Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC (Range) and Columbia Gulf Transmission, LLC (Columbia Gulf) filed administrative complaints against Texas Eastern Transmission, LP (Texas Eastern) with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Range, a natural gas producer, has long-term agreements with Texas Eastern and Columbia Gulf to transport gas through the Adair Interconnect. During two periods in 2019 and 2021, Texas Eastern's pipeline pressure was too low to move gas into Columbia Gulf's system, causing significant financial losses for Range. Petitioners sought FERC's intervention to require Texas Eastern to maintain higher pipeline pressures.FERC dismissed the complaints, finding that Texas Eastern had no minimum delivery pressure obligation. FERC also denied rehearing requests, stating that the complaints did not sufficiently demonstrate a violation of any pressure obligations. Petitioners argued that Texas Eastern failed to comply with its tariff and the Adair Interconnection Agreement, but FERC found these arguments procedurally and substantively insufficient. Additionally, FERC concluded that Texas Eastern's force majeure declaration in 2021 was irrelevant to the issue of reservation charge credits, as Columbia Gulf's refusal to accept gas was outside Texas Eastern's control.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld FERC's dismissal, agreeing that the complaints did not adequately plead violations of the Texas Eastern Tariff or the Adair Interconnection Agreement. The court also found that FERC did not need to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issues of equal service and the force majeure declaration, as the written record was sufficient. The court denied the petitions for review, affirming FERC's orders. View "Columbia Gulf Transmission, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Saad Aljabri, a former Saudi Arabian government official, who alleges that a group led by the current Saudi Prime Minister and Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud, plotted to kill him after he relocated to Canada. The district court dismissed Aljabri's claims, finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over most of the defendants, and that Aljabri had failed to state a claim against two others.The district court found that due to the burden on bin Salman to litigate in the United States and Saudi Arabia’s greater procedural and substantive interest, the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over bin Salman would not meet “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” The court also determined that the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute did not provide “specific” personal jurisdiction over other defendants because Aljabri failed to sufficiently align their alleged business activities in D.C. with the plot against his life. The court denied Aljabri's request for jurisdictional discovery, finding that any information revealed in the discovery would not change the court’s conclusion that exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendants would be unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims against Saudi Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud, albeit for a different reason: his immunity from suit. However, the court held that the district court did abuse its discretion in denying Aljabri’s motion for jurisdictional discovery outright. The court therefore reversed the district court’s order denying jurisdictional discovery, vacated the judgment of dismissal with respect to two defendants, and remanded for jurisdictional discovery. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims against two other defendants for the reasons given by the district court. View "Aljabri v. Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al Saud" on Justia Law

Three Chinese individuals invested in a project to improve Philadelphia’s transit infrastructure as part of an effort to obtain EB-5 visas, which are visas for foreign investors who create jobs in the United States. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) approved their visa applications. However, due to the oversubscription of the EB-5 visa program, the investors were waiting in line for visas to become available. In 2022, Congress changed the eligibility requirements for EB-5 visas, creating a new category of “reserved” EB-5 visas for foreigners who invest in “infrastructure projects”. The investors believed that they should be eligible for the new “reserved” visas based on their past investments in infrastructure. They sued the Department of Homeland Security and USCIS, arguing that previous investments in already-approved infrastructure-focused projects should be eligible for reserved EB-5 visas. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the government had taken no final agency action that may be challenged at this time.The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court agreed with the lower court that the arguments made by the appellants were premature. The court found that the statements made by USCIS in a Q&A and a policy manual merely clarified the existing process for seeking an immigration benefit and did not constitute final agency action. The court also noted that the appellants were not precluded from applying for reserved EB-5 visas. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the district court, dismissing the appellants' claims for lack of finality under the Administrative Procedure Act. View "Delaware Valley Regional Center, LLC v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The case involves the Federal Election Commission (FEC), the Campaign Legal Center, and the political action committee Correct the Record. The Campaign Legal Center alleged that Correct the Record coordinated with Hillary Clinton's 2016 presidential campaign and spent close to $6 million without disclosing these expenditures as contributions. Correct the Record argued that these expenditures were exempt from disclosure due to the FEC's "internet exemption," which exempts unpaid internet communications from contribution limitations and disclosure requirements.The FEC dismissed the complaint, leading to a lawsuit by the Campaign Legal Center. The district court ruled in favor of the Campaign Legal Center, finding that the FEC's dismissal was contrary to law. The FEC appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the FEC's interpretation of the "internet exemption" was contrary to the Federal Election Campaign Act's regulation of coordinated expenditures. The court also found that the FEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in dismissing allegations of coordination between Correct the Record and the Clinton campaign. The case was remanded back to the FEC for further action consistent with the court's decision. View "Campaign Legal Center v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

This case involves Duke Energy Progress, LLC, a grid operator, and two energy generation companies, American Beech Solar, LLC, and Edgecombe Solar LLC. The dispute centers around two orders by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The first order rejected Duke Energy's agreement with American Beech Solar, which did not require Duke Energy to reimburse the cost of network upgrades. The second order accepted Duke Energy's agreement with Edgecombe Solar, which Duke Energy filed unsigned and under protest, and required Duke Energy to reimburse the cost of network upgrades.In the lower courts, FERC rejected the agreement with American Beech Solar, arguing that it was not just and reasonable because Duke Energy had threatened to delay construction of the upgrades, preventing American Beech from connecting to the grid, unless American Beech agreed to forego reimbursement. FERC also approved the agreement with Edgecombe Solar, despite Duke Energy's protest that it should not be required to pay reimbursements.In the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the court denied Duke Energy's petitions for review. The court held that FERC's orders were not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. The court found that FERC's interpretation of its own regulation, Order 2003, was reasonable and entitled to deference. The court also found that FERC reasonably rejected Duke Energy's request for a deviation from the reimbursement requirement. Finally, the court held that FERC's orders did not violate the principle of treating similarly situated utilities differently without a reasonable justification. View "Duke Energy Progress, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

This case involves the sale of electricity under the Federal Power Act and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) efforts to limit the rates at which certain wholesale electricity is traded. For over two decades, FERC has maintained a "soft" price cap for certain short-term electricity sales in parts of the western United States. In August 2020, a heat wave in the western United States led to increased prices in the market for short-term electricity supply. Some of the short-term sales occurred at prices above FERC's soft cap. Sellers who transacted at above-cap prices were required to justify those transactions to FERC or be required to refund sale prices that exceed the cap. After reviewing the sellers' justification filings, FERC determined that some sellers had failed to justify their above-cap sales and ordered partial refunds.The case was brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court found that FERC should have conducted a Mobile-Sierra analysis, which presumes that contract rates formed through arms-length, bilateral negotiation are reasonable, before ordering refunds. The court agreed with the sellers that FERC erred by failing to conduct this analysis prior to ordering refunds. As a result, the court granted the sellers' petitions for review, vacated the orders they challenged, and remanded for further proceedings. The court dismissed the consumers' petitions for review as moot. View "Shell Energy North America (US), L.P. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Evergreen Shipping Agency (America) Corp. and its affiliates, who were charged by the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) for imposing "unjust and unreasonable" detention charges on TCW, Inc., a trucking company. The charges were for the late return of a shipping container. The FMC argued that the charges were unreasonable as they were levied for days when the port was closed and could not have accepted a returned container. Evergreen contested this decision, arguing that the FMC's application of the interpretive rule was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.The FMC had previously ruled in favor of TCW, Inc. in a small claims program. The Commission then reviewed the decision, focusing on the application of the interpretive rule on demurrage and detention. The FMC upheld the initial decision, stating that no amount of detention can incentivize the return of a container when the terminal cannot accept the container. The Commission dismissed Evergreen's arguments that failing to impose detention charges during the port closure would have disincentivized the return of the container before the closure.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and found the FMC's decision to be arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the FMC failed to consider relevant factors and did not provide a reasoned explanation for several aspects of its decision. The court also found that the FMC's application of the incentive principle was illogical. The court concluded that a detention charge does not necessarily lack any incentivizing effect because it is levied for a day on which a container cannot be returned to a marine terminal. The court granted the petition for review, vacated the Commission’s order, and remanded the matter to the agency for further proceedings. View "Evergreen Shipping Agency (America) Corp. v. Federal Maritime Commission" on Justia Law

The case involves LaFonzo Iracks, who pleaded guilty to unlawful firearm possession and possession with the intent to distribute Phencyclidine (PCP). Iracks had a previous conviction for involuntary manslaughter and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony in Maryland. He was released from prison in March 2021 and was caught with a firearm and PCP in January 2022. He pleaded guilty to these offenses later that year. During sentencing, the District Court had to decide whether Iracks’s 2015 firearm conviction was a crime of violence, which would determine the base offense level for the recent firearm charge. The District Court decided not to treat Iracks’s 2015 firearm conviction as a crime of violence and applied a lower offense level, resulting in a Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months. However, considering the severity of Iracks’s conduct, the District Court departed from the Guidelines range and sentenced Iracks to 41 months of incarceration and 36 months of supervised release.The District Court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Iracks challenged his above-Guidelines sentence on three grounds. First, he asserted that the District Court erred in justifying its upward variance based on the probation office’s recommendation when no such recommendation was made. Second, he argued that the District Court’s reasons for an upward variance were already accounted for in the Guidelines calculation. Finally, he contended that the District Court needed to, but failed to, address his argument that his future probation revocation proceedings in Maryland support a downward variance.The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's sentence. It found that the District Court did not rely on the probation office’s recommendation for an upward variance, which was a clearly erroneous fact. The Court of Appeals also found that the District Court's reasons for an upward variance were not already accounted for in the Guidelines calculation. Lastly, the Court of Appeals found that the District Court did not plainly err in failing to consider Iracks’s argument that his future probation revocation proceedings in Maryland warrant a downward variance. View "United States v. Iracks" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. S. Stanley Young and Dr. Louis Anthony Cox, who were not appointed to the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). They sued the EPA, alleging violations of the Federal Advisory Committee Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs claimed that the EPA's selection process was biased, favoring candidates who supported stricter air quality standards, and that the EPA failed to adequately explain its compliance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which awarded summary judgment to the EPA. The plaintiffs then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The Court of Appeals found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the suit. The court noted that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated an Article III injury with any of the theories presented. The court found no evidence that the EPA's process was biased against the plaintiffs. The court also noted that the plaintiffs had not raised an Equal Protection claim or any claim based on race or sex discrimination. Furthermore, the court found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a loss of benefits enjoyed by committee members, as they conceded that they had no individual right to serve on the committee. The court vacated the district court's order resolving the counts on the merits and remanded with instructions to dismiss both for lack of standing. View "Young v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The case involves the Sandpiper Residents Association and other residents of Sandpiper Cove, a privately owned apartment complex in Texas, subsidized by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under its Section 8 project-based rental assistance program. The residents sued HUD, alleging that the agency failed to ensure that Sandpiper Cove was maintained in a habitable condition. They sought to compel HUD to issue Tenant Protection Vouchers, which would allow them to receive rental payment assistance for use at other properties.The District Court dismissed the residents' claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that their claims had been mooted by the sale of Sandpiper Cove to a new owner who had not received a Notice of Default. The residents appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the District Court erred in dismissing the residents' claims as moot. The court found that the question of whether the residents were legally entitled to relief after the sale of Sandpiper Cove went to the merits of their case, not mootness. However, the court affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the residents' complaint because they failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court held that the residents had not shown that the new owner of Sandpiper Cove had received a Notice of Default, a condition necessary for the issuance of Tenant Protection Vouchers under the relevant statute. View "Sandpiper Residents Association v. Housing and Urban Development" on Justia Law