Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After the union and a former newsroom supervisor filed complaints against Ampersand, the ALJ found - and the Board affirmed - that each of these actions violated section 8(a)(1) and/or 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), 158(a)(3). The ALJ and Board further concluded that Ampersand violated section 8(a)(1) by coercively interrogating employees about union activity, surveilling union activity, and requiring employees to remove buttons and signs with a certain message. The court held that the Board did not protect the bulk of the employees' activity and that the Board's misconception of the line between protected and unprotected activity tainted its analysis. Because the court could conceive of no principle by which the Board could cleanse that taint, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board's decision and order, and denied the cross-application for enforcement. View "Ampersand Publishing, LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Relying on section 331(a) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 331(a), appellant filed an application to reallocate VHF channels from Nevada and Wyoming to New Jersey and Delaware. The FCC denied the application, interpreting section 331(a) to require reallocations of channels only between neighboring locations. Because the Commission's decision conflicted with the statute's text and purpose and because appellant could move its channels without creating signal interference, the court reversed. View "PMCM TV, LLC v. FCC" on Justia Law

In an effort to encourage superior performance, Medco introduced what it called the "WOW" program. This dispute arose when an employee wore a shirt with the Union's logo on the front and a message on the back that stated, "I don't need a WOW to do my job." Medco subsequently asked the employer to remove the shirt. Out of these events sprang charges of violations of section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), charges that the Board upheld in almost every aspect. At the same time another dispute arose, unrelated except that it involved a dress code provision, Medco, and the same general time period. Medco subsequently petitioned for review of the Board's order as to both matters. The court denied the petition in regards to the Board's determination that Medco committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain on its amendment of the dress code. However, the court set aside the Board's determination that Medco violated the Act in ordering the employee to remove his shirt, and on its ban on insulting, provocative, and confrontational expressions on clothing. View "Medco Health Sol. of Las Vegas v. NLRB" on Justia Law

A group of Freedmen, former Cherokee slaves and their descendants, sued in district court claiming that the Cherokee Nation had violated the 1866 Treaty that guaranteed the Freedmen all the rights of native Cherokees. To avoid the sovereign immunity bar, the Freedmen sued not only the Cherokee Nation itself but also the relevant executive official, the Principal Chief, in his official capacity. Applying the precedents that permitted suits against government officials in their official capacities, the court concluded that this suit could proceed against the Principal Chief in his official capacity, without the Cherokee Nation itself as a party. The Cherokee Nation and the Principal Chief in his official capacity were one and the same in the Ex Parte Young suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. As a result, the Principal Chief could adequately represent the Cherokee Nation in this suit, meaning that the Cherokee Nation itself was not a required party for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vann, et al v. DOI, et al" on Justia Law

Appellant brought suit against officials of the Administrative Office, solely in their official capacities, alleging that they rejected her job application in violation of her constitutional rights. The district court dismissed appellant's complaint, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the Administrative Office had sovereign immunity from suit. The court reversed the judgment and held that appellant's claim fell within the Larson-Dugan exception to the general rule of sovereign immunity. Since the district court did not address appellees' alternative jurisdiction arguments, the court left all of these arguments for consideration on remand. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pollack v. Duff, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a detainee at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, appealed from the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner, an Afghan national, became a senior Taliban official in 1994. He asserted, however, that he was not a part of the Taliban forces. The court found no clear error in the district court's factual determinations where the evidence established that petitioner was at least more likely than not a part of the Taliban forces. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of the petition. View "Khairkhwa, et al v. Obama, et al" on Justia Law

Appellee, an employee and participant in Hilton's retirement plan, sued for violations under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Appellee alleged that the Plan's benefit accrual formula was impermissibly backloaded and that Hilton, the Plan sponsor and administrator, violated both ERISA and the Plan by failing to credit certain years of service when calculating employees' vested credit. The court affirmed the district court's finding, that the Plan was impermissibly backloaded and that Hilton failed to calculate participants' vesting credit properly, because the district court handled the case well within its discretion. View "Kifafi v. Hilton Hotel Retirement Plan, et al" on Justia Law

When an employee's name and Social Security number listed on Form W-2 do not match in the SSA's database and this happens to a sufficient number of employees, the SSA sends the employer a "no-match" letter. In 2006, Judicial Watch filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, request with the SSA seeking the names of the 100 U.S. employers that generated the most no-matches from 2001 through 2006. The agency declined to produce such records, concluding that they were exempt under FOIA Exemption 3. The district court agreed with the SSA. The court affirmed the district court's judgment and held that the records sought by Judicial Watch would disclose "return information" and were protected from disclosure by the Tax Code, 26 U.S.C. 6103(a). Moreover, the Haskell Amendment was not applicable here because Judicial Watch sought data that could be associated with a particular taxpayer, the employer. View "Judicial Watch, Inc. v. SSA" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought substantial wage concessions on the basis of competitive pressures it claimed to be facing. Seeking to verify this contention, the union requested information about petitioner's prices and customers. Petitioner denied the union's request and then locked out the bargaining unit employees. Relying on a line of decisions endorsing a broad discovery standard, the Board found that the union's information request was relevant to duties as the employees' bargaining representative and that petitioner's information withholding and lockout were both unlawful. The court agreed with the Board's application of its discovery line of cases to an employer's competitive disadvantage claim and agreed that the union was entitled to the requested information to verify petitioner's assertions. The court disposed of petitioner's remaining arguments and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement of its order. View "KLB Industries, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Recognizing the growing importance of mobile data in a wireless market in which smartphones are increasingly common, the FCC adopted a rule requiring mobile-data providers to offer roaming agreements to other such providers on "commercially reasonable" terms. Verizon challenged the data roaming rule on multiple grounds. The court held that Title III of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq., plainly empowered the FCC to promulgate the data roaming rule. And although the rule bears some marks of common carriage, the court deferred to the FCC's determination that the rule imposed no common carrier obligations on mobile-internet providers. In response to Verizon's remaining arguments, the court concluded that the rule did not effect an unconstitutional taking and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. View "Cellco Partnership v. FCC" on Justia Law