Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Government sought to recover a $1.3 million judgment debt pursuant to the Federal Debt Collect Procedures Act (FDCPA), 28 U.S.C. 3001 et seq., by garnishing funds owed to WDG, a company T. Conrad Monts and his wife owned as tenants by the entireties. The court reversed the district court's holding that Monts had a sufficient property interest in WDG’s assets to permit garnishing them under the FDCPA in satisfaction of his debts. The court remanded for the district court to evaluate the Government’s alternative argument that it may garnish WDG’s assets by piercing the corporate veil between WDG and Monts. View "United States v. TDC Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

Trent M. Coburn pled not guilty to marijuana use in non-judicial proceedings related to a positive drug test, but was found guilty and received a negative non-commissioned officer evaluation report based on the offense. The Army subsequently denied Coburn continued Army Service. In Coburn I, the court remanded to the ABCMR so it could provide a reasoned explanation (if possible) for several questions the court could not resolve. Since then, the ABCMR has issued a new opinion in response to the court's remand, affirming the decision to terminate Coburn’s Medical Evaluation Board and proceed with his discharge. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the ABCMR’s conclusions. Therefore, the court affirmed the ABCMR’s decision to terminate Coburn’s disability processing and its conclusion that Coburn’s medical conditions did not warrant further medical review. View "Coburn v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Defendants Thaxton Young, Jesse Young, and Gerry Burnett challenged their convictions for conspiring to distribute heroin in Washington, D.C. Defendants raised numerous issues on appeal. The court concluded that the district court should not have based Burnett's sentence, in part, on conduct that occurred before he joined the conspiracy. Because the error was plain where Burnett would have been sentenced to a lower base offense level, the court reversed and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed the judgments of convictions and sentence in all other respects. View "United States v. Burnett" on Justia Law

Defendants Williams, Edwards, and Bowman appealed their convictions for participating in a cocaine distribution scheme. Defendants challenged their convictions on multiple grounds. The court held that the district court erred in admitting portions of Agent Bevington’s lay opinion testimony and that this error was not harmless. Therefore, the court reversed Williams’s conviction and remanded his case to the district court for further proceedings. The court did not reach Williams’s other challenges to his conviction other than to hold that the district court did not err in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal. The court affirmed the remaining judgments of conviction. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

CEI appealed the district court's dismissal of its Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, action against OSTP. CEI argued that the district court improperly ruled that documents which might otherwise be government records for FOIA purposes need not be searched for or turned over to the requestor because the head of the defendant agency maintained the putative records on a private email account in his name at a site other than the government email site which the agency had searched. The court agreed with CEI that an agency cannot shield its records from search or disclosure under FOIA by the expedient of storing them in a private email account controlled by the agency head. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Office of Science and Technology Policy" on Justia Law

The Tennis Channel filed a complaint alleging that Comcast violated Section 616 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 536, by giving preferential treatment to its affiliated networks in programming tier placement. Tennis Channel prevailed before the FCC, but the district court held that the Commission and Tennis Channel had failed to identify substantial evidence of unlawful discrimination based on affiliation (Tennis I). On remand, the Commission resolved the entirety of Tennis Channel’s complaint in Comcast’s favor and denied Tennis Channel’s petition for further proceedings. The court concluded that Tennis Channel fails to show that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it interpreted Tennis I consistently with that administrative law precedent; under the circumstances, the Commission correctly concluded that Tennis I left no room for it to find discrimination on the existing administrative record; and Tennis Channel’s reliance on Section 402(h) is misplaced. Regarding the request for further briefing, because the Commission correctly determined that Tennis I concluded the administrative record contained insufficient evidence to support a finding of Section 616 discrimination by Comcast, the Commission’s rejection of Tennis Channel’s request for further briefing was hardly a clear abuse of discretion. The Commission already had the opportunity to review the record evidence that Tennis Channel claimed in its petition for further proceedings was critical to showing affiliate discrimination. Regarding the request to reopen the record to allow submission of additional evidence, although the Commission’s explanation for denying Tennis Channel’s request was brief, it was sufficient. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "The Tennis Channel, Inc. v. FCC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the government violated various federal statutes by allowing Cape Wind's offshore energy project to move through the regulatory approval process. The Bureau allegedly violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), the Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1337(p), the National Historic Preservation Act, 54 U.S.C. 306108, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. 703(a). The Bureau and the United States Coast Guard allegedly violated the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-241, 414, 120, Stat. 516, 540 (2006). The Fish and Wildlife Service allegedly violated the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1538. The district court rejected most of plaintiffs' claims and granted partial summary judgment to the government agencies. The district court then rejected plaintiffs’ remaining claims, granted summary judgment, and dismissed the case. The court reversed the district court’s judgment that the Bureau’s environmental impact statement complied with NEPA and that the Service’s incidental take statement complied with the Endangered Species Act, and the court vacated both statements. The court affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing plaintiffs' remaining claims, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Public Employees v. Hopper" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of the Assistant Secretary's orders modifying the application of mandatory mine safety standards to their respective mines. Petitioners contend that the orders contain three conditions unnecessary to ensure adequate mine safety, thus making them arbitrary and capricious. Section 101(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act), 30 U.S.C. 801 et seq., permits modification if an equally effective alternative exists or if the standard itself negatively affects mine safety. These six petitions for review involve MSHA’s “permissibility” requirements, which, in general, mandate that certain equipment located in certain mine areas be approved by MSHA. Petitioners seek to use non-permissible electronic surveying equipment (NPESE) in locations where use of the equipment was otherwise off-limits. Because the challenged orders involve an area within the Assistant Secretary's expertise, and because they are supported by substantial evidence and a reasoned explanation, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Rosebud Mining Co. v. MSHA" on Justia Law

The Public Health Service Act (PHSA), 42 U.S.C. 201, establishes coverage requirements for all health insurance plans except those it deems “excepted benefits.” The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 26 U.S.C. 5000A(a), updated the PHSA’s coverage requirements and mandated that all applicable individuals maintain “minimum essential coverage.” The ACA left intact and incorporated the PHSA’s rules regarding excepted benefits. In May 2014, HHS announced its plan “to amend the criteria for fixed indemnity insurance to be treated as an excepted benefit” in the individual health insurance market. On top of the requirements codified in the PHSA, HHS added another. To be an “excepted benefit,” the plan may be “provided only to individuals who have . . . minimum essential coverage.” Several providers challenged the rule as an impermissible interpretation of the PHSA, and after a hearing, the district court permanently enjoined HHS’s enforcement of the rule under Chevron Step One. The court affirmed the district court's permanent injunction because HHS lacked authority to demand more of fixed indemnity providers than Congress required. View "Central United Life Ins. v. Burwell" on Justia Law

West Virginia filed suit challenging the President’s determination not to enforce certain controversial provisions of the Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. 300gg-22(a)(1), for a transitional period. That decision, implemented by a letter from the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, left the responsibility to enforce or not to enforce these provisions to the States, and West Virginia objects to being put in that position. The district court concluded that West Virginia lacked standing. The court agreed, rejecting the State's claim that requiring the States to assume the political responsibility of deciding whether or not to implement a federal statute supposedly creates an injury-in-fact. The court concluded that there is simply no support for this extraordinary claim. The court stated that the State's injury is nothing more than the political discomfort in having the responsibility to determine whether to enforce or not – and thereby annoying some West Virginia citizens whatever way it decides. And no court has ever recognized political discomfort as an injury-in-fact. Even assuming that the administration’s action created a theoretical breach of State sovereignty, West Virginia nevertheless lacks a concrete injury-in-fact. Finally, the court rejected West Virginia's argument that any party, whether or not a governmental entity, has standing to challenge a delegation from the government to carry out a governmental responsibility. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "State of West Virginia v. HHS" on Justia Law