Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Torres Advanced terminated Plaintiffs Elliott and Sickle's contracts when Elliott sought workers' compensation benefits under the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. 1651, and Sickle medically documented Elliott's claim, plaintiffs filed suit for breach of contract and common law torts. The DC Circuit held that the Act preempted Elliott's tort claims because they derived from his efforts to obtain Defense Base Act benefits. The court held, however, that the Act did not preempt Sickle's claims or Elliott's contract claim because those injuries arose independently of any claim for workers' compensation benefits. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sickle v. Torres Advanced Enterprise Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2004, the Commission found that certain of Entergy's rates were unjust and unreasonable. On a challenge by the LPSC, the DC Circuit remanded the case to the Commission because it had adequately failed to explain its reasoning in departing from its general policy of ordering refunds when consumers have paid unjust and unreasonable rates. The Commission, on remand, clarified that it actually has no general policy of ordering refunds in cases of rate design. After the Commission's correction of its characterization of its own precedent, the court found that the Commission's denial of refunds accords with its usual practice in cost allocation cases such as this one. The court also found that the Commission adequately explained its conclusion that it would be inequitable to award refunds in this case. Therefore, because the Commission did not abuse its discretion, the court denied the petition for review. View "Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FERC" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the Board's determination that it violated the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to bargain with the union. Petitioner claimed that the Board unreasonably discounted two threats that tainted the election, which the union won, and that union adherents told employees they risked deportation if they voted against the union and the union used an observer at one voting location who had recently been discharged for possession of a gun. The DC Circuit held that, given the lack of evidence connecting the gun incident to the election or to the union itself, that the Board did not abuse its substantial discretion in certifying the election results. The court also held that none of petitioner's additional objections was substantial enough to trigger its "extremely limited" scope of review. Therefore, the court denied the petition and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Equinox Holdings, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA's final rule that defined when certain hazardous materials were deemed discarded—as opposed to legitimately recycled—and therefore subject to EPA's oversight. In 2017, the DC Circuit upheld some aspects of the rule and vacated others, inviting the parties to consider briefing some of the issues. After reviewing the petitions, the court modified it's 2017 decision in three ways: (1) the court severed and affirmed EPA's removal of the spent catalyst bar from the vacated portions of the "Verified Recyler Exclusion"; (2) the court vacated Factor 4 in its entirety; and (3) the court clarified the regulatory regime that replaced the vacated Factor 4. The court denied the petitions for rehearing in all other respects. View "American Petroleum Institute v. EPA" on Justia Law

Anticipating the expiration of the fifty-year license for the Catawba-Wateree Project, Duke Energy petitioned for review of FERC's grant of a forty-year license. At issue was whether the Commission reasonably found that the measures required by the hydroelectric license it issued to Duke Energy were "moderate," warranting a forty-year license term under the Commission's precedents. The DC Circuit denied the petition for review and accorded due deference to the Commission's expertise in determining whether measures under a license were moderate or extensive and to its interpretation of its precedent and policy choices. View "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

Where a foreign broadcaster uploads copyrighted content to its website and directs that content onto a computer screen in the United States at a user's request, the broadcaster commits an actionable domestic violation of the Copyright Act. The D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court's finding, based on supportable factual findings, that TV Polska was liable for infringing Spanski's copyrights in fifty-one episodes of certain Polish-language television programs that TV Polska transmitted into the United States via its online video-on-demand system, and concluded that damages of $60,000 per episode were appropriate in light of the circumstances. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment as to both liability and damages. View "Spanski Enterprises, Inc. v. Telewizja Polska, S.A." on Justia Law

The DC Circuit denied a petition for review of the FAA's "airworthiness directive," that mandated removal of some of petitioner's engine cylinder assemblies. The court held that the FAA's conclusion that AEC63 cylinder assemblies presented a "hazardous" risk in the event of failure was supported by substantial evidence in the record. The court explained that the FAA gathered the record evidence, over a period of years, with multiple rounds of public comment, on the safety risks posed by AEC63 cylinder assemblies, and the FAA's "unsafe condition" determination was based on a proper application of the FAA 8040.4A methodology and was supported by substantial evidence in the record on cylinder assembly failures. View "Airmotive Engineering Corp. v. FAA" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit denied a petition for review of the FAA's "airworthiness directive," that mandated removal of some of petitioner's engine cylinder assemblies. The court held that the FAA's conclusion that AEC63 cylinder assemblies presented a "hazardous" risk in the event of failure was supported by substantial evidence in the record. The court explained that the FAA gathered the record evidence, over a period of years, with multiple rounds of public comment, on the safety risks posed by AEC63 cylinder assemblies, and the FAA's "unsafe condition" determination was based on a proper application of the FAA 8040.4A methodology and was supported by substantial evidence in the record on cylinder assembly failures. View "Airmotive Engineering Corp. v. FAA" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Google's motion to dismiss in an action brought by plaintiff and her company against Google for failing to remove an offensive blog post. Plaintiff alleged three state law causes of action: defamation; tortious interference with a business relationship; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court concluded that the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. 230, immunized Google from liability for the publication of third-party content. The court applied the three part test in Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014), to determine that Google had established immunity. In this case, Google qualified as an interactive computer service provider; plaintiff alleged that a third party created the offensive content on the blog; and plaintiff sought to establish that Google was liable as a publisher of the content. View "Bennett v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Google's motion to dismiss in an action brought by plaintiff and her company against Google for failing to remove an offensive blog post. Plaintiff alleged three state law causes of action: defamation; tortious interference with a business relationship; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court concluded that the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. 230, immunized Google from liability for the publication of third-party content. The court applied the three part test in Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014), to determine that Google had established immunity. In this case, Google qualified as an interactive computer service provider; plaintiff alleged that a third party created the offensive content on the blog; and plaintiff sought to establish that Google was liable as a publisher of the content. View "Bennett v. Google LLC" on Justia Law