Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dr. Jennifer Seed, a former employee of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), filed a lawsuit against the EPA and the United States, alleging age discrimination. Seed claimed that she was involuntarily demoted to a junior position as older managers were replaced with younger employees. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the EPA, concluding that Seed had not provided sufficient evidence to support her claim of age discrimination.The district court's decision was based on its finding that Seed had not provided direct evidence of discriminatory intent that would entitle her to a trial, nor had she provided indirect evidence that would give rise to an inference of discrimination. The court also found that Seed had not shown that she was treated less favorably than younger employees after her reassignment or that her treatment was based on her age.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed Seed's appeal, ruling that the court lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of her reassignment claims because she lacked standing under Article III of the United States Constitution. The court found that Seed had not demonstrated that a favorable court decision would likely redress her claimed injuries. The court therefore remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate the grant of summary judgment and to dismiss the reassignment claim for lack of standing. View "Seed v. EPA" on Justia Law

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers planned to dredge San Juan Harbor to facilitate the movement of large ships. The Corps published an Environmental Assessment, concluding that the project would not significantly impact the environment. The National Marine Fisheries Service also determined that the project was not likely to adversely affect certain threatened and endangered species, including seven types of coral. Three environmental groups sued the agencies, asserting that they had failed to adequately consider the project’s environmental toll. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant agencies.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the Corps and the Service did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in carrying out their responsibilities to evaluate environmental concerns. The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the Corps failed to adequately consider the breadth of the project’s impacts, erred in analyzing how the project would affect minority and low-income communities, and failed to use the best available science in assessing the project’s detrimental effect on corals. The court also found that the Corps's decision not to translate all materials into Spanish and not to extend the comment period for the Environmental Assessment when Hurricanes Irma and Maria struck Puerto Rico was not arbitrary or capricious. View "El Puente v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Alon Farhy, a U.S. permanent resident who failed to report his ownership of Belizean corporations to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), violating Section 6038(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. Farhy acknowledged his violation and the resulting penalties of nearly $500,000 under Section 6038(b). However, he disputed the IRS's method of collecting the penalties, arguing that the IRS lacked statutory authority to assess and administratively collect Section 6038(b) penalties. Instead, he contended that the government must sue him in federal district court to collect what he owes under Section 6038(b).The Tax Court agreed with Farhy, concluding that the Code does not empower the IRS to assess and administratively collect Section 6038(b) penalties. The court held that the IRS could only collect Section 6038(b) penalties through a civil suit filed by the U.S. Department of Justice, not through the administrative collection methods that it had used for over forty years.The case was then brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court disagreed with the Tax Court's interpretation. It held that the text, structure, and function of Section 6038 demonstrate that Congress authorized the assessment of penalties imposed under subsection (b). The court reversed the Tax Court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to enter a decision in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. View "Farhy v. Cmsnr. IRS" on Justia Law

A small business, Concert Investor LLC, applied for a Shuttered Venue Operators Grant from the Small Business Administration (SBA) after its revenue fell 94% due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The company, which helps mount concert tours for performing artists, applied for a grant of nearly $5 million, or 44.6% of its 2019 revenue. Concert Investor asserted eligibility for a Grant as a “live performing arts organization operator,” claiming that it “produces” live music concerts. However, the SBA denied the application, stating that Concert Investor did not meet the principal business activity standard for the entity type under which it had applied.Concert Investor appealed the SBA's decision in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under the Administrative Procedure Act. The SBA rescinded its denial during the lawsuit, but later issued a final denial, stating that Concert Investor did not create, perform, or present live performances, nor did it organize or host live concerts. The district court denied Concert Investor’s motion for summary judgment and granted the SBA’s, agreeing with the SBA that substantial evidence showed that Concert Investor was not a producer.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment order de novo and vacated the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the SBA. The court found that the SBA's definition of a "producer" was too narrow and inconsistent with the statutory language. The court also found that the SBA failed to consider relevant record evidence supporting Concert Investor’s eligibility for a Grant. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Concert Investor, LLC v. Small Business Administration" on Justia Law

The case revolves around James Hutchings, Jr., who was convicted of conspiracy to unlawfully traffic and transport firearms. The conviction was based on evidence obtained from Hutchings's iPhone, which was seized during the arrest of suspected firearms and narcotics trafficker Linwood Thorne. The phone was found in Thorne's apartment, and a separate warrant was obtained to search the phone based on its association with Thorne. It was only after the search began that the agents realized the phone belonged to Hutchings.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, where Hutchings moved to suppress the evidence from his phone, arguing that the search was unsupported by the warrant because the probable cause finding depended on the phone's association with Thorne. The district court denied Hutchings's motion, stating that the phone was indeed associated with Thorne, regardless of its ownership. Hutchings was found guilty and sentenced to 60 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Hutchings argued that the officers reviewing the report were required to discontinue their search after seeing the notation on its first page that the phone was "James's iPhone." The court disagreed, stating that the validity of the warrant did not depend on who owned the phones, but on their association with Thorne. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, stating that the label "James's iPhone" did not contradict the facts that supported the warrant application. View "USA v. Hutchings" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) certification of the Evangeline Pass Expansion Project, a series of expanded pipelines, compression facilities, and meter stations in the Southeastern United States. Environmental groups, including the Sierra Club and Healthy Gulf, challenged the certification, alleging that FERC improperly applied the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Additionally, the Alabama Municipal Distributors Group, a municipal customer of Southern Natural Gas Company, argued that a new lease from Southern to Tennessee Gas may mean more profits for Southern, so Alabama Municipal should receive a portion of those profits.Prior to reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, FERC had unanimously issued a Certificate Order to Tennessee Gas and Southern, denying all objections. FERC reaffirmed its determination on rehearing. The Sierra Club and Alabama Municipal timely petitioned for review.The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld FERC's certification of the Evangeline Pass Expansion Project. The court found that FERC's certification was reasonable and reasonably explained, as was its decision to deny a windfall to a pipeline owner's existing customers. The court rejected the Sierra Club's arguments that FERC failed to consider the full scope of environmental effects of the project, erred by failing to account for the environmental impact of two ongoing authorizations to export gas, and was required to use the "social cost of carbon" tool. The court also rejected Alabama Municipal's argument that it should receive a future credit on the existing rates it pays. The court concluded that all of FERC's decisions in this case were reasonable and reasonably explained, and therefore denied the petitions for review. View "Alabama Municipal Distributors Group v. FERC" on Justia Law

In 2020, seven victims of a 2016 terrorist bombing in Afghanistan obtained multi-million-dollar default judgments against the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the Haqqani Network. Following the Taliban’s 2021 takeover of Afghanistan, the victims, suing as John Doe plaintiffs, sought to attach assets held by the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (commonly known as the “World Bank”). The plaintiffs argued that these assets belonged to the Afghan government or the central bank of Afghanistan, and that the Taliban had become the de facto Afghan government and the Afghan central bank its “instrumentality.”The district court granted the World Bank’s and Fund’s motions to quash the plaintiffs' writs of execution. The court found the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) inapplicable in this case. It expressed doubt that the funds the plaintiffs sought to recover belonged to Afghanistan, and it could not recognize an ownership claim by the Taliban to Afghan assets since the United States had not recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The plaintiffs failed to show that the assets at issue fell under the TRIA, and so they had not shown that an exception to the Fund and the World Bank’s immunity applied. On that basis, the district court found that it lacked jurisdiction in the case and granted the motions to quash.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the TRIA does not abrogate the World Bank’s and Fund’s jurisdictional immunity under the International Organizations Immunities Act and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The court concluded that the TRIA applies only to foreign states and international organizations once jurisdiction has been established over them. Because the TRIA leaves the World Bank’s and Fund’s jurisdictional immunity intact, the district court could not entertain the plaintiffs' garnishment action. View "John Does 1-7 v. Taliban" on Justia Law

In 2002, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) advertised job openings with a promotion potential to grade thirteen, while existing employees in comparable positions could only be promoted to grade twelve. The American Federation of Government Employees, National Council of HUD Locals Council 222, AFL-CIO, representing the existing employees, filed a grievance arguing that this violated their collective bargaining agreement with HUD. The grievance proceeded to arbitration.The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) initially declined to resolve the jurisdictional issue of whether the grievance involved classification, which is generally non-arbitrable, or reassignment, which could be resolved in arbitration. The arbitrator determined that the grievance was arbitrable and found that HUD had violated the collective bargaining agreement. The FLRA agreed with HUD's exceptions that the arbitrator's remedy required reclassification and therefore violated the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS). The FLRA vacated the arbitrator’s remedial award and remanded for an alternative remedy.In 2018, the FLRA held that the grievance concerned classification and that the arbitrator had always lacked jurisdiction over the grievance. The FLRA vacated all of the arbitrator’s pronouncements and its own prior decisions. The union then filed a complaint in district court claiming that the FLRA’s decision was “ultra vires.” The district court rejected the union’s Administrative Procedure Act claim but denied the FLRA’s motion to dismiss the entire complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court later granted the union’s motion for summary judgment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the FLRA's decision. The court found that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) clearly precluded judicial review of FLRA arbitration decisions in both the courts of appeals and the district courts. The court also held that the FLRA did not violate a clear statutory prohibition by vacating the arbitrator's award and its own prior decisions. The court vacated the district court's orders and instructed it to dismiss the complaint. View "American Federation of Government Employees v. FLRA" on Justia Law

Johannes and Linda Lamprecht, Swiss citizens who lived in the United States in 2006 and 2007, underreported their taxable income by falsely claiming they had no foreign bank accounts. In reality, they had millions in a Swiss bank, UBS. The couple amended their tax returns for 2006 and 2007 in 2010, after the United States served a John Doe Summons on UBS in 2008, seeking information about unknown taxpayers who might have failed to report taxable income in UBS accounts. The amended returns reported taxable income in the previously undisclosed UBS accounts, increasing their tax liability by approximately $2.5 million. The couple paid these back taxes, but in 2014, the IRS informed them they would be penalized for their original inaccuracies, and in 2015, issued a formal “notice of deficiency” assessing about $500,000 in penalties.The Lamprechts challenged these penalties in the United States Tax Court, arguing that the IRS didn’t follow the tax code’s procedures when it first decided to penalize them, that they deserved protections for voluntarily fixing their own mistake before the IRS acted, and that the statute of limitations for assessing accuracy penalties had run on the two tax years. The tax court granted summary judgment to the IRS.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the tax court's decision. The court found that the IRS had complied with the statutory requirement for a supervisor's written approval for the penalty assessment. The court also ruled that the Lamprechts' corrected returns did not protect them from penalties because they were filed after a John Doe Summons was issued. Lastly, the court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the assessment of penalties because the John Doe Summons extended the statute-of-limitations period. View "Lamprecht v. Cmsnr. IRS" on Justia Law

In 2016, Jesse Benton, a political operative, received funds from Roman Vasilenko, a foreign national, and contributed those funds to a fundraiser supporting then-Presidential candidate Donald Trump. Benton was subsequently convicted of six felonies related to the unlawful contribution and related campaign finance filings. Benton appealed his conviction on several grounds, including challenges to the government’s decision to prosecute campaign finance crimes under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the admissibility of an earlier pardoned conviction, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the jury charge.The District Court denied Benton's motion to dismiss the charges, ruling that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act could be applied to false campaign finance filings. The court also allowed the admission of Benton's earlier pardoned conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and its use at sentencing. After a three-day jury trial, Benton was found guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to eighteen months' incarceration and twenty-four months' supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the government had discretion to prosecute under either the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). The court also found no error in the district court's admission of Benton's pardoned conviction under Rule 404(b) and declined to review Benton's challenge to the use of the pardoned conviction at sentencing. Finally, the court rejected Benton's challenges to the jury instructions, finding that any error was invited by Benton himself. View "United States v. Benton" on Justia Law