Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1963, the Republic of Guinea entered into an agreement with Halco establishing the Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée (CBG) for the purpose of developing Guinea's rich bauxite mines. Nanko filed suit against Alcoa, alleging breach of the CBG Agreement, asserting that it was a third-party beneficiary thereof, and another for racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C.1981. Nanko later added Halco as a defendant and asserted an additional claim against Alcoa for tortious interference with contractual relations. The district court dismissed the case under Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join Guinea as a required Rule 19 party. The court concluded that the district court's Rule 19 holding failed to fully grapple with Nanko's allegations and that those allegations, accepted as true, state a claim for racial discrimination under section 1981. The court reasoned that, insofar as the existing parties' interests are concerned, evidence of Guinea's actions, views, or prerogatives can be discovered and introduced where relevant to the parties' claims and defenses even if Guinea remained a nonparty. At this stage in the pleadings, the court did not believe that the allegations could be reasonably read to show that Guinea was a necessary party. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Nanko Shipping, USA v. Alcoa" on Justia Law

ABM petitioned for review of the Board's determination that the Union's effort to represent the workers who handle airline baggage was governed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., and not the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq. The court concluded that the Board violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(a), by applying a new test to determine whether the RLA applies, without explaining its reasons for doing so. Because an agency's unexplained departure from precedent was arbitrary and capricious, the court vacated the Board's order. In this case, the court held that the Board was not free to simply adopt the NMB's new approach without offering a reasoned explanation for that shift. The court explained that an agency cannot avoid its duty to explain a departure from its own precedent simply by pointing to another agency's unexplained departure from precedent. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, denied the Board's cross-application for enforcement, and vacated the order, remanding for further proceedings. View "ABM Onsite Services - West, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

29 of the bargaining unit's 54 employees had signed a decertification petition asking Scomas to withdraw recognition from the Union immediately if the petitioners make up 50% or more of the bargaining unit. Unaware that six employees had revoked their signatures, Scomas withdrew recognition from the Union. Consequently, the Union filed an unfair labor practice with the Board, and the Board ruled in favor of the Union. Scomas petitioned for review of the Board's order to recognize and bargain with the Union. The court concluded that Scomas violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. However, the court concluded that the Board abused its discretion in imposing a bargaining order. In this case, far from being deliberate or calculated, the court determined that Scomas's violation was unintentional and the company acted in good faith on a facially valid decertification petition. Because the bargaining order does not further the Act's purposes, the court granted the petition for review, denied the cross-application for enforcement, and vacated the bargaining order, remanding to the Board for the determination of a new remedy. View "Scomas of Sausalito v. NLRB" on Justia Law

North Dakota filed a motion to modify an injunction governing the Northwest Area Water Supply Project, but the district court stated that North Dakota did not present either changes in law or facts sufficient to warrant modifying the injunction and summarily denied the motion. The court concluded that, without a more nuanced explanation, the district court's acceptance of nonmovants' arguments in toto constituted an abuse of discretion. The court further concluded that North Dakota met its burden of presenting two significant changed circumstances that warranted modifying the 2005 injunction, and also requested a modification suitably tailored to those circumstances. First, issuance of the final supplemental Environmental Impact Statement and record of decision constituted a significant change, and second, the increase in arsenic levels over the course of the injunction's lifespan constituted a significant change. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to grant the motion. View "Government of the Province of Manitoba v. Zinke" on Justia Law

Defendants were arrested after interrupting an oral argument session of the United States Supreme Court. On appeal, defendants challenged their conviction under 40 U.S.C. 6134, the statue that prohibits making a "harangue" or "oration" in the Supreme Court building. The district court struck the words "harangue" and "oration" from section 6134 as unconstitutionally vague, and the Government appealed. The court concluded that the district court erred in striking these words as unconstitutionally vague where the core meaning of these words was delivering speeches of various kinds to persons within the Supreme Court's building and grounds, in a manner that threatens to disturb the operations and decorum of the Court. In the context of the Supreme Court's building and grounds, the court explained that the terms' core meaning proscribes determinable conduct. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Bronstein" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant after he was terminated from his position as a cook, alleging that defendant retaliated against him for his previous complaints under Section 11(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. 660(c); under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C 12101 et seq.; and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623(d). The court rejected plaintiff's claim that defendant fired him in retaliation for his filing of a complaint with OSHA, and declined to recognize a new implied cause of action under Section 11(c). The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that defendant's stated reason for firing plaintiff was a pretext for retaliation. In this case, the record lacks any direct or indirect evidence of retaliation. Rather, the record contained a plethora of evidence supporting defendant's stated reason for firing plaintiff: 13 violations of company policy. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Johnson v. Interstate Management" on Justia Law

The Secretary and the State of Wyoming appealed the district court's judgment vacating a rule delisting the gray wolf in Wyoming as a protected species. The Secretary and the State principally argued that the district court erred by failing to defer to the Service's reasonable interpretation of "regulatory mechanisms" to include the State's management plan for a wolf population buffer, which although not itself legally binding, was a practical entailment of the State's statutory population minima. Environmental groups cross-appealed the district court's conclusions that the Rule includes adequate provisions on genetic connectivity between wolf subpopulations and did not imperil the wolves in a "significant portion" of their range. The court concluded that the record demonstrated that the Service reasonably and adequately responded to concerns about the reliability of Wyoming's management plan, and that the district court did not err by rejecting the Environmental groups' contentions. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment vacating the Rule and otherwise affirmed. View "Defenders of Wildlife v. Zinke" on Justia Law

FedEx petitioned for review of the Board's conclusion that single-route FedEx drivers based at the Hartford, Connecticut terminal were "employees" under the National Labor Relation Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. In FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB (FedEx I), 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009), this court held that single-route FedEx drivers working out of Wilmington, Massachusetts were independent contractors, not employees, as the latter term was defined in the Act. The court concluded that this current case was materially indistinguishable from FedEx I; the Hartford single-route FedEX drivers were independent contractors to whom the Act's protections for collective action did not apply; and the court granted FedEx's petitions, vacated the Board's orders, and denied the Board's cross-appeal for enforcement. View "FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB" on Justia Law

In 2011, EPA issued policy letters that explained and arguably changed two EPA policies with respect to publicly owned water treatment facilities. A group representing interests of municipalities prevailed in the Eighth Circuit on their challenge to the new EPA policy letters. In 2013, EPA made statements indicating that it would not acquiesce in or follow the Eighth Circuit's decision outside of that circuit. Petitioner filed suit raising multiple challenges to EPA's non-acquiescence statement's legality. The court explained that the non-acquiescence letter merely articulates how EPA will interpret the Eighth Circuit's decision. To the extent petitioner seeks to directly challenge EPA's non-acquiescence statement, it must first sue in district court under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 702-704. To the extent petitioner seeks to directly challenge the 2011 policy letters, petitioner was well outside the 120-day window to directly challenge the letters in this court. To the extent petitioner believed EPA was violating the Eighth Circuit's mandate, the proper course of action was to seek mandamus or other appropriate relief in the Eighth Circuit. Accordingly, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to directly review EPA's non-acquiescence statement and dismissed the petition. View "Center for Regulatory Reasonableness v. EPA" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to failing to register with local authorities under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. 16901 et seq. Defendant first argued that insofar as the Attorney General took steps before defendant's alleged SORNA violation to "specify" the act's application to pre-SORNA offenders, those efforts were defective under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. Second, defendant argued that Congress's vesting the Attorney General with such authority violated the constitutional rule against undue delegation of legislative authority. The court explained that all the other geographic circuits have addressed the nondelegation claim and have rejected it. The court need not reach the delegation issue based on its conclusion regarding the APA claims. Concluding that the act did not apply to pre-SORNA offenders at the time of defendant's charged conduct because of the Attorney General's APA violations, the court reversed the district court ruling and vacated the conviction. View "United States v. Ross" on Justia Law