Justia U.S. D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Orchestra petitioned for review of the Board's ruling that musicians in the Lancaster, Pennsylvania, regional orchestra are employees and thus entitled to join a union. The court noted that, on the one hand, the Orchestra’s extensive control over the means and manner of musicians’ performance, the fact that musicians’ work forms part of the Orchestra’s regular business, the hourly pay, and the limited opportunities for entrepreneurial gain suggest, as the Board found, that the Orchestra’s musicians qualify as employees. On the other hand, the musicians’ high degree of skill, the limited amount of time they work for the Orchestra, and the parties’ beliefs regarding the nature of the relationship indicate that the Orchestra’s musicians are independent contractors. The court concluded that, in circumstances like this, the court must defer to the Board's conclusion when it is presented a choice between two fairly conflicting views. The court noted that there is no conflict with the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Lerohl v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia. Although the court there held that musicians who played for a symphony orchestra on a temporary basis were independent contractors, that case arose in a very different situation than the one here. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Lancaster Symphony Orchestra v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a foreign alien from Venezuela, seeks review of the TSA's determination that petitioner was a risk to aviation and national security, and denial of his application for FAA-certified flight school training. The Vara Declaration confirms that the internal agency materials express TSA’s reasoned, contemporaneous explanation for its decision. The internal agency materials, as illuminated by the Vara Declaration, offer a clear and reasonable statement of the grounds upon which TSA relied in denying petitioner’s application for flight training. Furthermore, the Declaration and the internal agency materials to which it refers are not impermissible post hoc rationalizations. Because petitioner and the court have a written statement explaining the grounds and rationale for TSA's action, and because the court found the agency action against petitioner was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, the court concluded that there is no need to remand the case for further review. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Olivares v. TSA" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a foreign alien from Venezuela, seeks review of the TSA's determination that petitioner was a risk to aviation and national security, and denial of his application for FAA-certified flight school training. The Vara Declaration confirms that the internal agency materials express TSA’s reasoned, contemporaneous explanation for its decision. The internal agency materials, as illuminated by the Vara Declaration, offer a clear and reasonable statement of the grounds upon which TSA relied in denying petitioner’s application for flight training. Furthermore, the Declaration and the internal agency materials to which it refers are not impermissible post hoc rationalizations. Because petitioner and the court have a written statement explaining the grounds and rationale for TSA's action, and because the court found the agency action against petitioner was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, the court concluded that there is no need to remand the case for further review. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Olivares v. TSA" on Justia Law

The Company challenged the Board's finding that the Company violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), for threatening an employee, as well as sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) for suspending and firing the employee. The Company principally contends that the Board misapplied the test in Wright Line, as articulated in Sutter East Bay Hospitals v. NLRB. The court concluded that Sutter East Bay is unhelpful to the Company, however, because evidence of an employer’s good faith belief suffices to meet the employer’s burden under Wright Line only if the employer acts on that belief as it normally would. Here, substantial evidence in the record supports the Board’s finding that the reasons given for suspending and firing the employee were pretextual because the Company’s conduct was not consistent with its policy and past practice. The court found the Company's remaining arguments unpersuasive. Accordingly, the court denied the petition and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement. View "Fort Dearborn Co. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

Appellants contend that the district court erred in denying their motions to suppress, relying on the court's subsequent decision in United States v. Glover. In Glover, the court reiterated the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between two of the grounds for suppression of wiretap evidence under 18 U.S.C. 2515. The court held that a wiretap order is "insufficient on its face," where it fails to identify the Justice Department official who approved the underlying application, as required by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 2518(4)(d). Accordingly, the court reversed the denial of the motions to suppress. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment, concluding that appellants' remaining contentions are meritless. View "United States v. Scurry" on Justia Law

The PACT Act, 15 U.S.C. 376a(a)(3)-(4), (d), prohibits the remote sale of cigarettes unless sales taxes have been paid in advance. Plaintiff, an enrolled member of the Seneca Indian tribe of New York State, operated a tobacco business in the Allegany Indian Territories and sold tobacco products from there across state lines. In 2010, plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of several sections of the PACT Act. The district court preliminarily enjoined the provisions and the court affirmed. The court found that plaintiff's closure of his business in the course of the litigation had not mooted the appeal, but observed that facts might later develop that had that effect. After remand, plaintiff renewed his pursuit of relief. The district court concluded that the case was moot and vacated the preliminary injunction because plaintiff stipulated that he had no intent to re-enter the business and the BATFE submitted a declaration stating that it had no intention of seeking or recommending enforcement action against plaintiff. The court concluded that, because plaintiff faces only a remote risk of federal prosecution or civil penalties, and any further merits decision would not shield him from the effects of possible state or local lawsuits, the case is moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gordon v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Under a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA), the government formally initiates prosecution but agrees to dismiss all charges if the defendant abides by negotiated conditions over a prescribed period of time. This case arises from the interplay between the operation of a DPA and the running of time limitations under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161-3174. In this case, after Fokker voluntarily disclosed its potential violation of federal sanctions and export control laws, the company and the government entered into an 18-month DPA, during which Fokker would continue cooperation with federal authorities and implementation of a substantial compliance program. In accordance with the DPA, the government filed criminal charges against the company, together with a joint motion to suspend the running of time under the Act pending assessment of the company’s adherence to the agreement’s conditions. The court held that the Act confers no authority in a court to withhold exclusion of time pursuant to a DPA based on concerns that the government should bring different charges or should charge different defendants. Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s denial of the joint motion to exclude time under the Act. The court granted the government’s petition for a writ of mandamus and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against NASA, his former employer, claiming unlawful discrimination. In plaintiff's first appeal, the court granted summary judgment to NASA on plaintiff's various claims of discrimination and retaliation over a six-year period. In this appeal, plaintiff alleges claims of discrimination and retaliation occurring between 1996-2004, under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791(b), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The court concluded that, without a disability within the meaning of the statute, or NASA regarding him as so impaired, plaintiff's claim of discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act fails. The court also concluded that plaintiff's Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims based on eight discrete events failed. Even assuming all of these events are actionable, there is no basis whatsoever for a reasonable jury to infer either discrimination or retaliation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to NASA in its entirety. View "Nurriddin v. Bolden" on Justia Law

This appeal concerns CityCenterDC, a large private development in the heart of Washington, D.C. At issue is whether the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. 3142(a), applies to the construction of CityCenterDC. In this case, the court concluded that the District of Columbia was not a party to the construction contracts for the building of CityCenterDC, and CityCenterDC is not a “public work.” Based on either of these two alternative and independent reasons, the court determined that the Davis-Bacon Act does not apply to the construction of CityCenterDC. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "District of Columbia v. DOL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and various D.C. statutes, seeking damages after officers shot and killed her dog while executing a search warrant. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officer who first shot the dog based on the grounds that plaintiff's eyewitness account of the shooting was uncorroborated and contradicted by other evidence. The court concluded that the district court improperly assumed the jury functions of making credibility determinations, weighing the evidence, and drawing legitimate inferences from the facts. Therefore, the court reversed and concluded that, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences most favorably to plaintiff, a jury could conclude that the officer acted unreasonably in shooting the dog. The court also reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the officers on plaintiff's claim that they violated the Fourth Amendment by unreasonably destroying her personal property during the shooting because this claim is intertwined with the dog's seizure. However, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to another officer who shot the dog, as well as to the District of Columbia. View "Robinson v. Pezzat" on Justia Law