Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1935, Yueh-Lan married Y.C., who founded the Formosa Plastics Group in 1954. In 2008, Forbes magazine ranked Y.C. as the 178th wealthiest person in the world. Y.C. remained married to Yueh-Lan, but had children with other women. Yueh-Lan helped to rear at least one of those children, Winston. In 2005, allegedly to reduce Yueh-Lan’s share of the marital estate, Y.C. made transfers, including to the New Mighty U.S. Trust. Y.C. died in 2008. In 2010, Winston—a citizen of Taiwan, allegedly acting as Yueh-Lan’s attorney-in-fact—sued New Mighty, its trustee, and one of New Mighty’s beneficiaries. Ruling on a motion to dismiss, the district court concluded that a traditional trust is an artificial entity that “assumes the citizenship of all of its ‘members’ for purposes of diversity jurisdiction” under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). Reasoning that New Mighty’s “members” included its beneficiaries, the court instructed the defendants to produce a list of all beneficiaries and their citizenship. The list included entities that were citizens of the British Virgin Islands, so that complete diversity did not exist. After the notice of appeal was filed, Yueh-Lan died. Winston and her Taiwanese executors moved to substitute the executors as Yueh-Lan’s personal representative. The D.C. Circuit reversed the dismissal and granted the motion to substitute, citing the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision, Americold Realty Trust, stating that a “traditional trust” carries the citizenship of its trustees. View "Wang v. New Mighty U.S. Trust," on Justia Law

In 1973, two Kalamazoo, Michigan hospitals formed a consortium to manage their health education programs and to train interns and residents. In the 1980s, they joined Michigan State University to form the Michigan State University Kalamazoo Center for Medical Studies (KCMS). KCMS administered graduate medical programs for residency programs for the hospitals. The hospitals agreed to incur “joint and equal responsibility for providing [KCMS] with sufficient financing to carry out its programs as negotiated on a yearly basis.” KCMS also received patient-care revenue, support from Michigan State University, and funds from contracts and grants. The hospitals sought reimbursement on their Medicare cost reports (42 U.S.C. 1395ww(h)) during fiscal years 2000–2004 for costs incurred for residents’ training at KCMS’s nonhospital clinics. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services found that the hospitals failed to show they incurred all or substantially all of the costs of their residency programs and that they failed to comply with a requirement of a written agreement detailing the financing of their offsite programs. The district court and D.C. Circuit affirmed the denials of reimbursement, rejecting an argument that the “written agreement” requirement was satisfied by a collection of documents executed over the years. None of the documents met the regulatory criteria. View "Borgess Medical Center v. Burwell" on Justia Law

In 2013, Winston & Strawn filed a lawsuit against McLean, and, weeks later, moved for summary judgment. The district court informed McLean that he was required to respond by August 18, 2014, and advised him that if he did not the court might treat the motion as conceded. He emailed his response to Winston & Strawn and mailed it to the court on August 18, but it did not arrive until August 20. On August 19, the court granted the motion, relying solely on Local Rule 7(b), under which the court has discretion to treat a motion “as conceded” if the nonmoving party fails to timely file an opposition. The court denied reconsideration. The D.C. Circuit reversed. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 56(a)), a motion for summary judgment cannot be “conceded” for want of opposition. “The burden is always on the movant to demonstrate why summary judgment is warranted.” There is nothing to indicate that the district court considered whether Winston’s assertions warranted judgment under Rule 56. A court must always engage in the analysis required by Rule 56 before acting on a motion for summary judgment. View "Winston & Strawn, LLP v. James P. McLean, Jr." on Justia Law

Smith sued the United States and Capitol Officers Rogers and Anyaso, alleging that while working for a federal agency on November 5, 2009, he drove officials to Capitol Hill, and, at an attended barricade, Rogers, in uniform, “began to chastise and yell at him for dropping off his passengers at that location.” Smith made a U-turn and left the area. Rogers radioed other officers, allegedly stating that Smith’s car struck Rogers’s leg. Minutes later, Anyaso arrested Smith for assault with a deadly weapon and assault on a police officer. Charges were dismissed months later. The defense provided a video recording (no audio) of the incident and an audio recording of Rogers’ radio transmission, which had been provided to Smith while his criminal case was pending. On the audio recording, Rogers states that Smith “intentionally almost struck this officer.” The video showed aggressive driving by Smith. The D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, upholding a determination that no material facts were in dispute and the court’s refusal to allow Smith to conduct discovery before its ruling. The officers had probable cause to arrest Smith. A “reasonable officer” would have felt threatened by the proximity of the fast-moving vehicle. The existence of probable cause foreclosed Smith’s claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, Fourth Amendment violations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. View "Smith v. United States" on Justia Law

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), intended “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education,” 20 U.S.C. 1400(d)(1)(A), permits parents and legal guardians to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs if they prevail in certain statutorily prescribed proceedings. In calculating a fee award, courts consider the “number of hours reasonably expended in litigation” and the “reasonable hourly rate,” determined in part by reference to the prevailing market rate for attorneys’ services. The plaintiffs, having prevailed in IDEA proceedings, sought attorneys’ fees and costs related to those proceedings and an award of “fees-on-fees” for work done in connection with their pursuit of fees for the IDEA proceedings. The district court granted both requests, but did not award the full amounts requested. The D.C. Circuit reversed in part, agreeing that the district court erred in excluding certain hours spent at “settlement conferences.” The court upheld determinations that the IDEA matters were not “complex federal litigation” to which the Laffey Matrix should apply and to apply the same rate to the initial fee and fees-on-fees awards. Plaintiffs forfeited claims raised for the first time on appeal: that their affidavits independently demonstrated a prevailing IDEA market rate that aligns with the Laffey Matrix and that the rates awarded were insufficient to attract competent counsel. View "Reed v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Kennedy, a D.C. fireman, had a beard. Department policy required him to shave it. Because of a medical condition, he could not do so without discomfort and infection. The Department refused to accommodate his condition. Kennedy sued, alleging 28 counts, including disability discrimination, arguing that his condition was a “disability” as defined by the Americans With Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008. The district court dismissed eight counts resting on that definition. Kennedy appealed that order on an interlocutory basis under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b), which provides an appellate court with jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order “if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order.” Kennedy filed a notice of appeal in the district court two days after the court denied reconsideration but waited several weeks before filing his application in the D.C. Circuit. The Circuit Court dismissed, rejecting Kennedy’s argument that the notice of appeal and the order denying reconsideration, both of which were transmitted to the Circuit Court within the statutory period, served the same purpose as an application. Even assuming the “functional equivalent” of an application satisfies section 1292(b) and Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the notice and order here did not meet that description. View "Kennedy v. Bowser" on Justia Law

The Service has long allowed American hunters who shoot Tanzanian elephants to repatriate their trophies because, according to the Service, doing so “would not be detrimental to the survival of the species.” However, in 2014, the Service changed course and indefinitely suspended issuance of import permits due in part to a “significant decline in Tanzania’s elephant population.” Two organizations representing hunters challenged the suspension in district court as substantively and procedurally flawed. The district court dismissed for lack of final agency action and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded that the de facto permit denial gives Safari Club Article III standing. The court also rejected the Service's claims of mootness and concluded that the relief Safari Club seeks extends well beyond the two 2014 findings. Because Safari Club is unable to fully litigate a challenge to the findings underlying the suspension without taking on risk that the permitting scheme is designed to avoid, the controversy evades review. Finally, the court rejected the Service's arguments regarding finality and exhaustion. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Safari Club International v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Appellant challenged the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 2253(a) to consider the merits of the appeal because the district court issued a certificate of appealability as to appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in cross-examining a witness. On the merits, the court concluded that appellant failed to show a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different without the allegedly deficient open-ended questioning by defense counsel on cross-examination. Therefore, the court rejected appellant's argument and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gooch, Jr." on Justia Law

The Postal Service contends that the Commission’s action denying its parcel reclassification request was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), for failing to acknowledge, much less explain, its decision to depart from precedent granting similar requests. The court found, in the challenged order, that the Commission neither acknowledged a change in course nor explained it. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. View "USPS v. PRC" on Justia Law

Kelly Foster filed suit against Appellees under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a), to enforce her rights under short-term and long-term disability benefit plans that had been adopted by her employer, Sun Trust Bank. The district court granted summary judgment to Appellees and dismissed Foster's complaint. The district court then denied Foster's motion for reconsideration. The court affirmed the district court's finding that the short-term disability plan is an ERISA-exempt “payroll practice” under Department of Labor regulations; held that the district court appropriately applied a deferential standard of review to the administrator’s denial of benefits under the long-term disability plan because the terms of the plan unambiguously granted the administrator, and the administrator alone, the power to construe critical terms of the plan and to decide an employee’s eligibility for benefits; and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Foster's motion for reconsideration. View "Foster v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc." on Justia Law