Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ryan Castaneira, a U.S. citizen, filed a Form I-130 petition to obtain permanent residency for his spouse, a Mexican national. USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the petition due to Castaneira's prior convictions in Georgia for crimes that appeared to qualify as "specified offenses against a minor" under the Adam Walsh Act. Castaneira argued that his convictions involved an undercover officer, not a minor, and thus should not be considered offenses against a minor. He also challenged the agency's use of the "beyond any reasonable doubt" standard to prove he posed no risk to his spouse.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Castaneira's claims. The court held that his prior convictions fell within the statutory definition of "specified offense against a minor" and that the Adam Walsh Act's grant of "sole and unreviewable discretion" to USCIS precluded judicial review of the evidentiary standard applied by the agency. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the standard of proof used by USCIS in making the no-risk determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling in part, agreeing that Castaneira's prior convictions were covered by the Adam Walsh Act. However, the appellate court vacated the District Court's jurisdictional ruling regarding the evidentiary standard. The court held that while USCIS's ultimate no-risk determinations are unreviewable, challenges to the agency's departure from its own binding precedent, such as the standard of proof, are reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether USCIS violated its own precedent by applying the "beyond any reasonable doubt" standard. View "Castaneira v. Noem" on Justia Law

Judith Jeltsje Pietersen, a Dutch citizen, and her fiancé, Daniel Gerhard Brown, an American citizen, sought to obtain a visa for Pietersen to enter the United States so they could marry. Pietersen had previously traveled to the U.S. under the Visa Waiver Program but was denied entry in February 2020 by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for alleged unlawful employment. Pietersen and Brown applied for a K-1 visa, but consular officers denied the applications, citing willful misrepresentation of a material fact under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).The appellants filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. Department of State, challenging the visa denials and the guidance in the State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM). They argued that the consular officers failed to properly review Pietersen’s applications and that the "reason to believe" standard used to determine inadmissibility was contrary to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the consular nonreviewability doctrine barred the claims and that the claims were otherwise meritless.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded the case. The court held that the consular nonreviewability doctrine did not bar the appellants' Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim for prospective relief. The court expressed doubts about the viability of the State Department's "reason to believe" standard and vacated the District Court’s alternative holding based on 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g). The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the INA authorizes the challenged FAM guidance. View "Pietersen v. United States Department of State" on Justia Law

Petitioners, who own New York’s electric-transmission grid, sought to finance upgrades required when new power sources connect to the grid. This would allow them to raise rates and earn a return on these investments. However, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) denied their requests to change the rules prohibiting owner upgrade funding.The transmission owners filed two petitions with FERC on April 9, 2021, under Sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act, requesting amendments to the Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) to allow them to fund interconnection upgrades. On September 3, 2021, FERC rejected the Section 205 filing, stating that the owners’ agreement with the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) limited their Section 205 rights. FERC also dismissed the Section 206 complaint, concluding that the owners failed to demonstrate that the existing funding mechanism was unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential. The owners’ requests for rehearing were deemed denied by operation of law on November 4, 2021, and FERC issued a new order on March 24, 2022, modifying its original orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and upheld FERC’s decisions. The court found that FERC acted reasonably in dismissing the Section 205 filing, as the owners had relinquished their rights to file for changes to the OATT without NYISO’s approval. The court also agreed with FERC’s dismissal of the Section 206 complaint, noting that the owners failed to provide sufficient evidence that the current rates were unjust or unreasonable. The court concluded that FERC’s orders were not arbitrary or capricious and denied the owners’ petitions for review. View "Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. FERC" on Justia Law

Carter W. Page filed a lawsuit against the United States, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and several current and former FBI officials. Page alleged that the FBI unlawfully obtained four warrants to electronically surveil him under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and leaked information obtained from these warrants to the press, causing him reputational harm and lost business opportunities. The district court dismissed Page's claims, finding them either time-barred or insufficiently pleaded.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Page's second amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that Page's FISA claims were time-barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations and that his claims were insufficiently pleaded. The court also dismissed Page's Patriot Act claim against the United States, with the majority concluding it was time-barred and the partial dissent finding it legally insufficient. Additionally, the court dismissed Page's Bivens claim and Privacy Act claims for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal of Page's FISA and Patriot Act claims as time-barred. The court held that Page had actual or inquiry notice of his FISA claims by April 2017, more than three years before he filed his complaint in November 2020. The court also found that Page's Patriot Act claim was barred because he failed to file his administrative claim with the FBI within two years of its accrual. The court concluded that Page had sufficient information by April 2017 to discover the basis for his claims, making them time-barred. View "Page v. Comey" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy with intent to distribute cocaine and manufacture and distribute methamphetamine into the United States. The district court sentenced her to 264 months’ imprisonment, 60 months’ supervised release, and ordered her to forfeit $18,000,000. The appellant sought reversal on multiple grounds, including lack of proper venue, ineffective assistance of counsel, and errors in sentencing and forfeiture.The appellant was indicted in the District of Columbia in 2016 for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and manufacture methamphetamine, knowing the drugs would be imported into the United States. The drug trafficking occurred in various countries, including Colombia, Mexico, and the United States. The appellant was arrested in Bogotá, Colombia, in 2017 and voluntarily accompanied DEA agents to the United States. She challenged her prosecution in the District of Columbia, arguing that no part of the conspiracy occurred there.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that venue was proper under 18 U.S.C. § 3238, which allows for trial in the District of Columbia when the offense is committed outside the United States and the offender is not arrested or brought into any district. The court also found that the evidence supported the jury’s finding of a single conspiracy, as the appellant played a central role in coordinating the drug trafficking operations. The court rejected the appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, noting that counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.Regarding sentencing, the court found no clear error in the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, including enhancements for using non-commercial aircraft, bribing law enforcement, maintaining a drug premises, and being an organizer or leader of the conspiracy. The court also upheld the $18,000,000 forfeiture order, finding that the appellant obtained the proceeds directly and indirectly from the drug trafficking operations under her control. The court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "USA v. Campos" on Justia Law

The Village of Morrisville, Vermont, sought to renew its federal license to operate a hydroelectric project in the Lamoille River Basin. The project had been in operation since 1981. Morrisville applied for a water quality certification from the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, which is required under the Clean Water Act for projects that may result in discharges into navigable waters. After lengthy discussions and two rounds of revisions, Vermont issued a conditional water certification. Dissatisfied with the conditions, Morrisville argued that Vermont waived its certification authority by allowing Morrisville to withdraw and resubmit its application twice.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) reviewed the case and found that Morrisville had unilaterally withdrawn and resubmitted its application to negotiate more favorable conditions, rather than at the behest of the state. FERC concluded that there was no evidence of a coordinated scheme between Morrisville and Vermont to delay the certification process. Consequently, FERC determined that Vermont did not waive its statutory certification authority.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and upheld FERC's decision. The court found that Morrisville's actions were unilateral and in its own interest, and there was no mutual agreement with Vermont to delay the certification process. The court distinguished this case from Hoopa Valley Tribe v. FERC, where there was a clear agreement to delay certification. The court concluded that Vermont did not waive its certification authority and denied Morrisville's petitions for review. View "Village of Morrisville, VT v. FERC" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the Department of Defense's (DoD) authority to impose time-in-service requirements for expedited naturalization of noncitizen servicemembers under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Historically, the DoD certified noncitizens' honorable service for naturalization without a time-in-service requirement. However, in 2017, the DoD issued a policy requiring a minimum of 180 days of active-duty service or one year for reservists before certifying honorable service. In 2020, a group of noncitizen servicemembers challenged this policy under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding the policy arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law, and that the DoD's role in certifying honorable service was purely ministerial. The court vacated the time-in-service requirement and enjoined the DoD from withholding certification based on the policy. The DoD appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. During the appeal, the DoD rescinded the challenged policy and did not introduce a replacement. The court determined that the case was moot due to the rescission of the policy and dismissed the appeal. The court also vacated the district court's judgment, finding no indication that the DoD rescinded the policy to evade review and emphasizing the need to clear the path for future litigation on the issue. View "Samma v. DOD" on Justia Law

In early 2020, Robert Goodrich liquidated his stock portfolio due to concerns about the financial market's reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in significant financial losses. Goodrich had an investment account with U.S. Trust Bank of America Private Wealth Management, managed by Matthew Lettinga. Despite advice from Lettinga to avoid liquidation, Goodrich insisted on selling his portfolio. Goodrich later sued Lettinga and Bank of America, claiming gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of the D.C. Securities Act, arguing that he was not adequately informed of the risks involved in liquidating his portfolio.The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Goodrich's claims of gross negligence and violations of the D.C. Securities Act, finding them implausibly pleaded. The court allowed the breach of fiduciary duty claim to proceed but later granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Goodrich had explicitly instructed the sale of his portfolio, which precluded liability under the terms of the investment agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decisions. The appellate court held that the investment agreement's exculpatory clauses were enforceable and that Goodrich's explicit instruction to liquidate his portfolio shielded the defendants from liability. The court also agreed that Goodrich failed to plausibly allege scienter, a necessary element for his claims under the D.C. Securities Act, and found no abuse of discretion in the District Court's limitation of discovery to the dispositive issue of whether Goodrich instructed the sale. View "Goodrich v. Bank of America N.A." on Justia Law

Captain Matthew Hight trained with the Saint Lawrence Seaway Pilots Association from 2015 to 2018 to become a maritime pilot on Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River. The Great Lakes Pilotage Act of 1960 requires certain ships on these waters to have a registered pilot on board. The Coast Guard oversees the registration of American pilots and supervises private pilotage associations responsible for training new pilots. Hight applied for registration in 2018, but the Pilots Association recommended denial, citing incomplete training and concerns about his temperament. The Coast Guard denied his application after an independent review.Hight challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the Coast Guard acted arbitrarily and capriciously, unconstitutionally delegated authority to the Pilots Association, and violated the First Amendment by requiring him to train with and join the Pilots Association. The district court rejected all claims, finding that the Coast Guard's decision was supported by substantial evidence, including Hight's failure to complete the required training and concerns about his temperament.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Coast Guard's decision was reasonable and supported by the record, as Hight had not completed the required supervised trips on the St. Lawrence River. The court also found that the Coast Guard did not unconstitutionally delegate authority to the Pilots Association, as the association's role was limited to providing advice and gathering facts. Finally, the court determined that Hight's First Amendment claim regarding mandatory association membership was not ripe for review, as he was not yet eligible to join the Pilots Association. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Hight v. DHS" on Justia Law

In this case, Iran provided material support for a Taliban attack that killed thirty Americans, including Navy special forces operator Kraig Vickers. Vickers' family sued Iran under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which allows for such suits against state sponsors of terrorism. The district court awarded damages to most of Vickers' family but dismissed the claim of his daughter, K.E.F.V., who was born two months after his death.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held a three-day evidentiary hearing and concluded that Iran was a state sponsor of terrorism that had provided material support for the attack. The court then determined damages for twenty-three plaintiffs and appointed special masters to recommend damages for the remaining plaintiffs, including the Vickers family. The special master recommended solatium damages for each family member, but the district court dismissed K.E.F.V.'s claim, stating that she could not recover solatium because she was born after her father's death.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the FSIA does not preclude after-born plaintiffs from recovering solatium and that well-established state tort law, including wrongful death statutes, supports the recovery of damages by children born after a parent's death. The court concluded that K.E.F.V. is entitled to solatium for the loss of her father's comfort and society, regardless of her birth date relative to his death. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "K.E.F.V. v. Islamic Republic of Iran" on Justia Law