Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case involves Duke Energy Progress, LLC, a grid operator, and two energy generation companies, American Beech Solar, LLC, and Edgecombe Solar LLC. The dispute centers around two orders by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The first order rejected Duke Energy's agreement with American Beech Solar, which did not require Duke Energy to reimburse the cost of network upgrades. The second order accepted Duke Energy's agreement with Edgecombe Solar, which Duke Energy filed unsigned and under protest, and required Duke Energy to reimburse the cost of network upgrades.In the lower courts, FERC rejected the agreement with American Beech Solar, arguing that it was not just and reasonable because Duke Energy had threatened to delay construction of the upgrades, preventing American Beech from connecting to the grid, unless American Beech agreed to forego reimbursement. FERC also approved the agreement with Edgecombe Solar, despite Duke Energy's protest that it should not be required to pay reimbursements.In the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the court denied Duke Energy's petitions for review. The court held that FERC's orders were not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. The court found that FERC's interpretation of its own regulation, Order 2003, was reasonable and entitled to deference. The court also found that FERC reasonably rejected Duke Energy's request for a deviation from the reimbursement requirement. Finally, the court held that FERC's orders did not violate the principle of treating similarly situated utilities differently without a reasonable justification. View "Duke Energy Progress, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

This case involves the sale of electricity under the Federal Power Act and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) efforts to limit the rates at which certain wholesale electricity is traded. For over two decades, FERC has maintained a "soft" price cap for certain short-term electricity sales in parts of the western United States. In August 2020, a heat wave in the western United States led to increased prices in the market for short-term electricity supply. Some of the short-term sales occurred at prices above FERC's soft cap. Sellers who transacted at above-cap prices were required to justify those transactions to FERC or be required to refund sale prices that exceed the cap. After reviewing the sellers' justification filings, FERC determined that some sellers had failed to justify their above-cap sales and ordered partial refunds.The case was brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court found that FERC should have conducted a Mobile-Sierra analysis, which presumes that contract rates formed through arms-length, bilateral negotiation are reasonable, before ordering refunds. The court agreed with the sellers that FERC erred by failing to conduct this analysis prior to ordering refunds. As a result, the court granted the sellers' petitions for review, vacated the orders they challenged, and remanded for further proceedings. The court dismissed the consumers' petitions for review as moot. View "Shell Energy North America (US), L.P. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Evergreen Shipping Agency (America) Corp. and its affiliates, who were charged by the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) for imposing "unjust and unreasonable" detention charges on TCW, Inc., a trucking company. The charges were for the late return of a shipping container. The FMC argued that the charges were unreasonable as they were levied for days when the port was closed and could not have accepted a returned container. Evergreen contested this decision, arguing that the FMC's application of the interpretive rule was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.The FMC had previously ruled in favor of TCW, Inc. in a small claims program. The Commission then reviewed the decision, focusing on the application of the interpretive rule on demurrage and detention. The FMC upheld the initial decision, stating that no amount of detention can incentivize the return of a container when the terminal cannot accept the container. The Commission dismissed Evergreen's arguments that failing to impose detention charges during the port closure would have disincentivized the return of the container before the closure.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and found the FMC's decision to be arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the FMC failed to consider relevant factors and did not provide a reasoned explanation for several aspects of its decision. The court also found that the FMC's application of the incentive principle was illogical. The court concluded that a detention charge does not necessarily lack any incentivizing effect because it is levied for a day on which a container cannot be returned to a marine terminal. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Commission’s order, and remanded the matter to the agency for further proceedings. View "Evergreen Shipping Agency (America) Corp. v. Federal Maritime Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves LaFonzo Iracks, who pleaded guilty to unlawful firearm possession and possession with the intent to distribute Phencyclidine (PCP). Iracks had a previous conviction for involuntary manslaughter and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony in Maryland. He was released from prison in March 2021 and was caught with a firearm and PCP in January 2022. He pleaded guilty to these offenses later that year. During sentencing, the District Court had to decide whether Iracks’s 2015 firearm conviction was a crime of violence, which would determine the base offense level for the recent firearm charge. The District Court decided not to treat Iracks’s 2015 firearm conviction as a crime of violence and applied a lower offense level, resulting in a Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months. However, considering the severity of Iracks’s conduct, the District Court departed from the Guidelines range and sentenced Iracks to 41 months of incarceration and 36 months of supervised release.The District Court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Iracks challenged his above-Guidelines sentence on three grounds. First, he asserted that the District Court erred in justifying its upward variance based on the probation office’s recommendation when no such recommendation was made. Second, he argued that the District Court’s reasons for an upward variance were already accounted for in the Guidelines calculation. Finally, he contended that the District Court needed to, but failed to, address his argument that his future probation revocation proceedings in Maryland support a downward variance.The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's sentence. It found that the District Court did not rely on the probation office’s recommendation for an upward variance, which was a clearly erroneous fact. The Court of Appeals also found that the District Court's reasons for an upward variance were not already accounted for in the Guidelines calculation. Lastly, the Court of Appeals found that the District Court did not plainly err in failing to consider Iracks’s argument that his future probation revocation proceedings in Maryland warrant a downward variance. View "United States v. Iracks" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. S. Stanley Young and Dr. Louis Anthony Cox, who were not appointed to the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). They sued the EPA, alleging violations of the Federal Advisory Committee Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs claimed that the EPA's selection process was biased, favoring candidates who supported stricter air quality standards, and that the EPA failed to adequately explain its compliance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which awarded summary judgment to the EPA. The plaintiffs then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The Court of Appeals found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit. The court noted that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated an Article III injury with any of the theories presented. The court found no evidence that the EPA's process was biased against the plaintiffs. The court also noted that the plaintiffs had not raised an Equal Protection claim or any claim based on race or sex discrimination. Furthermore, the court found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a loss of benefits enjoyed by committee members, as they conceded that they had no individual right to serve on the committee. The court vacated the district court's order resolving the counts on the merits and remanded with instructions to dismiss both for lack of standing. View "Young v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The case involves the Sandpiper Residents Association and other residents of Sandpiper Cove, a privately owned apartment complex in Texas, subsidized by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under its Section 8 project-based rental assistance program. The residents sued HUD, alleging that the agency failed to ensure that Sandpiper Cove was maintained in a habitable condition. They sought to compel HUD to issue Tenant Protection Vouchers, which would allow them to receive rental payment assistance for use at other properties.The District Court dismissed the residents' claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that their claims had been mooted by the sale of Sandpiper Cove to a new owner who had not received a Notice of Default. The residents appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the District Court erred in dismissing the residents' claims as moot. The court found that the question of whether the residents were legally entitled to relief after the sale of Sandpiper Cove went to the merits of their case, not mootness. However, the court affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the residents' complaint because they failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court held that the residents had not shown that the new owner of Sandpiper Cove had received a Notice of Default, a condition necessary for the issuance of Tenant Protection Vouchers under the relevant statute. View "Sandpiper Residents Association v. Housing and Urban Development" on Justia Law

The case involves Hospital de la Concepción, Inc. (HDLC), a hospital in Puerto Rico, and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). HDLC reduced the work hours of its employees, represented by Unidad Laboral de Enfermeras(os) y Empleados de la Salud (Union), without bargaining with the Union. HDLC argued that it was privileged under the collective-bargaining agreements (CBAs) to unilaterally reduce employees’ work hours without bargaining and that it had no obligation to provide the Union with the information requested. The NLRB cross-applied for enforcement of its decision and order.The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that HDLC violated the National Labor Relations Act by failing to bargain with the Union before reducing the employees’ work hours and by failing to provide the Union with requested information relevant to the decision to reduce work hours. The NLRB affirmed and adopted the ALJ's findings with modifications.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied HDLC’s petition and granted the NLRB’s cross-petition for enforcement. The court found that the CBAs did not authorize HDLC to unilaterally reduce its employees’ hours. The court also found that HDLC had a duty to respond to the Union’s information requests and failed to do so. The court rejected HDLC’s argument that the Board erred by failing to consider a defense not relevant to the theory under which it was charged. The court also found no error with the Board’s conclusion that HDLC failed to demonstrate that the economic exigencies exception privileged its unilateral reduction in employees’ scheduled work hours. Finally, the court could not consider HDLC’s argument that the Board should have excluded interim earnings from its remedy due to HDLC's failure to object before the Board. View "Hospital de la Concepcion v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

In March 2022, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued an order to seven chemical manufacturers/processors, managed by the Vinyl Institute, to test the chronic toxicity of 1,1,2-Trichloroethane (1,1,2-TCA) under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). The Vinyl Institute challenged the order, arguing that the EPA failed to comply with several statutory requirements. The Vinyl Institute also moved to supplement the administrative record with a scientific consultant’s report.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the Vinyl Institute's petition for review. The court found that the EPA's reliance on non-public portions of the administrative record was not part of "the record taken as a whole" subject to review. The court held that the EPA failed to provide substantial evidence that met its statutory mandate. The court vacated the order and remanded the case to the EPA to satisfy that mandate with "substantial evidence in the record taken as a whole." The court also denied the Vinyl Institute's motion to supplement the record with scientific information it could have—and should have—submitted earlier. View "Vinyl Institute, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The case involves an Asian American federal employee, Tommy Ho, who alleged that his employer declined to promote him in retaliation for his previous activity protected by Title VII. Ho had been employed as a criminal investigator in the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) since 1999. He filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint in 2015 alleging racial discrimination. In 2017 and 2018, he applied for three promotions but was not selected for any of them. Ho filed two more EEO complaints alleging that these non-selections were due to retaliation. The case at hand centers on Ho's application for a program manager position in 2019, for which he was not selected.The district court dismissed Ho's complaint, holding that it failed to sufficiently allege a causal connection between Ho's protected EEO activity and his non-selection for the program manager position. The court concluded that the ten-month gap between Ho's latest protected activity and his non-selection was too long to support an inference of causation.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to Ho, his allegations narrowly sufficed to support a plausible inference that his protected activity was a but-for cause of his non-selection. The court noted that Ho had previously complained about the conduct of the very people responsible for filling the opening, and that he was qualified for the position. The court also noted that the alleged reason for Ho's non-selection was entirely subjective. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ho v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Tristan Stevens, who participated in an attack on police officers at the United States Capitol’s Lower West Terrace on January 6, 2021. The district court convicted him of four counts of feloniously assaulting and impeding police officers and one count of committing civil disorder. At sentencing, the court concluded that Stevens committed the offenses with an intent to commit another felony: civil disorder. Stevens appealed his sentence, arguing that the court should have applied a different sentencing guideline to his offenses.The district court had previously determined that Stevens committed felonies because he acted with the intent to commit another felony—civil disorder. The court applied the sentencing guideline for aggravated assault to Stevens' offenses, which Stevens disputed. He argued that his conduct did not constitute "aggravated assault" even under the commentary definition.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with Stevens. The court held that "aggravated assault" unambiguously includes assault with intent to commit another felony. Therefore, the court properly applied the sentencing guideline for aggravated assault to Stevens’ offenses because his conduct constituted “felonious assault” and he acted with the “intent to commit another felony.” The court affirmed his sentence. View "USA v. Stevens" on Justia Law