Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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The case involves Bainbridge Fund Ltd. (Bainbridge), which sought to attach property owned by the Republic of Argentina (Argentina) in partial satisfaction of a judgment entered against Argentina in 2020. The property in question, the Chancery Annex, was a building owned by Argentina in Washington, D.C. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) stipulates that the property of a foreign sovereign cannot be attached unless the sovereign waives immunity and the property is used for commercial activity in the United States. The district court denied Bainbridge’s application after finding that the property in question is not used for commercial activity.Previously, in the Southern District of New York, Bainbridge obtained a judgment against Argentina for $95,424,899.38, arising out of Argentina’s default on a bond owned by Bainbridge. The bond contained a waiver of sovereign immunity by Argentina. Bainbridge sought to attach and execute upon the Chancery Annex to satisfy the judgment in part.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Bainbridge’s application. The court found that the Chancery Annex was not “used for commercial activity” at the time of filing. The court also rejected Bainbridge's argument that Argentina had waived the “commercial activity” requirement under Section 1610(a) of the FSIA. The court held that the bond did not evince an explicit promise or intent by Argentina not to raise FSIA defenses. View "Bainbridge Fund Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law

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The case involves Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation and United Therapeutics Corporation, both drug manufacturers, and the Health Resources and Service Administration (HRSA). The dispute centers around Section 340B of the Public Health Service Act, which mandates drug manufacturers to sell certain drugs at discounted prices to select healthcare providers. These providers often contract with outside pharmacies for distribution. The manufacturers argued that these partnerships have left the Section 340B program vulnerable to abuse, leading them to impose their own contractual terms on providers, such as limits on the number of pharmacies to which they will make shipments. The government contended that these restrictions violate the statute.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The district court ruled that Section 340B does not prohibit manufacturers from limiting the distribution of discounted drugs by contract.The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court agreed with the district court's ruling, stating that Section 340B does not categorically prohibit manufacturers from imposing conditions on the distribution of covered drugs to covered entities. The court further held that the conditions at issue in this case do not violate Section 340B on their face. The court did not rule out the possibility that other, more onerous conditions might violate the statute or that these conditions may violate Section 340B as applied in particular circumstances. The court affirmed the district court's decision to set aside the enforcement letters under review, while reserving the possibility of future enforcement under theories of liability narrower than the one pressed here. View "Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation v. Johnson" on Justia Law

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Eghbal Saffarinia, a former high-ranking official in the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Office of the Inspector General (HUD-OIG), was required by federal law to file annual financial disclosure forms detailing most of his financial liabilities over $10,000. One of Saffarinia’s responsibilities was the allocation of HUD-OIG’s information technology contracts. An investigation revealed that Saffarinia had repeatedly falsified his financial disclosure forms and failed to disclose financial liabilities over $10,000. The investigation also revealed that one of the persons from whom Saffarinia had borrowed money was the owner of an IT company that had been awarded HUD-OIG IT contracts during the time when Saffarinia had near-complete power over the agency operation.Saffarinia was indicted on seven counts, including three counts of obstruction of justice. A jury convicted Saffarinia on all seven counts, and the District Court sentenced him to a year and a day in federal prison, followed by one year of supervised release. Saffarinia appealed his conviction, arguing that the law under which he was convicted did not extend to alleged obstruction of an agency’s review of financial disclosure forms because the review of these forms is insufficiently formal to fall within the law’s ambit. He also argued that the evidence presented at trial diverged from the charges contained in the indictment, resulting in either the constructive amendment of the indictment against him or, in the alternative, a prejudicial variance. Finally, Saffarinia challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found no basis to overturn Saffarinia’s conviction. The court held that the law under which Saffarinia was convicted was intended to capture the sorts of activity with which Saffarinia was charged. The court also found that the government neither constructively amended Saffarinia’s indictment nor prejudicially varied the charges against him. Finally, the court found that the evidence presented at Saffarinia’s trial was sufficient to support his conviction. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of the District Court. View "USA v. Saffarinia" on Justia Law

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The case involves a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request by American Oversight seeking communications between the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress regarding healthcare reform. The agencies invoked Exemption 5 of the FOIA to withhold certain communications, arguing that they were "intra-agency" communications. The district court sided with the agencies, holding that the communications were protected from disclosure under Exemption 5.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The court held that the communications between the agencies and Congress were not "intra-agency" communications and therefore not protected by Exemption 5. The court reasoned that under the "consultant corollary" to Exemption 5, the term "intra-agency" encompasses nearly all documents used by an agency in its deliberative process, even if the author or recipient is not an employee of that same agency. However, the court concluded that agencies may not invoke Exemption 5 to withhold agency records generated by a government consultant with its own stake in the outcome of the agency’s decision-making process.The court also found that HHS's search for responsive records was inadequate because it failed to include obvious alternative terms for the subject matter of American Oversight’s request. The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to HHS and OMB on the applicability of Exemption 5 to the records at issue and to HHS on the adequacy of its search. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "American Oversight v. HHS" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Government of Romania's appeal against three judgments that confirmed an international arbitral award. The dispute originated from Romania's adoption of tax incentives to encourage investment in certain economically "disfavored" regions of the country. The Micula brothers and associated entities built food production facilities in Romania relying on these incentives. However, Romania repealed most of the tax incentives in 2005 in preparation to join the EU, leading the Miculas to file for arbitration in 2005.The district court confirmed the award in 2019 and entered judgment for $356,439,727, net of payments made and with interest. Romania challenged the subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the arbitration clause in the Sweden-Romania BIT was void as of Romania’s 2007 accession because EU law prohibits intra-EU agreements to arbitrate EU law disputes between a member state and the citizens of another member state. The district court ruled EU law was inapplicable because the parties’ dispute predated Romania’s EU membership and the award did not “relate to the interpretation or application of EU law.”In 2022, Romania sought relief from the 2019 Confirmation, and ensuing sanctions, arguing that two decisions of the EU’s highest court in 2022 held that “the agreement to arbitrate in the [Sweden-Romania] BIT was void the moment that Romania entered the EU.” The district court denied the motion, concluding that the CJEU Decisions did not hold Romania’s accession retroactively voided its pre-EU consent to arbitrate.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Romania's Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. The court held that the district court's jurisdictional analysis was not premised on the "interpretation and application of EU law." Rather, the district court independently found the requisite "jurisdictional fact" under the arbitration exception of an agreement to arbitrate with the Miculas. The court also found that the 2022 CJEU decisions did not support the interpretation that Romania’s 2007 accession to the EU retroactively rendered the preexisting agreement to arbitrate with Swedish investors “void ab initio.” View "Micula v. Government of Romania" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Jibril family, who alleged that they were wrongfully placed on the U.S. Government’s terrorist watchlist, known as the "Selectee List." The family claimed that this placement resulted in extensive and intrusive security screenings and significant delays during their domestic and international travels. They filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and other federal officials, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the Administrative Procedure Act.The District Court initially dismissed the case for lack of standing, as the Government neither confirmed nor denied the Jibrils’ Selectee List status. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision in part, holding that the Jibrils had plausibly alleged that they were on a terrorist watchlist and faced imminent risk of undue Government actions sufficient to support most of their claims for prospective relief.On remand, the Government filed a renewed motion to dismiss, this time submitting an ex parte declaration to the District Court for in camera review. Based on this submission, the District Court again dismissed the case, holding that the Jibrils lacked standing to pursue their complaint for prospective relief.The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, agreeing that the Jibrils lacked standing to seek forward-looking relief. The court also held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the Government’s ex parte submission to address matters implicating national security concerns. Finally, the court found no error in the District Court’s denial of the Jibrils’ motion for leave to amend their complaint. View "Jibril v. Mayorkas" on Justia Law

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The case involves Anthony Perry, a former employee of the Census Bureau, who retired under a settlement agreement after the Bureau initiated procedures to terminate him. Perry filed a "mixed case" appeal before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), alleging violations of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) and various federal anti-discrimination laws. The MSPB dismissed the case, stating it lacked jurisdiction over voluntary retirement decisions. Perry appealed to the district court, which upheld the MSPB's decision and granted summary judgment in favor of the government.Perry then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that the district court erred by not considering his discrimination claims de novo and by affirming the MSPB's dismissal of his case for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals partially reversed the district court's decision, ruling that the district court should have allowed Perry to litigate the merits of his discrimination claims as required by statute. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's conclusion that the MSPB correctly dismissed Perry's mixed case for lack of jurisdiction. View "Perry v. Raimondo" on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute over the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) implementation of the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standards Program. The program requires the petroleum industry to introduce increasing volumes of renewable fuel into the nation's transportation fuel supply each year. However, Congress overestimated the speed at which domestic production of renewable fuel could expand, leading the EPA to reduce the statutorily required renewable fuel requirements annually.The case was brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by two sets of petitioners. The first set, the Biofuel Petitioners, produce cellulosic biofuels and argue that the EPA's standards are set too low. The second set, the Refiner Petitioners, are fossil fuel refiners and retailers subject to the volume requirements and contend that the standards are too high.The court held that the EPA complied with the law and reasonably exercised its discretion in setting the renewable fuel requirements for the years 2020, 2021, and 2022. The court therefore denied the petitions for review. The court found that the EPA had the statutory authority to impose a supplemental volume for 2022 to make up for volume that should have been satisfied in 2016. The court also concluded that the EPA's new formula for calculating the annual percentage standards was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Sinclair Wyoming Refining Company LLC v. EPA" on Justia Law

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The case involves Maria Esparraguera, a career appointee in the Senior Executive Service (SES), who was removed from her position by the Department of the Army. Esparraguera claimed that her constitutional due process rights were violated by the Army. The district court dismissed her suit, stating that she failed to show that the removal implicated a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause.Previously, the district court had dismissed Esparraguera’s due process claim, finding that she had no constitutionally protected property interest in her SES status. The court did not address whether the process Esparraguera received (or the absence thereof) complied with the Due Process Clause. Esparraguera appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that Esparraguera had a protected property interest in her SES status. The court reasoned that the statutory and regulatory provisions applicable to her case gave Esparraguera a property interest in her SES status. The court also concluded that the government was required to provide her, at a minimum, some form of meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard before removing her from the SES. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Esparraguera v. Department of the Army" on Justia Law

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In September 2021, the House Select Committee investigating the January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol issued a subpoena to Stephen Bannon, a former advisor to President Donald Trump, to testify and provide documents. Bannon did not comply with the subpoena, leading to his conviction for contempt of Congress under 2 U.S.C. § 192, which criminalizes willfully failing to respond to a congressional subpoena. Bannon appealed his conviction, arguing that "willfully" should be interpreted to require bad faith and that his noncompliance was justified because his lawyer advised him not to respond to the subpoena.The District Court had previously rejected Bannon's argument, holding that "willfully" in Section 192 only requires that the defendant deliberately and intentionally refused to comply with a congressional subpoena. The court also dismissed Bannon's claim that his noncompliance was authorized by government officials and that the Select Committee's subpoena was invalid. Bannon was found guilty on both counts and sentenced to four months' incarceration for each count to run concurrently, with a $6,500 fine.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Bannon's interpretation of "willfully" was incorrect and that his "advice of counsel" defense was not a valid defense under Section 192. The court also rejected Bannon's arguments that his conduct was authorized by government officials and that the Select Committee's subpoena was invalid. The court concluded that Bannon's refusal to comply with the subpoena was a deliberate and intentional violation of the contempt of Congress statute, and his conviction was therefore affirmed. View "United States v. Bannon" on Justia Law