribute. Defendant contended that the arresting officers violated his right against self-incrimination; that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel; and that the district court failed to comply with certain procedural requirements at sentencing. The court concluded that, even assuming the admission of defendant's statement and head nod was error, the error was harmless; even if defendant's counsel's failure to renew the suppression motion was deficient under Strickland v. Washington, defendant could not show a substantial likelihood of a different result; and defendant's sentence was not procedurally unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Brinson-Scott" on Justia Law

The Board declared a rule that employers subject to its jurisdiction would be guilty of an unfair labor practice if they did not post on their properties and on their websites a "Notification of Employee Rights under the National Labor Relations Act." Trade associations and other organizations representing employers filed complaints in the district court, claiming that the Board's rule violated the National Labor Relations Act 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., and the First Amendment to the Constitution. As a preliminary matter, the court held that the time of filing with the Office of the Federal Register was the appropriate time for determining whether the Board had a valid quorum. That the Board may have lost a quorum before its rule was published did not render its rule invalid. On the merits, the court concluded that the Board's rule violated section 8(c) because it made an employer's failure to post the Board's notice an unfair labor practice, and because it treated such a failure as evidence of an unfair labor practice. Further, the Board's tolling rule was contrary to section 10(b). Accordingly, the court vacated the Board's posting rule. View "Nat'l Assoc. of Manufacturers, et al v. NLRB, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment against her claims of age and sex discrimination in the workplace. The district court credited the defense of plaintiff's employer that she was let go during a restructuring of the firm only because her expertise was not a good fit with the firm's new business focus. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff - including a productivity spreadsheet that included the age of each employee - the court concluded that a reasonable jury could find the employer's defense to be a pretext for discrimination. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barnett v. PA Consulting Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Agreeing with the Board, the district court ruled that Quantum's 1996 Management Agreement with the Pueblo was null and void for lack of approval by the Secretary as required by 25 U.S.C. 81, and that it was incapable of being validated by the 2000 amendment to section 81, the application of which would be impermissibly retroactive. Applying Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the court concluded that Congress made no clear statement that it intended the 2000 amendment to apply retroactively. The court also concluded that, because the 1996 Agreement required Secretarial approval that was never obtained and the parties agreed that the Agreement would be valid without Secretarial approval under section 81 as amended, the application of the new law would give life to a null and void agreement, thereby attaching new legal consequences to it. Although the Pueblo may have voluntarily undertaken the stated duties and liabilities under the Agreement, such an agreement was null and void without Secretarial approval before 2000. Since the Secretary never approved the Agreement, any legislative validation of the duties or liabilities attached to it was impermissibly retroactive. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "Quantum Entertainment Ltd. v. Dept. of the Interior" on Justia Law

Three securities exchanges filed with the SEC proposed changes to their fee-setting rules for the acquisition of certain proprietary market data. Petitioners, two trade associations, requested the Commission to suspend the rules pursuant to its authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(C), contending that they were unlawful under NetCoalition I. When the SEC failed to do so, petitioners sought review in this court. The court held that the plain text of section 19(b)(3)(C), as amended by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, was clear and convincing evidence to the court of Congress's intent to preclude review of a rule change at the filing stage. Further, petitioners failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances for mandamus relief. The court declined to reach any other justiciability or jurisdictional question presented by the petitions. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions. View "NetCoalition v. SEC" on Justia Law

The union charged Flagstaff with dozens of unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (3). The ALJ dismissed most of the allegations and a divided Board affirmed eight violations, reinstated four charges the ALJ had missed, and affirmed the dismissal of everything else. Rejecting the ALJ's findings, the Board concluded that Flagstaff violated section 8(a)(1) when its president threatened employees that unionization would be futile; and that Flagstaff violated section 8(a)(1) and (3) by modifying an employee's schedule in retaliation for her union activity and by firing another employee because of his union activity. The court agreed that the Board failed to muster substantial evidence for its conclusions about the president and one of the employees and, therefore, granted Flagstaff's petition in part. The court denied the petition in all other respects. View "Flagstaff Medical Center, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

AstraZeneca, a manufacturer of pharmaceutical products, appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment. AstraZeneca sought declaratory judgment that the FDA could not approve generic versions of its Seroquel product and sought to restrain the FDA from approving abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) for such competing products until the expiration of a period of exclusivity. As a preliminary matter, the court determined that its decision would affect AstraZeneca's actual rights and the case was not moot. On the merits, the court concluded that AstraZeneca's claims failed because the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 301-99, only provided exclusivity for changes approved as part of a supplement. Because the FDA reasonably considered Table 2, a table summarizing previously submitted glucose data, as separate from the pediatric supplements, Table 2 was not a change approved in the supplement and therefore the statute did not entitle AstraZeneca to exclusivity for Table 2. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP v. FDA, et al" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, the SEC promulgated a rule requiring certain companies to disclose payments made to foreign governments relating to the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals. Petitioners challenged the statute and the regulation, raising constitutional and statutory claims. The court dismissed the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. Because petitioners have simultaneously filed a complaint in the district court, the court need not consider transferring the petition to that court. Additionally, the court's dismissal of the petition was without prejudice to petitioners' suit in the district court. View "American Petroleum Institute, et al v. SEC" on Justia Law

Mingo Logan applied to the Corps for a permit under section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1344, to discharge dredged or fill material from a mountain-top coal mine in West Virginia into three streams and their tributaries. The Corps issued the permit to Mingo Logan, approving the requested disposal sites for the discharged materials. Four years later, the EPA invoked its subsection 404(c) authority to "withdraw" the specifications of two of the streams as disposal sites, thereby prohibiting Mingo Logan from discharging them. Mingo Logan then filed this action challenging the EPA's withdrawal of the specified sites. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Mingo Logan and concluded that the EPA had post-permit withdrawal authority. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. EPA" on Justia Law

Defenders sued the EPA based on the EPA's alleged failure to promptly promulgate revisions to certain effluent limitations and effluent limitations guidelines under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. UWAG, an association of energy companies and three national trade associations of energy companies, appealed the denial of intervention and also asserted that the court should vacate the district court's order entering a consent decree between Defenders and the EPA because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court affirmed the denial of intervention because UWAG lacked Article III standing and, as there was no appellant with standing, dismissed the remainder of the appeal. View "Defenders of Wildlife, et al v. Jackson" on Justia Law