Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After defendant was found guilty of the lesser-included offense of possession with intent to distribute a detectable amount of PCP, he appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. The court concluded that defendant was seized when the officer touched him and instructed him to "hold on" and defendant complied. In this case, no reasonable person in defendant’s position and subject to the officer's directives would have believed that he was free to go on about his business. The Government asserts that defendant walked quickly toward a certain neighborhood, made furtive gestures, and recognized the police. Based on the facts on the record, the court concluded that the officers had no reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying their stop of defendant. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Castle" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiring with her boyfriend to extort money from a prominent doctor with whom defendant had previously had an affair. The district court denied defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, holding that defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to introduce expert testimony on battered woman syndrome. The district court therefore did not need to (and did not) decide whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. The court concluded, however, that defendant was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to introduce expert testimony on battered woman syndrome. In this case, the duress instruction would have given jurors a legal basis upon which to vote not guilty, and the expert testimony on battered woman syndrome would have supported both elements of defendant’s duress defense. The factors here add up to a reasonable probability that the jury would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt if expert testimony on battered woman syndrome had been presented at defendant’s trial. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to decide whether counsel was constitutionally deficient in failing to present such testimony. View "United States v. Nwoye" on Justia Law

Defendants Knight and Thorpe were convicted of charges related to the kidnapping and burglary of a couple. The U.S. Attorney’s Office in the District of Columbia prosecutes both federal offenses and most D.C. Code offenses. It may prosecute combined federal and D.C. Code charges in either U.S. District Court or D.C. Superior Court. The court concluded that there was no Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(b), violation. In this case, because the January arrests were for D.C. Code offenses, those arrests did not trigger the Speedy Trial Act’s 30-day clock. Therefore, the court affirmed as to the Speedy Trial Act issue. The court affirmed Thorpe's sentence and concluded that his sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. Finally, the court remanded for the district court to address Knight’s and Thorpe’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the first instance. View "United States v. Knight" on Justia Law

Aggregate Industries transferred work from one bargaining unit to another over the objections of the union representing both units. The ALJ found that because the company had bargained over the issue to impasse, it was entitled to make the change unilaterally. The Board held, however, that the company had merely transferred work and thus it had changed the scope of the bargaining unit. Therefore, the Board determined that the company no right to insist that the union bargain over the issue. The Board also held that even if the company had merely transferred work, it had not given the union a fair chance to bargain. The court disagreed and granted the petition for review and denied the application for enforcement of all aspects of the Board’s order addressing the company’s decision to transfer material hauling work. In this case, because the company had the right to unilaterally transfer material hauling work, the union acted improperly when it refused to fill the company’s dispatch order. Under Article 3 of the Ready-Mix Agreement, Aggregate therefore had the right to hire anyone it wanted, including its own drivers. Thus, Aggregate did not engage in unlawful direct dealing when it made its proposal to the construction drivers. The court upheld the Board's decision in a collateral matter. View "Aggregate Indus. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Defendants plead guilty to conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbing a liquor store in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. Defendants argued that undercover police officers instigated the use of firearms in the reverse sting operation leading to their arrest. The court concluded that the district court did not err in applying the five-level enhancement under USSG 2B3.1(b)(2) for possession of a firearm where the actual possession of a firearm is not a prerequisite to application of the enhancement for inchoate offenses, such as the robbery conspiracy in this case. Furthermore, the record amply supports the district court’s finding that defendants intended that firearms would be possessed during the robbery and that such possession was reasonably foreseeable. The court agreed with defendants, however, that the case must be remanded for the district court to address whether the alleged police introduction of firearms into the conspiracy was sentencing entrapment. Finally, the court found no merit in defendant Hopkins' other challenges. View "United States v. McKeever" on Justia Law

After petitioner was charged with violating FAA regulations while on board a flight, including interfering with crewmember duties, the ALJ rejected petitioner's claim that a medical emergency caused his erratic behavior. The charges stemmed from petitioner's actions on the flight where he thought he was in love with another passenger and would not follow crewmember instructions to stop talking to her and leave her alone. The court rejected amicus's argument and concluded that it had no doubt that proscribing passenger interference with crewmember duties satisfies the “minimum nexus” to safety in flight required by Bargmann v. Helms; the FAA has authority to impose civil penalties on passengers under 49 U.S.C. 46301(a)(5)(A) where the term "individual" applies to the common sense understanding that the term refers to a natural person; the Agency did not improperly add omitted violations to the amended notice and thus petitioner did not receive inadequate notice of the violations; and the court rejected petitioner's arguments regarding the Administrator's determination that petitioner violated the Interference Rule and the Seatbelt Rules. Because the court found no merit in petitioner's challenges, the court denied the petition for review. View "Wallaesa v. FAA" on Justia Law

The Companies, operators of nursing homes, petitioned for review of the Board's determination that the Companies violated the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., by engaging in bad-faith bargaining with the Union. The Companies challenged two of the remedies the Board imposed: reimbursement of litigation costs incurred by both the Board and the Union during Board proceedings; and reimbursement of “all” of the negotiation expenses the Union incurred during its bargaining sessions with the Companies. The court concluded that the Board lacks authority to require the reimbursement of litigation costs incurred during Board proceedings. The court held, however, that the Board may require an employer to reimburse a union’s bargaining expenses pursuant to its remedial authority under section 10(c) of the Act. The court also concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Companies’ alternative challenge to the amount of the bargaining-costs award because they failed to raise it before the Board. Accordingly, the court granted the Companies’ joint petition in part and granted the Board’s cross-application for enforcement in part. View "Camelot Terrace, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, four retired correctional officers, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the District deprived them of their federal right under the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA), 18 U.S.C. 926C, to carry a concealed weapon. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs allege that they meet the statutory requirements but have been unable to obtain firearms training because the District of Columbia has refused to certify that, as correctional officers, they had a statutory power of arrest. The court held that, taken together, the LEOSA’s plain text, purpose, and context show that Congress intended to create a concrete, individual right to benefit individuals like plaintiffs and that is within “the competence of the judiciary to enforce.” The court, applying de novo review, held that the complaint states a claim under section 1983. In this case, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the federal right they seek to enjoy has been unlawfully deprived by the District to be remediable under Section 1983. Further, plaintiffs allege that the District’s actions resulting from its erroneous interpretation of how the LEOSA applies to these facts have deprived them of their federally established concealed-carry right. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Duberry v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Levoleucovorin is better known by the brand-name Fusilev, which Spectrum has sold since 2008 for the purpose of counteracting liver damage during a type of chemotherapy known as methotrexate therapy. Under the Orphan Drug Act amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 360aa-ee, intended to increase incentives for companies to develop new orphan drugs, Spectrum received exclusive marketing rights to the Methotrexate Indications for seven years. Spectrum then received approval from FDA to market Fusilev for an altogether new use: helping patients with advanced colorectal cancer to manage their pain. Two days after Spectrum’s exclusivity period expired for the Methotrexate Indications, Sandoz received FDA approval to market a generic version of levoleucovorin for the Methotrexate Indications. Spectrum argued that Sandoz’s sole intended use of the generic was to treat patients with colorectal cancer, even though the label provided for use only in patients undergoing methotrexate therapy. The district court granted summary judgment against Spectrum. FDA concluded that it need look no further than the use indicated in Sandoz’s abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) to make certain the generic drug will not trench on the prior grant of exclusivity to Spectrum. The court agreed and found FDA's interpretation of the Orphan Drug Act reasonable. The statute does not unambiguously foreclose FDA's interpretation that “for such disease or condition” refers only to the uses included on a drug’s label. The court noted that, to the extent FDA has discretion in choosing how best to implement the Orphan Drug Act, it is up to the agency to strike the balance between the congressional policy goals of drug affordability and innovation. The court rejected Spectrum's remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Spectrum Pharm., Inc. v. Burwell" on Justia Law

The Service listed three antelope species – the scimitar-horned oryx, addax, and dama gazelle – as endangered. On the same day that the Service designated the antelope species as endangered, it issued a blanket exemption for qualifying domestic entities and individuals that breed the antelope species in captivity. The district court determined that the Captive-Bred Exemption violated Section 10(c) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq. President Obama then signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. G, tit. I, 127, 128 Stat. 5, 315-16 (Section 127), which reinstated the Captive-Bred Exemption. Friends of Animals filed suit alleging that the Reinstatement Rule violates the Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706, and that Section 127 violates the United States Constitution. The district court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment and denied Friends of Animals' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that, under FEC v. Akins, Friends of Animals has informational standing to pursue its claims, so there is no jurisdictional impediment to this lawsuit. The court rejected Friends of Animals' claims on the merits, concluding that Congress acted within its constitutional bounds when it passed Section 127. Therefore, the court concluded that there can be no doubt that the Service was fully authorized to reinstate the Captive-Bred Exemption. View "Friends of Animals v. Jewell" on Justia Law