Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Spectrum Act, Pub. L. No. 112-96, 126 Stat. 156, responds to the rapidly growing demand for mobile broadband services by granting the FEC authority to reallocate a portion of the licensed airwaves from television broadcasters to mobile broadband providers. The Act contemplates the repurposing of licensed spectrum through a multi-step auction process. The statutory framework governing the repacking process is set out in 47 U.S.C. 1452. This case involves a challenge to the Commission’s implementation of the Spectrum Act brought by a particular species of broadcasters - low-power television (LPTV) stations. Determining that it has jurisdiction, the court rejected petitioners’ contention that the terms of section 1452(b)(5) unambiguously compel protecting LPTV stations from displacement in the repacking process called for by the Act. Furthermore, the court concluded that the Commission’s treatment of LPTV stations in the challenged orders rests on a reasonable understanding of subsection (b)(5) for purposes of Chevron step two, and the court rejected petitioners’ arbitrary-and-capricious arguments to the same effect. Finally, the court rejected petitioners' procedural challenge. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Mako Commc'n v. FCC" on Justia Law

Petitioner is the alleged mastermind of the bombings of the U.S.S. Cole and the French supertanker the M/V Limburg, as well as the attempted bombing of the U.S.S. The Sullivans. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus to dissolve the military commission convened to try him and appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to preliminarily enjoin that trial. The court concluded that the district court did not err as a matter of law by extending the abstention principles established in Schlesinger v. Councilman, which dealt with courts-martial, to petitioner's pretrial challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of a military commission. The court also concluded that the district court's ultimate decision to abstain based on the unique circumstances to petitioner's case was appropriate. Because petitioner cannot show that his conduct clearly and indisputably took place outside the context of hostilities, the court denied his petition for mandamus relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In Re: Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Al-Nashir" on Justia Law

This case concerns the Trans Alaska Pipeline System. Oil companies depositing crude oil extracted from their fields on the North Slope into the pipeline receive the same proportion of oil they initially contributed at the southern end of the pipeline at Valdez, but the companies do not receive the same quality of oil because the oil has been commingled in the pipeline. FERC oversees a mechanism for calibrating payments known as the Quality Bank, which assigns each company’s crude oil a value based on the quality of its components or "cuts." At issue is the formula used to value one of these cuts, called Resid. The court concluded that the Commission failed to respond meaningfully to evidence presented by Petro Star, rendering its decision arbitrary and capricious, and that Petro Star’s purported failure to provide a viable methodology does not provide an independent ground for the Commission’s decision. Therefore, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for the Commission to reconsider the methodology used to value Resid or to provide a more reasoned explanation for its approach. The court also found that Alaska lacks standing to intervene. View "Petro Star Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against individual FBI agents and a Metropolitan Police Department detective, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims arising out of a search of his home and his coinciding arrest. The court affirmed the district court's holding that defendants have qualified immunity for the timing of the search where it was not clearly established in Maryland at the time that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the nighttime execution of a daytime-only warrant. However, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims for unlawful seizure and no-knock entry. The court concluded that, taking plaintiff's allegations as true for the purpose of passing upon a motion to dismiss, plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that defendants violated the Fourth Amendment; the statute of limitations has not yet begun on plaintiff's section 1983 and Bivens claims; and the court rejected defendants' claims that plaintiff is collaterally estopped from litigating the legality of the search and seizure and that Heck v. Humphrey barred plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Jones v. Kirchner" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from an ongoing labor dispute between OHL and the Union. After OHL refused to bargain with the Union, the Board determined that OHL violated the National Labor Relations Act, 158(a)(3), (a)(1). OHL petitioned for review. The court concluded that the Board did not err in affirming and adopting the ALJ’s articulation of the controlling legal standard; substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings that OHL employee Jennifer Smith never used the alleged racial slur at issue and that it was unreasonable for OHL to believe that she did; and substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that OHL’s proffered reasons for firing OHL employee Carolyn Jones were pretextual. The court concluded that OHL's remaining arguments lack merit. Accordingly, the court denied OHL's petitions for review and granted the Board's cross-applications for enforcement. View "Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC v. NLRB" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the United States challenges its liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-75, for a portion of the cost of cleaning up hazardous substances at three California facilities owned by Lockheed. The government acknowledges its own share of CERCLA liability and also that it agreed to reimburse Lockheed’s share via overhead charges on unrelated contracts. At issue is whether the government has a valid claim that the particular mechanism by which the United States will pay its share of the costs of environmental remediation under CERCLA interacts with the parties’ agreed-upon contract-based reimbursement method in a way that impermissibly requires the government to make double payment. The court concluded that the district court’s CERCLA judgment did not create any double recovery and the court rejected the government's arguments to the contrary; the government's protest that the crediting mechanism does not help, but instead harms it further, is unavailing; even assuming the court was in a position to review the equities of the parties’ own choice in their Billing Agreement to resort to the indirect-cost billing and crediting mechanism and their apparent decision to use that mechanism for payment and crediting of future costs, the government has not clearly identified how the crediting mechanism is a source of inequity; and, at this juncture, on appeal from the district court’s judgment imposing no liability on the government for past costs, section 114(b) simply is not implicated. Because the all of the government's claims fail, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellants, three federal prisoners who spent several years housed in specially designated Communication Management Units (CMUs), filed suit contending that their designation to CMUs violated their due process rights. One appellant also alleges his continued CMU placement was in retaliation for protected speech in violation of the First Amendment. Appellants seek damages under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e, for injuries arising out of their confinement in CMUs. The district court granted summary judgment for the government. The court found that the duration and atypicality of CMU designation sufficient to give rise to a liberty interest and thus reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether appellants were afforded sufficient process. The court affirmed the judgment as to the retaliation claim because appellant cannot show that his First Amendment rights were violated. The court held that appellants have alleged harms qualifying for compensation under the PLRA because their injuries were neither mental nor emotional in nature and so do not require a showing of physical injury. Nonetheless, the court upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment because the prison official was entitled to qualified immunity. View "Aref v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The Board promulgated the Health Care Rule in 1989, which established eight standardized bargaining units for acute-care hospitals. This case concerns the application of the Health Care Rule on a retrospective basis - in particular, to preexisting bargaining units that did not conform to the eight standardized units set forth in the Rule. The Rule prescribes that, if there is a petition to represent an additional unit in a hospital with preexisting nonconforming units, the Board may find the additional unit appropriate only if it comports, to the extent practicable, with one of the eight standardized units. The Board understands that aspect of the Rule to apply as follows: in any representation election that would create a new bargaining unit, the new unit must include all unrepresented employees who would be grouped together in one of the Rule’s standardized units. At issue in this case is whether the same understanding of the Rule governs an election to add unrepresented employees to a preexisting bargaining unit, as opposed to an election to create a new bargaining unit. In other words, when a union seeks to add unrepresented employees to a preexisting nonconforming unit, must the unit embrace all (and not just some) of the unrepresented employees who would fit within the same standardized unit in the Rule? The Board answered in the negative and reasoned that the addition of employees to an already existing unit - the creation of a new unit - necessarily keeps the number of bargaining units constant. Petitioner, an acute-care facility, argues that the Board’s distinction between preexisting units and new units under the Rule is arbitrary and incompatible with the Board’s own precedent. The court rejected petitioner's challenge to the Board’s interpretation and application of its own regulation. Therefore, the court upheld the Board’s understanding that the Rule is inapplicable in the context of elections to add employees to a preexisting unit. The court denied the petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Rush Univ. Med. Ctr. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

After the United States detained Mohammed Jawad at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base for more than six years until he was released and returned to his native Afghanistan, Jawad filed suit alleging that they subjected him to torture while he was in their custody. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Jawad’s complaint because the federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear his claims. Section 7(a) of the Military Commissions Act, 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(2), strips federal courts of jurisdiction to hear most claims against the United States arising out of the detention of aliens like Jawad captured during the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. The court rejected Jawad's reasons why the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) finding that he was an "enemy combatant" does not satisfy the section 7(a) requirements. The court also rejected Jawad's remaining claims. View "Jawad v. Gates" on Justia Law

Care One petitioned for review of the Board's determination that Care One committed a series of unfair labor practices in an effort to prevent the certification of a union at its nursing home and rehabilitation facility in Morristown, New Jersey. The Board held that Care One had interfered with employees’ protected activity and discriminated against union-eligible employees by instituting a system-wide, discretionary benefits increase shortly before a scheduled representation election and denying the increase to the union-eligible employees. The Board also held that the company unlawfully interfered with its employees’ right to organize by distributing to employees eligible to vote in the upcoming election a threatening leaflet associating unionization with job loss; presenting a slideshow depicting employees, without their consent, as if they supported the Company’s antiunion campaign; and issuing a post-election memorandum reiterating the company’s workplace violence policy, which the Board concluded could reasonably be read in context to threaten reprisal for protected union activity. The court concluded that the Board's conclusions are supported by substantial evidence and denied Care One's petition for review, affirming the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Care One at Madison Avenue v. NLRB" on Justia Law