Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bally's Park Place, Inc. (Bally's) petitioned for review of a decision and order of the NLRB which found that Bally's committed unfair labor practices in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1),(3), when it discharged an employee because of his support for the United Auto Workers. The court held that substantial evidence supported the NLRB's view of the disputed events and that the court would not disturb the NLRB's conclusion that the employee's termination was unlawful. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and granted the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement.

This case concerned petitioner's handling of accounts belonging to seven Wachovia Securities, Inc. (Wachovia) customers. Petitioner, a registered representative associated with Wachovia, a member of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), petitioned for review of an order of the SEC sustaining a disciplinary action against her by the NYSE. The court denied the petition for review and affirmed the SEC order because the court concluded that the SEC's decision was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.

Judicial Watch filed a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B), asking the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to disclose records of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that showed how much money they gave to political campaigns. At issue was whether the requested documents were "agency records" for purposes of FOIA. The court held that the FHFA's unexercised right to use and dispose of the records requested in this case was not enough to subject those records to FOIA where the FHFA had not read or relied on the records in any way. The court held that because it held that FHFA did not control the records, it need not reach FHFA's alternative argument.

Appellant challenged a judgment of the district court affirming the Social Security Administration's (SSA) denial of his application for disability benefits. Appellant contended that the ALJ did not properly apply the "treating physician rule" in evaluating his application and further argued that new evidence had come to light that warranted a remand to the agency. The court held that the ALJ did not, as required by the treating physician rule, explain his reasons for rejecting the opinion of appellant's treating physician. The court also held that a letter from the Board of Medicine validating appellant's complaint, as well as a judicial determination that a physician's report contained a false representation, qualified as new evidence within the meaning of 42. U.S.C. 405(g). Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.

Spectrum Health -- Kent Community Campus (Spectrum) withdrew recognition from its employees' union after receiving a petition indicating that the union no longer had majority support. The NLRB found this action unlawful because it occurred within the first three years of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, during which time a union enjoyed a conclusive presumption of majority support. The court held that the NLRB properly interpreted the term of the collective bargaining agreement and that Spectrum waived its objections to the bargaining order by failing to raise them in a timely manner before the NLRB. Accordingly, the court denied Spectrum's petition for review and granted the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement.

Appellants challenged a plan to manage the elk and bison populations in the National Elk Refuge and Grand Teton National Park pursuant to the National Wildlife Refuge Improvement Act (Improvement Act), 15 U.S.C. 668dd-668ee. At issue was whether the plan's failure to commit to a deadline for ending supplemental feeding was arbitrary and capricious under the Improvement Act. Also at issue was whether the plan unlawfully gave the Wyoming Fish and Game Department a veto over whether supplemental feeding would end. The court held that the record amply demonstrated that the agencies collected the relevant data, identified the dangers posed by supplemental feeding, and adopted a plan to mitigate those dangers. They also determined that the many objectives of the Improvement Act, including conservation, would be best met without implementation of a fixed deadline for stopping supplemental feeding was not arbitrary or capricious. The court took the Secretary at his word that Wyoming had no veto over the Secretary's duty to end a practice that was concededly at odds with the long-term health of the elk and bison in the refuge. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

When the Kiewit Power Constructors Company warned its electricians that their morning and afternoon breaks were too long, two of them responded that things would "get ugly" if they were disciplined, and one said that the supervisor had "better bring [his] boxing gloves." Each was fired. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) reinstated both workers, finding that in context their statements were not physical threats, but were merely figures of speech made in the course of a protected labor dispute. The court held that because the NLRB's finding were supported by substantial evidence, the court denied Kiewit's petition for review and granted the cross-application for enforcement.

Appellant appealed the decision of the district court to detain him prior to trial where appellant was considered a flight risk. At issue was whether the recorded findings, even if not in the form required by the Bail Reform Act (Act), 18 U.S.C. 3142, were sufficient to support the conclusion that appellant's pretrial detention was necessary in order to assure his presence at trial. The court held that because the district court failed to conform to the requirements of section 3142(g), i(l), the court must remand the case for the district court to consider all the relevant facts and to prepare findings of fact and a statement of reasons in support of appellant's pretrial detention pursuant to the Act, or otherwise to order appellant's pretrial release subject to appropriate conditions.

This case stemmed from appellee's legal representation of appellant in a criminal tax fraud case. Appellee subsequently filed a lawsuit against appellant for recovery of unpaid attorneys' fees and appellant counterclaimed for malpractice and later petitioned for arbitration before the District of Columbia Attorney/Client Arbitration Board (ACAB), an arm of the District of Columbia Bar. Appellant also moved the district court for a stay pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 3, the denial of which he appealed. At issue was whether appellant was "in default" of his right to arbitrate. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the stay where appellant failed to make a timely assertion of his right to arbitrate and his litigation activity, after he filed his initial answer and counterclaim, imposed substantial costs upon appellee and the district court.

Six defendants appealed from judgments of conviction on multiple charges related to a drug distribution business, including drug conspiracy, RICO conspiracy, continuing criminal enterprise, murder, and other related charges in violation of federal and District of Columbia laws. On appeal, defendants asserted numerous issues of error covering, among other things, evidentiary issues, conduct of the trial, prosecutorial misconduct, and jury instructions. Upon review, the court held that most of the asserted errors either were not erroneous or were harmless. As to one category of issue involving alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause, a Supreme Court decision intervening between the trial and the court's consideration of the case compelled the court to remand convictions for some drug charges (Counts 126-138) for further consideration in light of Bullcoming v. New Mexico. The court also remanded for further proceedings for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised by Calvin Smith (Counts 4 and 5) and vacated one murder conviction as to Rodney Moore that, as the parties agree, merged with another conviction (Count 32). Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.