Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mohamed Tawid Al-Saffy, an Egyptian-American Muslim employed by the Foreign Agricultural Service, filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging that the Agriculture and State Departments each discriminated against him based on religion and national origin, and retaliated against him for filing an EEO complaint. The district court granted summary judgment to the government. The court concluded that, because Title VII requires final agency action to notify the employee of his right to appeal and the governing time limitation, the order dismissing the 2012 Complaint did not trigger the ninety-day deadline for Al-Saffy to file suit. Instead, given the lack of timely final action by the agency, Al-Saffy could have and did file a civil action more than 180 days after the filing of the 2012 Complaint with the agency. Therefore, Al-Saffy’s October 10, 2013 filing in district court thus preserved his claims from the 2012 Complaint. The court also concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the government on Al-Saffy's claims against the State Department because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Al-Saffy had an employment relationship with the State Department within the meaning of Title VII, and whether Al-Saffy knew about the State Department’s alleged role in discrimination against him prior to 2013. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Al-Saffy v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Until recently, incumbent public utilities were free to include in their tariffs and agreements “the option to construct any new transmission facilities in their particular service areas, even if the proposal for new construction came from a third party.” The Commission ordered utilities to remove rights of first refusal from their existing tariffs and agreements. In S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, the court upheld the Commission's removal mandate. Under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, FERC must presume a contract rate for wholesale energy is just and reasonable and cannot set aside the rate unless it is contrary to the public interest. The Commission had reserved judgment on whether to apply this presumption to the rights of first refusal until evaluating the individual utilities’ compliance filings. The court also reserved judgment. Petitioners seek review of FERC's determination at the compliance stage, urging that the Commission erred in concluding that Mobile-Sierra does not in fact protect their rights of first refusal contained in their Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) Membership Agreement. The court held that the Commission painted with a broader brush than necessary in applying potentially applicable Supreme Court precedent, but the court denied the petition nonetheless because nothing in the Mobile-Sierra doctrine requires its extension to the anticompetitive rights of first refusal at issue here. View "Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Alaska Native tribes filed suit against the Department, challenging the regulation implementing the prohibition barring the Department from taking land into trust for Indian tribes in Alaska. After the district court held that the Department’s interpretation was contrary to law, the Department, following notice and comment, revised its regulations and dismissed its appeal. Alaska intervened and now seeks to prevent any new efforts by the United States to take tribal land to trust within the State's borders. In this case, Alaska intervened in the district court as a defendant and brought no independent claim for relief. The court concluded that once the Department rescinded the Alaska exception, this case became moot. Even assuming, as Alaska argues, that the district court’s interpretation of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), 43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., injured the State, such injury cannot extend the court's jurisdiction by creating a new controversy on appeal. Accordingly, the court dismissed Alaska's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Akiachak Native Community v. DOI" on Justia Law

SFPP and several shippers challenged aspects of three of FERC's orders related to filings by SFPP for cost-of-service tariffs on its pipelines. SFPP disputes FERC’s choice of data for calculating SFPP’s return on equity and the Commission’s decision to grant only a partial indexed rate for the 2009 index year. Shippers claim that FERC’s tax allowance policy for partnership pipelines, such as SFPP, is arbitrary or capricious and results in unjust and unreasonable rates. The court concluded that FERC's choice of data for assessing SFPP's real return on equity was arbitrary or capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), because the Commission provided no reasoned basis to justify its decision to rely on the September 2008 data. Therefore, the court granted SFPP's petition on this issue. The court concluded that FERC's indexing analysis was not arbitrary or capricious where FERC complied with the plain text of its regulations when it found that granting SFPP a full indexed rate adjustment would result in unjust and unreasonable rates. Finally, the court also concluded that FERC must demonstrate that there is no double recovery of taxes for partnership pipelines. Accordingly, the court granted SFPP's petition in part and denied the petition in part. The court granted Shippers' petition and vacated FERC's orders with respect to the double recovery issue, and remanded to FERC. View "United Airlines, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

NFB filed suit challenging the DOT's rule requiring that air carriers begin to purchase ticketing kiosks accessible to blind persons within three years of the rule taking effect so that 25 per cent of kiosks eventually will be blind-accessible. The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. 46110(a) because the rule is an “order” over which the court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction. The district court did not dismiss the complaint, but instead, transferred it to this court re-styled as a petition for review. NFB subsequently filed a notice of appeal - which the court construed as a petition for a writ of mandamus - challenging the district court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction. The court concluded that section 46110(a) includes review of DOT rulemakings. The court did not reach NFB’s arguments on the merits because the court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction of NFB’s complaint and that reasonable grounds do not excuse NFB’s untimely filing. View "National Fed. of the Blind v. DOT" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a citizen of Burkina Faso, filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552, after DHS failed to disclose many of the immigration documents he had requested and gave no particularized explanation for its withholding decision. Shortly after plaintiff filed suit, the Department reversed course and spontaneously released a number of previously withheld documents, while offering a heavily revamped explanation for its remaining withholdings. The district court dismissed the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the only live FOIA decision now under review is the one the Department chose to make for the first time in litigation, and for which there was no administrative avenue to exhaust. Once the government abandoned its original FOIA decision, the dispute between the parties centered on the correctness of the Department’s materially novel and different in-court disclosure decision. View "Bayala v. DHS" on Justia Law

The Associations filed suit under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., challenging the Commission’s decision authorizing Freeport to redesign its liquefied natural gas terminal in Texas to support export operations. The court held that the Associations have standing to press their challenges to the Commission’s orders and that their case is not moot. However, the court denied the petition on the merits. The court concluded that, to the extent the Associations complain about the environmental consequences of exporting natural gas from Freeport’s terminal, those objections should be raised in the pending challenge to the Department of Energy’s order authorizing Freeport to export natural gas. The court found no error in the Commissions analysis of the non-export-related environmental consequences of Freeport's proposal that would rise to the level of arbitrary and capricious decision-making. Accordingly, the court rejected the Associations' challenges. View "Sierra Club, et al v. FERC" on Justia Law

Sierra Club filed suit under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., seeking review of the Commission's authorization of an increase in production capacity at a liquefied natural gas terminal in Louisiana. The court concluded that Sierra Club has standing but that its challenges to the Commission’s orders fail on the merits, largely for the reasons stated in the companion case, Sierra Club v. FERC (Freeport), No. 14-1275 (D.C. Cir June 28, 2016). The court also concluded that the court otherwise lacks jurisdiction over challenges to the Commission’s cumulative impacts analysis because Sierra Club failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court dismiss the petition in part and denied the petition in part. View "Sierra Club v. FERC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Authority, alleging disability discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment to the Authority. The court concluded that the district court erred by focusing on only the first definition of "disability" and failed to consider whether plaintiff met either the record-of-impairment or regarded-as-impaired definitions of disability. Compounding the error, the district court also applied an outmoded statutory standard, overlooking material changes to the governing law worked by the 2008 Amendments. Given the legal standard prescribed by the 2008 Amendments, the court held that petitioner came forward with sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that his alcoholism substantially limited major life activities compared to most people in the general population. Furthermore, petitioner's complaint was timely filed under both the three-year and one-year limitations periods provided by District law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Alexander v. WMATA" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a former pilot with Spirit Airlines, challenges the DoT's refusal to consent to the release of the urine sample it says petitioner produced for a mandatory drug test. Because the sample tested positive for controlled substances, petitioner lost his job and airman medical certificate. The court held that neither the DoT’s general rule against releasing urine samples for DNA testing, nor its refusal to release the sample in this case, is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-132, 105 Stat. 952. The court also held that petitioner's constitutional challenges to the rule fail. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Swaters v. DOT" on Justia Law