Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

NTCH challenges the FCC's Memorandum Order and Reconsideration Order approving the transfer of radio spectrum licenses to Verizon, granting Verizon forbearance from a statutory provision, and refusing to initiate proceedings to revoke other licenses held by Verizon. Verizon intervened in support of the FCC. The court rejected NTCH's claims and concluded that the FCC’s decision not to initiate proceedings to revoke Verizon’s licenses is not subject to judicial review; any questions about the licenses Verizon obtained before the Spectrum Assignment are not properly before the court; NTCH’s challenge to the FCC’s grant of prospective forbearance is moot because no foreign entity now has any ownership of Verizon; and the Commission’s determination that the Spectrum Assignment was in the public interest was reasonable and therefore survives arbitrary and capricious review. View "NTCH, Inc. v. FCC" on Justia Law

After two warrantless searches of his home by MPD members, plaintiff filed suit against the District and individual MPD officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court concluded that, even assuming, without deciding, that the initial sweep of plaintiff's home by the MPD Emergency Response Team (ERT) was justified under the exigent circumstances and emergency aid exceptions to the warrant requirement, the second top-to-bottom search by the Explosive Ordinance Disposal Unit (EOD) after the MPD had been on the scene for several hours was not. In this case, the MPD had already secured the area and determined that no one else was inside plaintiff's home and that there were no dangerous or illegal items in plain sight; plaintiff had previously surrendered peacefully to MPD custody; and the information the MPD had about plaintiff failed to provide an objectively reasonable basis for believing there was an exigent need to break in plaintiff's home a second time to search for hazardous materials. And assuming, without deciding, that the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement applies to a home, the court concluded that the scope of the second search far exceeded what that exception would allow. Because the law was clearly established at the time that the law enforcement officers must have an objectively reasonable basis for believing an exigency justifies a warrantless search of a home, and because no reasonable officer could have concluded such a basis existed for the second more intrusive search, the court concluded that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity across the board. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Corrigan v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was terminated from his position as a police reserve officer for making harsh and accusatory statements to his superiors in emails with his co-workers cc’d. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that he was terminated in violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. The court concluded that, under Pickering v. Board of Education, plaintiff's emails are not protected under the First Amendment where his interest in sending them is outweighed by the police department’s interest in promoting office harmony and efficiency. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case and denial of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. View "LeFande v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in unlawful possession of a firearm and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). On appeal, defendant challenges the enhancement in light of Johnson v. United States. The court concluded that Maryland Robbery with a Deadly Weapon is a violent felony under the ACCA’s still-valid force clause and thus defendant's 188-month sentence remains legal and he is not entitled to a new sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Redrick" on Justia Law

After Charles Ramsey pleaded guilty to violating the conditions of his parole by committing a new drug offense in the 1990s, he filed a habeas corpus petition in which he argued that the plea agreement, as construed by the Southern District of West Virginia, terminated his parole or at least prohibited the Commission from using his 1990s offense to deny him credit for street time or for other parole-related purposes. The district court denied habeas relief. The court affirmed, rejecting Ramsey's reading of the plea agreement. In this case, the court concluded that nothing in the 2004 plea agreement or in Ramsey v. Felts terminated Ramsey’s parole, precluded revocation for future offenses or prohibited the Commission from using his 1995 cocaine offense to deny him credit for street time or to calculate his salient factor score. View "Ramsey v. USPC" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from the government's long-running Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961–68, case against the nation’s major cigarette manufacturers. The government alleged a conspiracy to deceive the American public about the dangers of cigarettes. The district court issued a comprehensive remedial order ten years ago. RJR sought to dissolve the order as void under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) and unjust under Rule 60(b)(6), but the district court denied the motion. The court explained that the Supreme Court made clear in United States Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, that relief under Rule 60(b)(4) is available “only in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process.” The court concluded that none of those defects exists in this case. The court also concluded that, although RJR could have challenged its remedial obligations under Rule 60(b)(6), it failed to do so. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of RJR's motion. View "United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc." on Justia Law

NCR seeks review of the Board's decision and order that NCR violated section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5) & (1), when it refused to bargain with the Union after a mail ballot election. The court concluded that the Board did not abuse its discretion in rejecting NCR’s objections to the conduct of the election; NCR’s objections to the election stem from a misreading of the Agreement and Notice, and from a disagreement with the Board’s policy on handling late-received ballots; the Board’s adherence to the parties’ stipulated agreements as to phrasing of the instructions and the ballot count date does not constitute an election irregularity; the Board was under no obligation to discuss the decisions on which NCR relies where the grounds for distinction are readily apparent; and absent an election irregularity resulting from the Board’s conduct of the election, the Board’s disenfranchisement precedent is inapplicable. The court also concluded that the Board’s interpretation, based on the balancing of conflicting interests in affording employees the broadest participation in election proceedings while still protecting against “delay and uncertainty,” is consistent with its precedent. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "NCR Corp. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of two Notices issued by FERC as part of ISO New England’s eighth forward-capacity market. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that FERC did not engage in collective, institutional action when it deadlocked on FCA 8’s rates. Consequently, the Notices describing the effects of that deadlock are not reviewable orders under the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824d-824e. View "Public Citizen, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

CalPortland seeks review of the Commission's decision ordering CalPortland to temporarily reinstate Jeffrey Pappas, pursuant to section 105(c)(2) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 815(c)(2), pending final order on Pappas’s underlying discrimination complaint currently pending before the Commission. The court concluded that the Commission’s order directing CalPortland to hire Pappas is immediately appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. Because the Commission’s temporary reinstatement order satisfies the requirements of the collateral order doctrine, the court has jurisdiction to hear this petition for review. The court also concluded that the text and structure of section 105(c)(2) of the Mine Act preclude the Commission from directing an owner or operator to temporarily “reinstate” a complainant who has never been employed by that owner or operator. Because Pappas was an “applicant for employment” who was not eligible for temporary reinstatement pending final order on his complaint, the court granted CalPortland’s petition for review and vacated the Commission’s decision and order. View "CalPortland Co., Inc. v. MSHR" on Justia Law

In the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. 5491, Congress established a new independent agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an independent agency headed not by a multi-member commission but rather by a single Director. PHH is a mortgage lender that was the subject of a CFPB enforcement action that resulted in a $109 million order against it. PHH seeks to vacate the order, arguing that the CFPB’s status as an independent agency headed by a single Director violates Article II of the Constitution. The court concluded that CFPB’s concentration of enormous executive power in a single, unaccountable, unchecked Director not only departs from settled historical practice, but also poses a far greater risk of arbitrary decisionmaking and abuse of power, and a far greater threat to individual liberty, than does a multi-member independent agency. The court noted that this new agency lacks that critical check and structural constitutional protection, yet wields vast power over the U.S. economy. The court concluded that, in light of the consistent historical practice under which independent agencies have been headed by multiple commissioners or board members, and in light of the threat to individual liberty posed by a single-Director independent agency, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States cannot be stretched to cover this novel agency structure. Therefore, the court held that the CFPB is unconstitutionally structured. To remedy the constitutional flaw, the court followed the Supreme Court’s precedents and simply severed the statute’s unconstitutional for-cause provision from the remainder of the statute. With the for-cause provision severed, the court explained that the President now will have the power to remove the Director at will, and to supervise and direct the Director. Because the CFPB as remedied will continue operating, the court addressed the statutory issues raised by PHH and agreed with PHH that Section 8 of the Act allows captive reinsurance arrangements so long as the amount paid by the mortgage insurer for the reinsurance does not exceed the reasonable market value of the reinsurance; CFPB’s order against PHH violated bedrock principles of due process; and the CFPB on remand still will have an opportunity to demonstrate that the relevant mortgage insurers in fact paid more than reasonable market value to the PHH-affiliated reinsurer for reinsurance, thereby making disguised payments for referrals in contravention of Section 8. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "PHH Corp. v. CFPB" on Justia Law