Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a report mentioning the CIA’s “operational control” over fourteen detainees transferred to Guantanamo Bay in September 2006. Based on this, a lawyer representing one of the detainees requested records from the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) about the CIA’s “operational control” at Guantanamo from September 2006 to January 2007. The CIA identified three documents but stated it could neither confirm nor deny the existence of other records, citing the need to protect classified intelligence sources and methods.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the CIA. The court concluded that the CIA had adequately justified its Glomar response, which allows an agency to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of records if doing so would reveal classified information. The court found that the CIA had not waived its right to issue a Glomar response despite the release of some documents and references in the Senate report.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the CIA did not waive its Glomar response through official acknowledgment, as the Senate report and the released documents did not constitute an official acknowledgment by the CIA. The court also found that the CIA’s justification for its Glomar response was logical and plausible, as confirming or denying the existence of additional records could reveal protected intelligence sources and methods. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the CIA. View "Connell v. CIA" on Justia Law

Henry Searcy, Jr. sought certification as an agent under the NFLPA’s 2012 Regulations Governing Contract Advisors but failed the required exam twice. After an arbitrator sided with the NFLPA, Searcy sued the NFLPA, its Executive Director, Prometric LLC, and Prometric’s Vice President and General Counsel. He alleged breach of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and sought vacatur of the arbitration award under the FAA.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claims against Prometric Defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and against the NFLPA Defendants for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims against Prometric Defendants and instructed the District Court to reconsider its dismissal of claims against the NFLPA Defendants, specifically examining whether Section 301 of the LMRA preempted Searcy’s state law claims.Upon further review, the District Court concluded it had jurisdiction and dismissed the claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Searcy appealed again. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the District Court erred in finding subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against the NFLPA Defendants. The court determined that Section 301 of the LMRA does not completely preempt Searcy’s state law claims, as these claims do not require interpretation of the NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal on different grounds and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). View "Searcy v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2021, petitioners challenged the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) authorization of two liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminals in Cameron County, Texas, and a related pipeline. The court partially granted the petitions and remanded the case to FERC without vacating the orders. On remand, FERC reauthorized the projects, prompting petitioners to challenge the reauthorization, arguing non-compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act (NGA).Previously, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found FERC’s environmental justice analysis inadequate and required FERC to either justify its chosen analysis radius or use a different one. FERC was also directed to reconsider its public interest determinations under the NGA. On remand, FERC expanded its environmental justice analysis but did not issue a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which petitioners argued was necessary. FERC also did not consider a new carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) proposal as part of its environmental review.The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found FERC’s failure to issue a supplemental EIS for its updated environmental justice analysis arbitrary and capricious, as the new analysis provided a significantly different environmental picture. The court also held that FERC should have considered the CCS proposal as a connected action or a reasonable alternative. Additionally, the court found FERC’s rejection of air quality data from a nearby monitor arbitrary and capricious. The court vacated FERC’s reauthorization orders and remanded the case for further proceedings, requiring FERC to issue a supplemental EIS and consider the CCS proposal. View "City of Port Isabel v. FERC" on Justia Law

Five police officers from the Crime Suppression Team were patrolling Southeast Washington, D.C., when they encountered Antonio Malachi Bryant. Upon searching him, they found a firearm. Bryant, a previously convicted felon, was charged with possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to suppress the gun, arguing it was obtained through an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Bryant’s motion to suppress. The court found that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to seize Bryant when they observed a bulge in his waistband, which they believed to be a weapon. The court concluded that the seizure was constitutional and did not need to determine the exact moment the encounter turned into a seizure, as the reasonable suspicion was established by the time the bulge was observed.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to detain and search Bryant when they saw the bulge in his waistband. The court found that Bryant was not seized until after the officers observed the bulge, and thus the seizure was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. The court also noted that the officers’ approach and initial questioning did not constitute a seizure, as police officers are permitted to approach individuals in public places without it being considered a seizure. The court concluded that the District Court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and upheld the denial of the motion to suppress. View "USA v. Bryant" on Justia Law

A computer science professor and a tech inventor challenged the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), arguing that its provisions against circumventing technological protections on copyrighted works and distributing circumvention tools violate the First Amendment. They claimed these provisions unduly stifle fair use of copyrighted works, which they argued is protected speech. The plaintiffs sought to invalidate these provisions as facially overbroad and a prior restraint on speech.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the plaintiffs' facial First Amendment challenges and their Administrative Procedure Act claims but allowed their as-applied First Amendment claims to proceed. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that the DMCA's impact on third-party free speech interests was different from its impact on their own. The court also held that the triennial rulemaking process for exemptions did not constitute content-based censorship. The plaintiffs' as-applied claims were later dismissed after the Librarian of Congress granted an exemption for the professor's security research, and the court found that the tech inventor's proposed device would likely lead to widespread piracy.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the facial challenges. The court held that the DMCA's anticircumvention and antitrafficking provisions are not facially overbroad because they regulate conduct, not speech, and their legitimate applications, such as preventing digital piracy, far outweigh any potential unconstitutional applications. The court also rejected the argument that the triennial rulemaking process constitutes a prior restraint on speech, noting that the DMCA does not target expression and that alternative avenues for lawful access to copyrighted works remain available. View "Matthew Green v. DOJ" on Justia Law

Carol Lewis and Douglas Sargent, both diabetics and Medicare beneficiaries, sought reimbursement for continuous glucose monitors and related supplies from 2015 to 2017. After the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) denied their claims, they pursued judicial review and sought to represent a class of individuals with similar claims. The district court denied their motion for class certification, noting that most putative class members had unexhausted or untimely claims. The court concluded that neither waiver of the exhaustion requirement nor equitable tolling of the limitations period was appropriate, reducing the putative class to seventeen individuals, which was too small to meet the numerosity requirement for class certification. After the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) issued new guidance in 2022, the district court granted partial judgment in favor of Lewis and Sargent, setting aside the denials of their claims and declaring that continuous glucose monitors are durable medical equipment.Lewis and Sargent appealed the denial of class certification to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. They did not challenge the favorable merits judgment but focused solely on the class certification issue. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed their appeal for lack of constitutional standing. The court held that their desire to serve as class representatives did not create a cognizable Article III interest, as they did not allege any concrete individual injury resulting from the denial of class certification. The court emphasized that an abstract interest in representing a class is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III standing. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Lewis v. Becerra" on Justia Law

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a rule allowing certain H-4 visa holders, who are dependent spouses of H-1B visa holders, to work in the United States. Save Jobs USA challenged this rule, arguing that DHS exceeded its authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA includes provisions that grant the Secretary of Homeland Security the power to set conditions for nonimmigrants' stay in the U.S. and to establish necessary regulations. DHS relied on these provisions to justify the rule.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of DHS, citing the precedent set by the D.C. Circuit in Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. DHS (Washtech). In Washtech, the court upheld a DHS rule allowing certain foreign students to work in the U.S. based on similar INA provisions. The district court found that Save Jobs USA did not meaningfully distinguish its case from Washtech and thus ruled in favor of DHS.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the INA provisions cited by DHS indeed grant the agency the authority to issue employment-related rules for nonimmigrants. The court noted that Save Jobs USA did not effectively challenge the applicability of the Washtech precedent. Additionally, the court rejected Save Jobs USA's argument that the major questions doctrine should apply, stating that Washtech had already interpreted the relevant statutory provisions post-West Virginia v. EPA. Therefore, the appellate court upheld the district court's summary judgment in favor of DHS. View "Save Jobs USA v. DHS" on Justia Law

In this case, a private insurance company, TIG Insurance Company, sought to enforce two judgments against the Republic of Argentina. The dispute centers on whether Argentina, as the successor to a state-owned Argentine company, Caja Nacional de Ahorro y Seguro, is liable under reinsurance contracts that Caja entered into with TIG in 1979. TIG alleged that Caja failed to pay as promised under these contracts, leading to arbitral awards and subsequent judgments in TIG's favor.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially ruled in favor of Argentina, finding that Argentina's property was immune from execution under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) because it was not used for commercial activity at the time the writ would issue. The court also held that the Illinois district court lacked jurisdiction over Argentina for the 2018 judgment and that TIG needed to amend the 2001 judgment in Illinois to name Argentina before seeking enforcement in D.C. TIG appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that two FSIA exceptions—the arbitration and waiver exceptions—might apply. The court held that an agreement could be "made by" a sovereign if it legally binds that sovereign to arbitrate, even if the sovereign was not an original signatory. The court also found that implied waiver does not require evidence of subjective intent but can be based on objective actions, such as agreeing to arbitration or a choice-of-law clause. The court vacated the district court's decisions and remanded for further analysis and factfinding on these issues.The appellate court affirmed the denial of TIG's request for jurisdictional discovery and precluded TIG from advancing an alter ego theory or arguing that Argentina failed to raise its immunity in a responsive pleading. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's instructions. View "TIG Insurance Company v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

In a dispute between the Republic of Djibouti and Doraleh Container Terminal (Doraleh), Doraleh secured a $474 million arbitral award against Djibouti. Djibouti then nationalized a majority interest in Doraleh and appointed a provisional administrator, Chantal Tadoral, to manage the company. Quinn Emanuel, a law firm, sought to enforce the arbitral award in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, claiming to represent Doraleh. However, Tadoral stated she did not authorize the filing, and Djibouti requested the case be dismissed.The District Court for the District of Columbia entered judgment for Doraleh, holding that Quinn Emanuel’s authority was irrelevant or, alternatively, that Djibouti had forfeited the issue by not raising it during arbitration. Djibouti appealed, arguing that the district court erred by not determining whether Quinn Emanuel had the authority to represent Doraleh.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court. The appellate court held that Quinn Emanuel’s authority is relevant and that the issue of a lawyer’s authority can be challenged at any point in litigation. The court found that Djibouti presented substantial evidence questioning Quinn Emanuel’s authority, which required the district court to determine whether the law firm had the authority to file the suit. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court to determine Quinn Emanuel’s authority to represent Doraleh. View "Doraleh Container Terminal SA v. Republic of Djibouti" on Justia Law

The case involves People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and two animal rights advocates, Madeline Krasno and Ryan Hartkopf, who frequently commented on the National Institutes of Health (NIH) social media pages to criticize NIH’s funding of animal testing. NIH used keyword filters to automatically hide comments containing specific words like “animal,” “testing,” and “cruel,” which resulted in the appellants' comments being filtered out and not viewable to the public. The appellants argued that NIH’s policy violated the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the comment threads on NIH’s social media pages were limited public forums and upheld NIH’s speech restrictions as reasonable. The court found that the restrictions were viewpoint-neutral and reasonable in light of the forum's purpose. The appellants then appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and agreed that NIH’s comment threads are limited public forums. However, the court held that NIH’s “off-topic” restriction, as implemented through its keyword filters, was not reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum and was therefore unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The court found that the restriction lacked objective, workable standards and was inflexible and unresponsive to context, which made it unreasonable. The judgment of the district court was reversed, and summary judgment was directed in favor of the appellants. View "People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Tabak" on Justia Law