Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves Troy Sargent, who participated in the January 6, 2021, protest at the U.S. Capitol. During the protest, Sargent assaulted a U.S. Capitol Police officer and attempted to do so again after being explicitly ordered not to. He was charged with assaulting, resisting, or impeding law enforcement officers under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). Sargent pleaded guilty, and the District Court sentenced him according to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The court had to determine which of two guidelines was most appropriate for Sargent's conduct: § 2A2.2, which applies to aggravated assaults, or § 2A2.4, which applies to obstructing or impeding officers. The District Court determined § 2A2.2 was most applicable, which carries a higher base offense level than § 2A2.4.Sargent appealed, arguing that his conduct did not fall within the plain meaning of "aggravated assault" in the guideline text of § 2A2.2. He relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, which held that courts may apply Auer deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations only if the regulation is genuinely ambiguous after applying “all the standard tools of interpretation.”The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the District Court was correct to apply § 2A2.2. The court found that the plain meaning of "aggravated assault," according to the text, structure, and context of the Guidelines, unambiguously captures Sargent’s conduct. Therefore, the court did not need to address the degree of deference to afford the commentary to the Guidelines. View "USA v. Sargent" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request made by The National Security Archive ("Archive") to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the disclosure of the Perroots Memo. The memo, written by Lieutenant General Perroots in 1989, detailed events from 1983 that helped avert a nuclear crisis. The CIA produced the memo's cover letter but withheld the rest of the document, citing FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3. The Archive sued the CIA to compel disclosure of the memo.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the CIA, as the Archive conceded that the response was justified under FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3, and the CIA had not waived its right to claim the exemptions. The district court also denied the Archive's motion to amend judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, upon de novo review, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the Archive had standing to bring the case, as it had suffered a concrete injury when the CIA refused its FOIA request. However, the court rejected the Archive's arguments that the CIA had waived its right to assert the exemptions through the official acknowledgment and public domain doctrines. The court found that the CIA was not involved in the disclosure of the Perroots Memo, and therefore, the exemptions were not waived. The court also declined to consider the Archive's request to reclassify the Perroots Memo, as the Archive failed to make any substantive arguments regarding its reclassification request in its briefs. View "National Security Archive v. CIA" on Justia Law

The case involves Trenton Palmer, an experienced private pilot, who was charged by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for flying his plane at an altitude of less than 100 feet above ground level and within 500 feet of people, a house, and other structures. The FAA claimed that Palmer violated a regulation establishing minimum safe altitudes. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found Palmer guilty of the violation, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) affirmed the decision. Palmer appealed, arguing that the ALJ committed multiple prejudicial errors and that the complaint against him should have been dismissed.Previously, the ALJ had denied Palmer's motion to dismiss the FAA’s complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to give fair notice of the charges. The ALJ found that Palmer violated Sections 91.119(a), (c), and 91.13(a) of the FAA regulations. The ALJ mitigated Palmer’s suspension from 120 days to 60 days. Palmer appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board and the FAA cross-appealed the ALJ’s mitigation of Palmer’s suspension. On de novo review, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s order and reversed the ALJ’s mitigation of the Administrator’s sanction because the Administrator’s selected sanction was supported by a reasonable explanation and there were no mitigating circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the decision from the NTSB. The court found that Palmer's arguments on appeal as to the Section 91.119 violations turn on whether he proved his defense that the low flight was necessary for takeoff or landing. The court rejected Palmer's claim of inadequate notice as legally unsupported and facially implausible. The court also found no error in the ALJ’s reliance on expert witness testimony and the Board’s subsequent affirmance. The court denied Palmer’s petition for review. View "Palmer v. FAA" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Elizabeth Schacht, a staff anesthesiologist and critical care physician at a Department of Veterans Affairs hospital complex in Colorado. In 2018, she was fired due to consistent and serious problems with her patient care, professionalism, and communication. The hospital Director deemed her performance as a potential imminent threat to patient welfare. After her dismissal, Dr. Schacht appealed to a VA Disciplinary Appeals Board, which upheld her discharge following a four-day evidentiary hearing. Dr. Schacht then filed an action in federal district court, challenging the Board's decision.The district court initially granted in part and denied in part both parties' motions for summary judgment. It rejected most of Dr. Schacht's procedural claims except her contention that the Board's failure to explain why it had excluded her additional evidence was arbitrary and capricious. The court remanded the case for the Board to provide either an explanation for its evidentiary ruling or a revised decision. Upon remand, the Board explained that it had rejected Dr. Schacht's submission due to its late submission and irrelevance to the case. The district court accepted the Board's reasoning and granted summary judgment to the agency.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. It found that the Board's decision to reject Dr. Schacht's late submission was reasonable and not arbitrary. The court also held that the Board's decision to uphold Dr. Schacht's firing was not arbitrary or capricious as it adequately explained why it believed no alternative penalty would redress Dr. Schacht's unprofessional conduct. View "Schacht v. Lieberman" on Justia Law

The case involves Absolute Healthcare, operating as Curaleaf, a company that runs medical marijuana dispensaries across the United States. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that Curaleaf committed four unfair labor practices, including unlawfully firing an employee, Anissa Keane, for attempting to unionize a Curaleaf store in Gilbert, Arizona. The NLRB also ordered Curaleaf to read aloud to its Gilbert-based employees a notice describing the Board’s findings and to grant the union access to Curaleaf’s Gilbert store.The case was initially heard by an administrative law judge who found in favor of the NLRB on all four charges. The judge ordered Curaleaf to reinstate Keane with backpay, to read aloud a notice of the unfair labor practice findings to Curaleaf Gilbert employees, and to grant the union access to Curaleaf Gilbert’s facilities any time Curaleaf spoke to its employees about unionization. Curaleaf appealed to the NLRB, challenging only the unlawful-discharge finding and the notice-reading and union-access remedies. A divided three-member panel of the NLRB affirmed the administrative law judge's decision.The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court held that the NLRB's finding that Curaleaf unlawfully fired Keane was not supported by substantial evidence. The court also held that the NLRB's notice-reading and union-access remedies could not be enforced. However, the court granted the NLRB's cross-application for enforcement as to the three uncontested unfair labor practices. View "Absolute Healthcare v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The case involves David W. Noble, Jr., a candidate for president in the National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC) election, who sought to publish his campaign material in the NALC's magazine, the Postal Record. The NALC denied Noble's request, citing an internal policy that only allows political advertisements to be run in the magazine's designated election issue. Noble sued NALC, asserting that the Union was required to publish his campaign material under Section 401(c) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). The district court granted NALC's motion to dismiss the complaint, interpreting the LMRDA to only require a union to coordinate the delivery of a candidate’s standalone, already-printed campaign material to its membership, not to publish a candidate's campaign advertisements.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation of the LMRDA. The appellate court held that the term "distribute" in Section 401(c) of the LMRDA includes the publication of campaign literature in a union magazine. The court also found that the district court misapplied the reasonableness standard by focusing on the reasonableness of NALC's internal policy rather than the reasonableness of Noble's request. The court further held that requiring NALC to publish Noble's campaign material would not constitute compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of Noble's claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Noble v. National Association of Letter Carriers" on Justia Law

An investigative reporter, Jason Leopold, sought access to the written directives of the United States Capitol Police and audits and reports prepared by the Inspector General of the Capitol Police. He invoked the District Court’s mandamus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, claiming a common law right to access public documents and a statutory right under 2 U.S.C. § 1909(c)(1). The District Court dismissed these claims, holding that sovereign immunity barred the suit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, but for different reasons. The court found that Leopold failed to establish that the Capitol Police had a clear, indisputable, and ministerial duty to provide access to the records. The court also rejected Leopold's argument that the Inspector General of the Capitol Police breached his duty to publish all audits and reports that recommend corrective action under 5 U.S.C. § 404(e)(1)(C), as applied to the Inspector General of the Capitol Police under 2 U.S.C. § 1909(c)(1). The court concluded that even if this duty existed, the Inspector General was forbidden from publishing the audits and reports due to their designation as "security information" under 2 U.S.C. § 1979. The dismissal was affirmed without prejudice, allowing Leopold to refile his complaint with the requisite allegations to satisfy the mandamus standard if he so desires and if he plausibly believes that he can prove those allegations. View "Leopold v. Manger" on Justia Law

The case involves journalist Robert Schilling's attempt to obtain records related to the Committee on Oversight and Reform of the United States House of Representatives' use of outside consultants as part of a congressional investigation. Schilling sought these records under the common law right of access, alleging that the hearings were part of a series of public-private collaborations targeting political opponents of the climate policy agenda. He claimed that the requested records would show that the Committee used unpaid consulting services to prepare for the hearings, in violation of federal law and House rules.The district court dismissed Schilling's petition, ruling that the Constitution's Speech or Debate Clause barred the case. The court held that the Clause acts as an absolute jurisdictional bar to suits seeking compelled disclosure of materials related to legislative activity. Schilling appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, but on different grounds. The appellate court did not address the question of whether the Speech or Debate Clause barred Schilling's claim. Instead, it dismissed the case on the grounds of sovereign immunity. The court found that the documents Schilling sought were not "public records," and thus, there was no duty imposed on Congress to grant Schilling's request. As a result, the Larson-Dugan exception to sovereign immunity did not apply, and Schilling's claim was barred by sovereign immunity. View "Schilling v. United States House of Representatives" on Justia Law

A retired New York police officer, Thomas Webster, attended a rally convened by former President Trump on January 6, 2021, and subsequently assaulted Officer Rathbun of the Metropolitan Police Department at the Capitol. Webster was convicted of five felonies and one misdemeanor offense and was sentenced to ten years in prison. He appealed his convictions and sentence.Webster's trial took place in the District of Columbia. He had requested a change of venue, arguing that he could not get an impartial jury in the District due to its political leanings and exposure to news coverage of the January 6th events. The district court denied his motion, finding no presumption of prejudice against Webster in the District's jury pool. The court also noted that other January 6th cases had proceeded to trial in the District without any jury-bias issues. A jury subsequently found Webster guilty on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed Webster's convictions and sentence. The court rejected Webster's arguments that the jury was not impartial, that he was wrongly denied his right to effectively cross-examine Officer Rathbun, and that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury on his Section 111(b) charge. The court also found no error in the district court's application of a sentencing enhancement for Webster's use of body armor during the commission of the offense, and it rejected Webster's argument that his sentence was substantively unreasonable compared to other January 6th defendants. View "USA v. Webster" on Justia Law

The case involves Bainbridge Fund Ltd. (Bainbridge), which sought to attach property owned by the Republic of Argentina (Argentina) in partial satisfaction of a judgment entered against Argentina in 2020. The property in question, the Chancery Annex, was a building owned by Argentina in Washington, D.C. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) stipulates that the property of a foreign sovereign cannot be attached unless the sovereign waives immunity and the property is used for commercial activity in the United States. The district court denied Bainbridge’s application after finding that the property in question is not used for commercial activity.Previously, in the Southern District of New York, Bainbridge obtained a judgment against Argentina for $95,424,899.38, arising out of Argentina’s default on a bond owned by Bainbridge. The bond contained a waiver of sovereign immunity by Argentina. Bainbridge sought to attach and execute upon the Chancery Annex to satisfy the judgment in part.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Bainbridge’s application. The court found that the Chancery Annex was not “used for commercial activity” at the time of filing. The court also rejected Bainbridge's argument that Argentina had waived the “commercial activity” requirement under Section 1610(a) of the FSIA. The court held that the bond did not evince an explicit promise or intent by Argentina not to raise FSIA defenses. View "Bainbridge Fund Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law